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TEAM PROFILES
The Technical Report on the 2017/18 UEFA Champions League is the 14th of its kind. It aims to provide a permanent record of the 125 matches played in the group stage and the knockout rounds and, although space does not permit analysis of individual matches, to present an overview based on factual information and interpretation of statistics.

The report is backed by input from the team of UEFA technical observers who attended the matches played during the knockout stages of the competition, culminating in the final in Kyiv. The team pages related to the top 16 teams therefore contain additional remarks about playing styles and formations.

UEFA's team of technical observers during the 2017/18 season was formed by Cristian Chivu (Romania), Jerzy Engel (Poland), Stefan Majewski (Poland), Ginés Meléndez (Spain), Michael O'Neill (Northern Ireland), Peter Rudbæk (Denmark), Willi Ruttensteiner (Austria), Thomas Schaaf (Germany) and Gareth Southgate (England). David Moyes (Scotland) and Mixu Paatelainen (Finland) joined the team of observers at the final in Kyiv.

By highlighting tendencies and trends at the peak of professional club football, the aim is to provide a meaningful tool to the more than 160,000 coaches who hold a UEFA licence. It is hoped that the report may be helpful to coaches active in the development levels of the game in terms of working on the qualities needed by the players and coaches who will play roles in shaping the UEFA Champions League of the future.
Goals galore, stunning strikes and some unexpected early exits reinforced the UEFA Champions League’s capacity to surprise, but ultimately two giants of the competition came to the fore.
A season of prolific, record-setting goalscoring served to enhance the global appeal of the UEFA Champions League still further. It was therefore no surprise that the 96 group games included only four goalless draws. The element of surprise was that all four occurred in matches involving Spanish clubs: Barcelona twice and Atlético de Madrid twice. With Sevilla also playing out a brace of 0-0 results in the knockout rounds, Spain accounted for six of the season’s seven fixtures that failed to change the numerals on the scoreboard.

If eyebrows were raised by the statistic related to the country that has provided an unsurpassed total of 16 finalists over the last 25 years, they were also raised by the early elimination of Atlético de Madrid, finalists and semi-finalists in recent seasons. When the ball started rolling in September 2017, few would have predicted that Diego Simeone’s side would emerge victorious from only one of their six games, nor that they would score only five goals – two of them from dead-ball situations. Their two draws against Qarabağ allowed the Klopp in 2013, would fail to win a game? Or that Napoli, performing strongly in Serie A, would not progress? Or that Monaco, semi-finalists in the previous season, would finish at the foot of Group G without a win and leaking 16 goals in the process – five of them in Porto on the final matchday, when the 5-2 win allowed Sírgio Conceição’s side to claim second place ahead of RB Leipzig? Or that the winner of a group involving clubs from France, Germany and Portugal would be – with a degree of comfort – Beşiktaş of Turkey? Above all, who would have thought that Benfica, European champions of yesteryear, would navigate through Group A without netting a point and scoring only one goal – albeit a brilliant one? That goal by Haris Seferović against CSKA Moskva in the opening fixture was followed by 490 sterile minutes.

It meant that the difference between first and last in Group A was 15 points – a huge margin in an 18-point campaign. Tottenham Hotspur, one of only four contestants to end the group phase unbeaten, were not far behind, winning Group H 14 points ahead of APOEL. In Group D, Barcelona finished 13 points up on Olympiacos, while the gap was 12 in three other groups. The difference only dropped into single figures in Groups C and E, where the high number of draws sliced the margin to nine points. Differences between second and third ranged from three to a dozen – the latter case occurring in Group B, where Celtic and Anderlecht beat each other to tie on three points while Paris Saint-Germain and Bayern München were doing likewise to finish level on 15. This was one of only two groups where first and second were level on points – the other being Group C where head-to-head performances had to separate Chelsea and Roma.

Eusebio Di Francesco’s Roma were one of three teams to qualify with nine goals from six games, along with Shakhtar Donetsk and the usually prolific Barcelona, who, on this occasion, scored only once away from the Camp Nou. In the same group, Juventus took second place despite scoring only seven times. At the other end of the spectrum, Unai Emery’s Paris scored 25 times, while Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool, having come through the play-offs to reach the group stage, hit 23 goals – 12 at Anfield and 11 on the road. Even so, having surrendered advantages (notably a 3-0 in Seville), they drew three games and required a win in the last game against Spartak Moskva to ensure progress. They shaded...
Paris’s 5-0 at Celtic.

win at Maribor, Real Madrid’s 6-0 at APOEL or handsome margins, including Liverpool’s 7-0 were won by visiting teams, some of them by groups failed to supply any, and 31 matches.

There were 20 draws, even though three matches were home wins – 45 to be precise. Although home goals dominated by 173 to 133, the hosts did not find it easy to impose home rule. Fewer than half of the 96 group matches were home wins – 45 to be precise. There were 20 draws, even though three groups failed to supply any, and 31 matches were won by visiting teams, some of them by handsome margins, including Liverpool’s 7-0 win at Maribor, Real Madrid’s 6-0 at APOEL or Paris’s 5-0 at Celta.

Real Madrid finished second behind Tottenham Hotspur. However, the defending champions had demonstrated in the previous season that the runner-up spot in the group stage was no barrier to ultimate success.

ROUND OF 16

Real Madrid faced a problematic draw against Paris Saint-Germain with the first match in Spain, and Adrien Rabiot’s 13th-minute goal after a cross from the right seemed to add to their complexity. But a penalty and two goals from cutbacks from the left allowed Zinedine Zidane’s team to travel to France with a degree of comfort. Playing a 1-4-4-2 with an unusual midfield of Lucas Vázquez, Casemiro, Mateo Kovacic and Marco Asensio, they thwarted the home team by dominating possession, starving them of on-target attempts, coach Vincenzo Montella made a telling change deep into the second half, injecting Wissam Ben Yedder into the Sevilla attack. Within six minutes he had scored twice and United’s late reply provided insufficient consolation. José Mourinho’s team were out.

There was also a close call for Roma. Shakhtar Donetsk came back from 0-1 to prevail 2-1 at home, the winner coming from a direct free-kick. Paulo Fonseca’s team played neat football in Rome, but struggled to create openings against a well-organised home team. A single goal from an elaborate combination move was enough to send Roma through. But not all the ties were so closely contested. After a confident start in March, a 16th-minute red card stippled Byzsk to set up a deep 1-4-4-1 defence against a rampant Bayern, who settled in five goals and, in a formality of a return match in Istanbul, completed the task with a further 3-1 victory.

A square pass at the edge of their box proved to be Chelsea’s undoing in the home leg against Eremo Valencia’s Barça, Andrés Iniesta racing in to steal possession and cut the ball back for Lionel Messi to equalise the long-range strike by Willian. Even though Chelsea hit the Camp Nou woodwork, they stumbled against an inspired Messi, the key figure in a 3-0 home win. But home victories were not cheap. Basel set out to stop Manchester City playing through the middle, their 1-3-4-2-1 structure often condensing into deep 1-5-4-1 defending. But a corner, a cutback and two long-range shots condemned them to a 4-0 defeat insufficiently remedied by a 2-1 victory in Manchester that left Guardiola complaining that his team had “forgotten to attack”. Liverpool went one better. Their direct attacking and counterattacking produced a 5-0 win in Porto followed by – unusually, bearing in mind the rest of their campaign – a goalless draw at Anfield. The round had produced seven away wins and 25 goals for visitors, compared with 22 for home teams. The quarter-finals were to involve five straight wins propelled them into the knockout rounds with time to spare. The seemingly comfortable side for their neighbours was jolted by United’s late-goal defeat at Basel and José Mourinho’s side needed to come back from a 1-0 half-time deficit at Old Trafford to secure top spot at the expense of CSKA Moskva.

When the curtain came down on the group stage, 306 goals had been scored, compared with 278 in the previous season. It was one of many issues that went to the competition. Manchester United experienced similar problems after a goalless draw in Seville had left them vulnerable to away goal damage at Old Trafford. After a first half that yielded three on-target attempts, coach Vincenzo Montella made a telling change deep into the second half, injecting Wissam Ben Yedder into the Sevilla attack. Within six minutes he had scored twice and United’s late reply provided insufficient consolation. José Mourinho’s team were out.

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Virgil van Dijk (centre) was a commanding addition to the Liverpool defence.

Based on their domestic league positions, Manchester City were justifiably regarded as favourites when the ball started rolling at Anfield. Just over half an hour later, predictions were being revised. Two counterattacks (the first from a corner for City) and a long-range strike had put Liverpool 3-0 up, with their well-timed, well-choreographed high pressing disrupting City’s passing patterns and pre-empting any reply to the early advantage. Throwing players forward in 1-3-5-2 formation, City’s revival hopes were fuelled by a second-minute goal in the return leg, only for a slick combination with a rebound off the keeper, followed by a defensive error, to provide two away goals. There was to be no comeback.

But, elsewhere, there were. Sevilla’s direct attacking along the flanks and fast transitions asked questions of Jupp Heynckes’ Bayern – and earned the Spanish club a deserved 1-0-first-half advantage. The Germans rallied after the break and, committing seven or eight players to attacking moves, scored two precious away goals. It allowed them to adopt a conservative approach to the return in Munich, where the visitors struggled to breach a solid formation.

Roma could feel aggrieved about the severity of a 4-1 first-leg defeat in Barcelona. A good all-round display was undermined by two own goals, a rebound and, after they had come back to 3-1 down, a defensive error that rounded off the scoreline. In Rome, however, they were richly rewarded for determined, aggressive attacking play – a through pass, a penalty and a header from an inswinging corner allowing Di Francesco’s team to achieve their miracle on away goals.

The other tie also seemed to have been settled by a conclusive first-leg scoreline. A masterful display in Turin gave Real Madrid a 3-0 win against Juventus, thanks to three outstanding goals: the first a cutback from the left by Isco; the second an overhead kick by Cristiano Ronaldo after a misunderstanding between Giorgio Chiellini and Gianluigi Buffon; and the third a great interior run and finish by left-back Marcelo. The return in Madrid was, however, a tale of the unexpected. Encouraged by a second-minute goal, Juventus exerted pressure on the full-backs and overpowered a midfield that worked more efficiently when Zinédine Zidane pushed Isco forward in the second half and resorted to an attack in which Ronaldo was abetted by Marco Asensio and Lucas Vázquez. Even so, Juventus were good value for their epic comeback to 3-0 and were seemingly stronger (with substitutions in hand) as extra time approached – only for their endeavours to be undone by a last-minute penalty.
SEMI-FINALS

MADRID PUSHED TO THE LIMIT

There was angst at the Estadio Santiago Bernabéu when Real Madrid took on Bayern in the semi-finals. Once again, Madrid wrote the script for a placid return with an accomplished away result. After right-back Joshua Kimmich had given Bayern the lead, the home team squandered chances and allowed the visitors to plunder a result thanks to a long-range shot and a counterattack following a corner in Bayern’s favour — a square pass and untimely slip allowing Marco Asensio to strike the winner.

In Madrid, there was a touch of déjà vu as Kimmich again gave Bayern the lead. Although a Karim Benzema header restored parity, Madrid’s 1-4-4-2 formation led to them being regularly outnumbered in midfield areas, with improvised right-back Lucas Vázquez put under enormous pressure by David Alaba and Franck Ribéry. A switch to 1-4-3-3 redressed the balance but it took a bizarre slip by goalkeeper Sven Ulreich for Madrid to edge ahead, Benzema tapping the ball into an unguarded net. Bayern showed great determination to find an equaliser and, with crosses a permanent threat, attacked constantly in search of the goal that would take them to Kyiv — but failed to find it.

LIVERPOOL HOLD OFF ROMA

In Liverpool, Roma had the upper hand for the opening 20 minutes, their 1-3-4-1-2 structure giving them numerical advantage in midfield. But, once again, the home team’s direct running, power play intensity and countenattacking potential began to overwhelm their opponents. Between the 36th and 69th minutes, they scored five. But Roma, switching to 1-4-3-1-2 in search of goals, found a couple — a neat through pass to Edin Džeko on the left of the box and a late penalty. It left them requiring a repeat of their 3-0 against Barcelona — a result that became impossible when a defensive error allowed Sadio Mané to strike after nine minutes. After a freak own goal (a clearance hitting James Milner in the face and rebounding into the net) had produced an equaliser, a corner set up Liverpool’s second. With nothing to lose, Roma’s 1-4-3-1 gave way to 1-2-4-4 attacking, which was rewarded with three goals. The last, however, was a penalty when the clock showed 90+4, and a valiant revival had fallen one goal short of forcing extra time. After needing to dig deep into mental resources to combat determined comebacks, Liverpool and Real Madrid were on their way to Kyiv.
MADRID COMPLETE HISTORIC TREBLE

Substitute Gareth Bale lit up Kyiv as Real Madrid claimed a historic third successive title, and 13th overall, with a 3–1 victory against Liverpool.
These were elements of déjà vu from start to finish. From the time when Zinedine Zidane handed in the teamsheet he had presented in Cardiff a year earlier to the moment when Real Madrid captain Sergio Ramos offered the trophy to the heavens. Between the two events, the outcome, as it had been in Real Madrid’s previous two finals, was decided by actions that those spectators carrying traditional timepieces might have measured in movements of the second hand.

Those decisive moments sliced the final into, as UEFA technical observer Peter Rudbæk put it, “3 x 30 minutes.” The first half-hour was a tactically absorbing contest. Jürgen Klopp remained loyal to his 1-4-3-3 structure, whereas Zinedine Zidane had again opted for a 1-4-4-2 with Isco a free ranger across the width from his starting area behind Cristiano Ronaldo and the hardworking Karim Benzema, generous in his efforts to exploit the wide areas and find spaces to receive. The scope of Isco’s running obliged Liverpool’s No.14 Jordan Henderson to patrol wide areas in front of his back four while, at the other end of the NSC Olimpiyskiy Stadium, his numerical counterpart Casemiro performed similar duties in front of Ramos and Raphael Varane.

The opening skirmishes highlighted the contrasting credos. Liverpool, with Sadio Mané and Mohamed Salah at the cutting edge and Roberto Firmino dropping off to receive, challenged the Madrid defence with powerful running at the back line. This enabled their trademark high pressing, aimed at preventing the defending champions from playing out from the back. The technical quality of their opponents, however, meant that the aim was not wholly achieved. But, while the ball wasn’t matching Modrić and Kroos as playmakers, the former was challenging the Madrid defence with powerful movements of the second hand.

To their credit, Liverpool dug deep into mental resources to find an almost-immediate reply. After winning a corner, James Milner urged his team-mate to increase the decibels. His deep dead-ball delivery from the right was pushed goalwards by goalkeeper Keylor Navas, who was out of his goalmouth.$return

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At this point, Zidane, realising that Isco’s attempts to create overloads in the wide areas were not bearing fruit and that Ronaldo’s manoeuvres were well-read by the Liverpool defence, opted to throw Gareth Bale into the fray, switching to the 1-4-3-3 structure that, until Bale’s long-term injury, had been the norm. Within three minutes, the Welshman rendered a tribute to his boss’s wisdom. Just as Zidane himself had converted a pig’s ear of a cross by Roberto Carlos into a silk purse of a goal with the volley that won the 2001 final, Bale

Bale raced away after coming on as a substitute second of the match after Zidane himself had converted a pig’s ear of a cross by Roberto Carlos into a silk purse of a goal with the volley that won the 2001 final, Bale

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...
threw his legs skywards to meet a delivery from Marcelo’s less-scuffed right boot. After the overhead kick had hit the net, Zidane turned from the edge of his technical area towards the bench shaking a wrist in disbelief at the celestial display of technique.

Bale’s work of art gave Liverpool another psychological mountain to climb. What’s more, their defence had to adjust its modus operandi to deal with the blistering pace of the Welsh attacker. Whereas their policy had been to sit tightly on Isco, Bale’s acceleration obliged them to stay looser and give themselves a margin. Coupled with the

obligation to push for a second equaliser, the result was a more stretched formation that allowed Modrić and Kroos to orchestrate with a degree of comfort and for Marcelo to persist with his upfield runs with the ball. Ronaldo, frustrated for most of the balmy Kyiv evening, began to find openings for runs between centre-backs and full-backs – one promising example thwarted by the untimely intervention of a pitch invader.

Liverpool, backed by the vocal assurances from their supporters that they would never walk alone, stuck valiantly to the uphill task against the sober, positionally disciplined Madrid centre-backs. That is until Bale, with seven minutes to play, received possession in the ever-growing space between the attacking and defensive units of the Liverpool team. Running the ball on his left foot, he struck at goal from an exorbitant distance. He was probably as surprised as anybody when it squirmed out of Karius’s gloves into the roof of the net. Game over.

When the referee signalled that the contest had, indeed, come to its conclusion, the Liverpool keeper prostrated himself on the Kyiv turf, head in hands. Nacho led a line of Madrid players who, creditably, interrupted celebrations of a historic hat-trick of titles to offer consolation. Thomas Schaaf, who headed the UEFA team of technical observers in Kyiv, had reasons to commiserate with his friend and compatriot Jürgen Klopp. “It was a great final played with pace and intensity, but as a coach you can’t do anything about injuries or individual errors.”

Thomas Schaaf
After leading Real Madrid to a hat-trick of UEFA Champions League titles, Zinédine Zidane reflects on the keys to his extraordinary success.

The celebratory songs were still echoing round the streets of Madrid when Zinédine Zidane, with his customary elegance and aplomb, announced that it was “time for another voice to be heard in the dressing room”. His departure added a new dimension to expressions about leaving at the top. No coach, not even during Real Madrid’s run of five successive titles when the competition was launched in the 1950s, had ever achieved a hat-trick of victories. Foundations for unparalleled success had been laid in 2014 when he sat on the Madrid bench in the Estádio do Sport Lisboa e Benfica as assistant to Carlo Ancelotti. After his first solo success two years later, the technical report commented: “The debutant’s impact can be traced to man-management rather than tactical issues.” Zidane himself insisted: “It’s all about unity, effort, companionship and, when the time comes to play, quality and leaving everything on the field.” This interview provides confirmation that he remained loyal to those principles.
people watching your matches praised the balance that Casemiro and Kroos gave you in the middle of the pitch. Can you tell us a little more about their respective roles?

I asked Kroos and Modrić to defend by pushing up and trying to deny our opponents space, while Casemiro gave us balance across the pitch by providing cover for those pressuring midfielders. His role was key – both on the ground and in the air.

How would you define a modern forward?

Benzema is often criticised, but what did you think of the work he did for the team? Karen was important for the balance of the side in terms of how I wanted the team to attack. He helped to implement our possession game by playing his team-mates in. He makes himself available and is a real team player.

Is possession important?

When you have the ball, you’re not trying to win it back, so you’re normally less danger. You can also make your opponents run and tire them out. Knowing that my players had the necessary skill set, I felt an obligation to strengthen our identity as a possession-based team – not possession for possession’s sake, but possession for the purposes of attacking our opponents. At the same time, having possession is no guarantee of victory!

To what extent do you rely on analysis – both of opponents and of your own team? How do you communicate that analysis to your players? How much time do you spend talking about what your opponents might do?

At Real Madrid, my coaching staff and I used to spend time on team level analysis, but we limited what we passed on, as I wanted our team to remain focused on our own game. However, I spent time on individual analysis during the week, and I had a word with each player before each match.

Liverpool brought a bit of fresh blood to the competition. What, in your view, are the strengths of their style of play? What problems did you think that Liverpool would pose in the final?

They’re a counterattacking team that do a lot of pressing and are very quick to get the ball up to their three forwards when they win possession. They’re also a team that never give up.

Did you give Marcelo and the rest of the defence special instructions before the match on account of Liverpool’s three forwards, particularly Mohamed Salah?

Not at all! Our game was always the same, regardless of who we were facing. However, we told players about the individual characteristics of opposing players, so that we were aware of specific things that those players did. I didn’t need to do too much of that, as I wanted my players to focus primarily on our own game.

Over the last few seasons, people watching Real Madrid’s games have often praised and commented on the performances of Marcelo and Dani Carvajal and highlighted their importance for the team. How important are full-backs in general, and how important were those two players for your team?

They were a very important part of our system, as they had that ability to do something unexpected and create uncertainty in the minds of our opponents. When the ball went out to the wing, there was always the possibility of something happening. Indeed, we often managed to break teams down by keeping hold of the ball and then launching moves from out on the wing.

In Ronaldo and Sergio Ramos, you had two extraordinary players at opposite ends of the pitch. Can you tell us a little more about each of them – about their leadership qualities, and about their importance for their team-mates, and for you, as their coach, both on and off the pitch?

They are both players with a lot of energy and influence within the squad. Sergio Ramos is a natural leader and a big presence in the dressing room, and Cristiano Ronaldo is a leader on the pitch who inspires his team-mates. They complement each other well.

To what extent is the job of a coach different in the UEFA Champions League? Are the challenges the same as in La Liga?

For me, there is no difference. I have always prepared for all matches with the same level of application. In any event, when you’re coaching Real Madrid, you have to win everything, while maintaining a certain standard of play – that’s my philosophy.

What were the main lessons that you learnt during your three title-winning campaigns?

When you’re working with talented and experienced players, the most important thing is to keep them calm. That’s what I needed when I was a player, so that’s the approach that I try to adopt.

Some people play golf, while others read. How do you escape the stresses of life as a coach?

I play sport, and I like to read. I also spend time with my family, that’s very important to me.

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Zinedine Zidane
RESULTS

PLAY-OFFS – LEAGUE PATH (Aggregate scores played over two legs; the first-named club played at home in the first leg)

GROUP STAGE

GROUP A

Manchester United FC 6 0 0 4 9 13 6
FC Basel 8 4 0 2 11 6 12
FC CSKA Moskva 6 3 0 3 8 13 9
SL Benfica 6 0 0 6 1 13 0

GROUP B

FC Porto 6 3 1 2 15 10 10
FC Shakhtar Donetsk 6 4 0 2 9 9 12
St. Etienne 6 1 0 5 2 13 2

GROUP C

AS Roma 6 3 2 1 9 6 11
Sevilla 6 2 3 1 12 9 0
FK Anderlecht 6 1 0 5 3 16 3

GROUP D

Real Madrid CF 6 4 1 1 17 7 13
AS Monaco FC 6 0 2 4 6 16 2
Juventus 6 4 1 1 15 6 10

GROUP STAGE

GROUP A

CSKA Moskva 6 3 0 3 8 13 9
Sevilla FC 6 2 3 1 12 9 0

GROUP B

Manchester City FC 6 5 0 1 14 5 15
FC Bayern München 6 5 0 1 9 11 2

GROUP C

AS Roma 6 3 2 1 9 6 11
Sevilla FC 6 2 3 1 12 9 0

GROUP D

Real Madrid CF 6 4 1 1 17 7 13
AS Monaco FC 6 0 2 4 6 16 2

PLAY-OFFS – CHAMPIONS PATH (Aggregate scores played over two legs; the first-named club played at home in the first leg)

GROUP STAGE

GROUP A

FC Spartak Moskva 6 1 3 2 9 13 6
Sevilla FC 6 2 3 1 12 9 0

GROUP B

FC Porto 6 3 2 1 16 8 11
FC Shakhtar Donetsk 6 4 0 2 9 9 12

GROUP C

AS Roma 6 3 2 1 9 6 11
Sevilla FC 6 2 3 1 12 9 0

GROUP D

Real Madrid CF 6 4 1 1 17 7 13
AS Monaco FC 6 0 2 4 6 16 2

ROUND OF 16

13 February – 16 March

Basel 2-5 Man. City
Juventus 4-3 Tottenham
Real Madrid 5-2 Porto

Sevilla 1-4 Liverpool
Bayern 8-1 Beşiktaş
Chelsea 1-4 Barcelona

Shakhtar Donetsk 2-2 Roma
Sevilla 2-1 Man United

QUARTER-FINALS

13–11 April

Jüventus 3-4 Real Madrid
Sevilla 1-2 Bayern

Liverpool 5-1 Man City
Barcelona 4-4 Roma

SEMI-FINALS

26 April – 2 May

Bayern 3-0 Real Madrid
Barcelona 4-0 Liverpool

FINAL

26 May

Real Madrid 3-1 Liverpool

FINAL KYIV 2018
SQUAD OF THE SEASON

Competition for places in the all-star team was fierce, but Real Madrid dominated the observers' final choice.

The number of players who impressed UEFA's technical observers at individual matches added up, by the time they assembled in Kyiv, to a shortlist that was a total mismatch. To complicate life even further, they juggled with additional names, with the result that they had to select a teamsheet that generally supported them. But there was a surprising level of consensus when it came to picking the 'winners'. Bearing in mind the déjà vu nature of the teamsheet – and the outcome – in Kyiv, it was not surprising that of the eight Real Madrid players who had featured in the squad of the 2016/17 campaign were on the teamsheet again in 2018, along with Lionel Messi. As usual, there were some near misses, such as Sevilla's Steven N'Zonzi or the FC Barcelona duo of Marc-André ter Stegen and Andrés Iniesta, the latter playing Seville FC's Steven N'Zonzi or the FC Barcelona duo of Lionel Messi. As usual, there were some near misses, such as Sevilla's Steven N'Zonzi or the FC Barcelona duo of Marc-André ter Stegen and Andrés Iniesta, the latter playing Seville FC's Steven N'Zonzi or the FC Barcelona duo of Lionel Messi.

Perennial winners included Atletico Madrid midfielder Koke, who was named in his fourth consecutive UEFA Champions League Team of the Season. Steady campaign and made saves when required; collected third consecutive winner's medal. Barcelona's goalkeeper, who provided composure and decisive moment in his own right. Lively full-back key to the semi-finals. Performed excellently in the knockout stage.
BALANCE OF POWER

Whatever the item up for debate in Kyiv, the conversation soon came back to the importance of getting the balance right within a team.

THE MODERN WAY

Pace and pressing reaped rewards for Liverpool – as it did for Monaco last season.

“They had pace and power throughout the team. Their physicality and offensive vocation were most impressive.” The quotation could easily be thrown into the ‘fake news’ basket, as the comment was made by Ryan Giggs, one of UEFA’s team of technical observers during the 2016/17 season, after watching the eventual semi-finalists Monaco. Poetic licence has been brought into play as his remark could equally well apply to Liverpool’s contribution to the 2017/18 UEFA Champions League. In both cases, critics were ready to label them ‘breaths of fresh air’.

“When we talk about 1-4-3-3,” David Moyes commented when the group of UEFA observers met on the morning after the Kyiv final, “we tend to think of the Dutch 4-3-3 with wingers and wide players. I think that Liverpool’s 4-3-3 is completely different. Apart from the two full-backs, nearly all the players concentrate their efforts into a central area – as if we extended the outside lines of the penalty boxes from end to end. At first, it seems quite easy to coach against it. But the Liverpool system allows them to press very easily with their three forwards. This covers your defensive players very quickly, whether you’re playing with a back four or a back three. Also, on the counterattack, they’re extremely fast – they have fast individual dribblers. They’re all happy to run in behind without the ball and not always receive it to feet. I think Liverpool summed up a lot of modern-day trends.”

In few words, his comments raised a number of issues. As Thomas Schaaf added: “The decisive points are waves of attack, quick changes of play and speed. The system requires speed going forward, players with pace who are prepared to do a lot of high-intensity running.” Over the season, Roberto Firmino and Sadio Mané averaged 53 high-intensity sprints per match, Mohamed Salah 46.
HIGH AND WIDE

With full-backs pushing ever higher, the space they leave behind has become a key battleground. Putting on the brakes and going back to the first point raised by David Moyes, Liverpool’s narrow attacking front emphasised the importance of full-backs in exploiting the wide areas in the modern game. The pages featuring statistics on crossing offer ample confirmation. Among the top teams of the season, Bayern München provided an exception to the general rule by fielding two wingers. Even Barcelona frequently opted to depart from their traditional default setting and operate a 1-4-4-2 with Lionel Messi in a free-spirit role behind Luis Suárez – and no wingers. Real Madrid, during the knock-out rounds, preferred to adopt a similar style with Karim Benzema and Cristiano Ronaldo, leading the front line in a winger-less formation.

“This is why we are seeing so many wingers being converted into full-backs,” Jerzy Engel commented at the meeting in Kyiv. “They are becoming more and more important in organising attacks from the sides.” The feeling was that the 2017/18 season had indicated the view expressed by Ryan Giggs a year earlier that “wingers are definitely going out of the game. Full-backs are now the wingers, no matter what system you play.

Going back to Bayern, statistics reveal that, despite the presence of Arjen Robben and Franck Ribéry, the main purveyors of crosses were Joshua Kimmich and David Alaba. For Real Madrid, it was Marcelo on the left and, with Dani Carvajal’s campaign restricted by injury to eight matches, Toni Kroos stepping in as the main supplier from the right, albeit generally from positions deeper than the overlapping full-back. James Milner emerged as Liverpool’s main crosser of the ball due to permutations at full-back, while Trent AlexanderArnold and Andrew Robertson were establishing themselves as the season wore on.

The evolving job description for full-backs has developed into a perennial talking point – not only at UEFA Champions League level but also at the age-level tournaments where the emphasis is more clearly on player development. “In the old days,” Peter Rudbæk commented with a wry smile, “the left-back needed to be quick and to have a good left foot. Marcelo’s cross for Gareth Bale in the final was an example that he has to be good with his wrong foot as well.”

The debating point is whether the attacking slant in the job description is encouraging teams to set themselves up to exploit the full-backs’ defensive weaknesses – or at least the space behind them. “We saw in the final,” Misu Pauzelainen remarked, “how quickly Sergio Ramos was out to cover the spaces left by Marcelo. I think Real Madrid achieved a very good positional balance in the full-back areas.”

“The attacking full-backs carry a risk element,” Thomas Schaal added, “so they have to be taught how to stay compact and to deal with shifts of play. I saw quite a few goals during the season where a player started wide to receive in the space behind the full-back and then cut in to score.”

AVALANCHE OF GOALS

With the emphasis increasingly on attack, defenders are being tested to the maximum. The eyebrows raised when Jossip Ćoštra first started fielding Messi on the right now remain firmly lowered as the use of wrong-footed wingers has proliferated to the point of almost becoming the norm. Selecting the best goals in a season that set a new scoring record was a process that revealed how many successful strikes were as a result of a wrong-footed winger cutting inside to strike to the far corner of the net. “I think that in the Champions League every coach now has to be attacking,” David Moyes said. “And I think we saw that: to be an attacking coach, you need to work on top-quality defending by top-quality defenders. Teams like Liverpool or Real Madrid who operate with three forwards who have limited defensive responsibilities obviously rely on fewer players to defend. So creating the best balance is the coach’s priority.”

PRESSING MATTERS

Aggressive pressing is shifting momentum away from the trend to build from the back. The three forwards’ defensive responsibilities may have been limited in terms of zonal play and distances to be covered. But the observers noted the spread of what one of them described as “the Guardiola effect”, based on everybody pushing forward with or without the ball and existing aggressive high pressure after ball losses and, in the process, making it difficult for opponents to counterattack with clarity. Liverpool’s modus operandi provided a prime example of effective, high-intensity, collective pressing by a compact block.

“The trend towards forward tracking and high pressing has a significant effect,” Jerzy Engel argued. “Before, teams had more space to start their game from the back. Now the pressure is so high that teams are being forced into a lot of defensive errors that, at this level, lead to goals.”

PLAY SCHOOLS

Three tactical approaches held sway – pressing, possession and safety first.

One of the views was that the competition had, in very broad brush strokes, brought together three schools of thought. One of them could carry a German label based on the playing styles of Borussia Dortmund, RB Leipzig, Bayern since Guardiola departed and Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool – an advanced pressing game with players suffocating opponents.
by swarming around ball carriers. At the same time, they are set up to retreat when they have to into a compact block and bring another important weapon to bear — the lightning-fast counterattack with players flooding forward.

The second school carries a Spanish label, with Real Madrid and Barcelona operating variations on the theme that could also be applied to Manchester City, Sevilla, Paris and even Tottenham. Possession play is the priority, allied with an ability to attack with and without the ball. When possession is lost, there are immediate attempts to regain it with high pressure but, once it is won, the brilliant ball skills in tight situations allow them to retain it and then launch counterattacks.

The third group also carries a Latin label, based on a more rational, cautious style associated with Italy or Portugal but, in the UEFA Champions League, extendible not only to Juventus or Porto but also to teams such as Manchester United, Chelsea or even Atlético Madrid, who step away from the Spanish norm. The emphasis is on not losing the ball and in rational thinking about the number of players behind the ball, in possession and out of possession.

“I think that’s an interesting theory,” Misu Paatelainen said. “We talk about attacking football but, when you attack, how do you get the right balance? How many players do you leave below the ball? These are key questions for any coach.”

A COMEBACK FOR THE COMEBACK?

Both in individual games and two-legged ties, holding a lead is getting tougher every year.

For many years, technical reports have highlighted the importance of scoring the first goal — and proved the point with strong statistical evidence. But, since the number of comebacks for teams conceding the first goal is rock bottom in 2014/15 with a net zero grand total of five, there has been a steady ascent of five this season from 15 in 2015/16 to 17 in 2016/17. The upward trend was continued in 2017/18, when 20 of the 99 games that produced results were won by a team rebounding from a 0-1 deficit. In other words, one in five victories for the team conceding first.

Among the dozen comebacks during the group stage, the most spectacular was Panathinaikos’ return from being a goal down to beat Celtic 7-1 at home, followed by the two corners and two counterattacks that allowed Manchester City to record a valuable 4-2 away win against SSC Napoli. Seven of the comebacks were by visiting teams.

Interestingly, the incidence of rebounded results was much higher in the knockout rounds, where eight of the 27 matches to produce goals resulted in victory for the team conceding first — five of them in favour of away teams. As the issue goes beyond a numbers game, so much for statistics. Theories about teams becoming mentally better equipped to deal with adverse situations can be supported by other matches, such as the comeback from 2-0 down that earned Roma a 3-0 win atホームタウン at Stamford Bridge. Or the fightback that salvaged an identical result for Sevilla after trailing 3-0 at half time at home to Liverpool. Or, moving into the group stage, Tottenham’s response to being 2-0 down to Juventus after just nine minutes — a situation in which many teams would have folded.

“I saw that game in Turin,” Cristian Chivu commented, “and I was impressed not only by the way they reacted but the way they did so by playing well. Credit to Mauricio Pochettino because it’s about how we manage the players, how we take positives of them and how we give them the right motivation.”

The outstanding feature, however, was the number of aggregate comebacks after conceding the first leg rather than the first goal. After the 4-1 defeat at the Camp Nou, Jerzy Eugén observed that, in the return, Roma achieved their 3-0 turnaround by “changing the system to 1-3-5-2 with Schick supporting Dzeko in attack. The players worked hard as wing-backs, while De Rossi spread the game from midfield. They held a high line, pressed the goalkeeper and the three defenders avoided mistakes and won the aerial battles that Barcelona were forced into.”

Needing the same result after losing 5-2 in Liverpool, Eusebio Di Francesco preferred a 1-4-3-3 approach against Jürgen Klopp’s three-pronged front line, switching to 1-4-2-4 attacking when chasing the comeback in the second half. Juventus offered similar storylines but in reverse order — playing return legs away from home. The observer at the 2-2 home draw with Tottenham remarked: “2-0 up after ten minutes, the home team adopted a defensive interpretation of the game, with ten men below the ball and few options for fast transitions.” In the return at Wembly, Massimiliano Allegri pushed Alex Sandro forward to effectively defend with a line of three and, as Thomas Schaaf explained, “decided the game in their favour at key moments within ten minutes, even though Tottenham put in a great performance.” He then expected a formality in Madrid after a superb performance in Turin had given Real a 5-0 advantage. An equally outstanding display by Juventus came within a whisker of forcing extra time.

In a similar vein, it could be added that, in the knockout rounds, there were more victories for visitors than for home teams — symptom of a more ambitious approach to away
FINDING KEEPERS

From shot-stopping to ball-playing, demands on goalkeepers have never been higher.

One of the difficulties encountered by the technical team while selecting their squad of the season was the choice of goalkeepers. “We mustn’t forget that the goalkeeper’s main job is to defend the goal, not to play the ball,” Cristian Chivu said. “I wonder how many dominated both aspects during the whole season.”

“We’ve been analysing the goalkeeper position over the past few years,” Thomas Schaaf commented, “and, in my opinion, the first and foremost is to stop the ball going in. If that doesn’t work, it doesn’t matter how well the keeper plays. The coach has to link him with the style of play. For example, Marc-André ter Stegen was an integral part of build-up play and was required to have technical ability.”

Finally, Romu’s Alisson Becker was selected alongside Keylor Navas because, as Cristian Chivu put it, “he’s a keeper with good positioning and good attitude. He’s very relaxed and he gives confidence to everybody.”

Goalkeeping performances, however, were linked to game plans and the steady increasing implementation of high pressing. To quote an example, when Roma, 4-1 down from the first leg, decided to press Marc-André ter Stegen in the return match, the Barcelona keeper was unable to play a short pass and was obliged to play long on 34 occasions. Only 13 of those deliveries were received by team-mates – and it cannot be said that Barça are set up as a second-ball team. By way of comparison, in the away leg of the previous round against Chelsea, Ter Stegen had played long on only seven occasions – four of them going successfully.

“On one side of the coin there is praise for teams’ mental fortitude in adverse situations, for their ambition and for their will to win. On the other side of the coin is a provocative question: are teams only prepared to come out and play when they really have to? In my opinion,” said Cristian Chivu, “teams who know they have fewer possibilities show better quality because they are under less pressure. In situations where you have nothing to lose, players tend to do things differently.”

THE TOUCH OF MAGIC

Does individual brilliance or collective quality provide the most consistent route to goal?

“If we don’t develop players with dribbling skills, I don’t know how many spectators we will have in ten years’ time.” The remark by Peter Rudbaek provoked debate at the meeting in Køge, amid general acknowledgement that, as one of the coaches put it: “The best coaching philosophies often don’t deliver the end product unless they have a touch of magic from Latin America.” Once again, the upper echelons of the scoring chart were dominated by non-Europeans.

One of the charms of the UEFA Champions League is that the competition showcases the world’s best players. But, from a development standpoint, what is being done in other continents, particularly South America, to produce such talented attackers and finishers? And what more could be done in Europe?

The counter-argument is that collective virtues have greater importance. In a recent interview, Mauricio Pochettino, manager of the Tottenham side who were one of two opponents to defeat Real Madrid (and finish ahead of them in Group H), said: “We don’t rely on exceptional 1v1 skills. We have a lot of quality in our squad, but our main virtues are to associate with each other and to combine to create. We have enough tactical flexibility to react to different situations and I would say that we are disciplined but we try to generate chaos to disorganise our opponents.”

TITLES TALK

Madrid showed how getting the balance right makes all the difference.

Three successive titles – the second and third with the same starting line up – inevitably prompted the technical observers to discuss the qualities that earned a position of such prominence. “To try to paint the big picture,” Peter Rudbaek added, “the team is good because they have good players. But they are also clever in their interpretation of the game. Modrić and Kroos defend five or ten metres ahead of Casemiro, who protects the centre-backs. But, in possession, when they start to build up, it’s often the other way round. Casemiro moves forward and the other two drop down into the area where they have space to act as playmakers.”

Mixu Paatelainen concluded: “Real Madrid are a great example of a well balanced team. It’s not a case of ‘you five attack, you five defend.’ They keep their positions and they’re difficult to play against when they lose the ball because Kroos and Modrić are higher, leaving Casemiro to do the job of protecting through the middle. They have their structure in place all the time. The whole team is balanced all the time.” For Real Madrid, balance is power.
The 2016/17 UEFA Champions League raised the goal standard with an average that, for the first time in the competition’s history, exceeded three goals per game. The 2017/18 season prolonged that trend by boosting the average to 3.21 per match and nudging past the benchmark of 400 goals for the first time since the reduction to a 125-game format in 2003/04. The increase could be traced back to a group stage that was adorned with 28 goal celebrations more than in the previous campaign. Fittingly, the 400-mark was reached when the spectacular overhead kick by Gareth Bale hit the Liverpool net in Kyiv.

The two finalists were the competition’s leading scorers, although Paris Saint-Germain achieved the highest average per game, by dint of scoring 25 of their 27 goals during the group stage. The 13 matches involving Liverpool offered the public 57 goals – 14% of the season’s total. They were among the seven teams who reached a mean of two goals per game – four of them English. Barcelona, normally prolific, fell short of this landmark with 17 goals in their 13 games. Another Spanish contestant, Atlético de Madrid, had reached the semi-finals in the previous season with an average of 1.25 goals per game and, in 2017/18, were among the group fallers with a mean of 0.83 per match.

The trend for goalscoring to even itself out over the 90 minutes of UEFA Champions League football continued in 2017/18, when 14% more goals hit the net after the interval than before the break – with the longer periods of added time at the end of the second half a conditioning factor. Two seasons previously, the difference had been 33%. The most productive quarter-hour was the middle period of the second half – but by a minimal margin. In consequence, the statistics do not support theories about fatigue factors.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the 2017/18 season halted the trend towards home rule. In the previous season, 61% of goals were scored by home teams. This time round, the share was sliced to 55% (52% in the knockout rounds). The search for similar figures goes back to the 56% recorded during the 2013/14 campaign. The number of goalless draws dropped from ten to seven, with Spanish clubs involved in six of them. The seventh was Liverpool’s home draw with Porto after their 5-0 victory in the away leg. The record total of goals was shared by 188 players, with 71 of them scoring more than once. The scoring chart reveals a strong Liverpool presence, with Mohamed Salah, Sadio Mané and Roberto Firmino claiming equal shares in a joint tally of 30. Behind them, Philippe Coutinho, before his...
In the aftermath of UEFA EURO 2016, there had been much ado about a trend towards more direct attacking, which could be underpinned by statistical evidence. The underlying premise was, however, removed by the patterns of the 2017/18 season, in which the average number of passes in scoring moves was 4.05 over a time-span of 7.68 seconds. This represented increases of 10% and 16% respectively compared to the previous season, setting the highest figures of the current decade and hinting at a move away from direct attacking. Or did it?

The season’s script was written in a series of paradoxes. Barcelona’s goals were scored after 3.88 passes as opposed to 6.15 in 2016/17. Real Madrid’s drops from 5.03 and 14.31 seconds to 4.36 and 12.39 respectively. Juventus’s successes were based on 6.64 passes in 19.14 seconds compared with 3.36 in 11.36 in the previous season. Bayern München averaged 5.96 passes over 17.35 – far in excess of their averages under José Guardiola, while the Catalan coach’s Manchester City were scoring goals after 2.8 passes and 8.10 seconds. The disconcerting stats invite discussion about high pressing and the ability to strike rapidly after regains in the attacking third. This dovetails neatly with one of the other eye-catching statistics to emerge in 2017/18.

Over half of the season’s goals were scored in phases of possession that began in the final third. To complete the figures, 35% of goalscoring moves were initiated from the middle-third of the pitch and only 14% resulted from playing through the opposition from the defensive third. That represented a further drop from 16% in an ongoing tendency also reflected in the fact that, as a starting point for goalscoring moves, tackling by defenders dropped dramatically to one-third of the level registered in 2016/17. The stats spell out a steady increase in the percentage of final-third goalscoring moves from 43% in 2015/16 to 51% in 2017/18. As an argument in favour of the dividends to be obtained from high pressing, 96 of the 323 open-play goals (compared with 65 in the previous season) had their origin in latching on to a loose ball or a loose pass by an opponent.

Liverpool’s had of 41 goals encapsulates the statistical paradoxes. The direct attacking by Jürgen Klopp’s team resulted in their scoring moves averaging 2.56 passes in 7.68 seconds. No fewer than 26 scoring moves were launched in the final third and only three from the back – a solitary example in the knockout rounds when an intercepted Roma cross allowed them to surge upfield and take a 2-0 advantage at Anfield. Their statistics were distorted by three long moves totaling 18 passes in 106 seconds when ahead in high-scoring games against Maribor and Spartak Moskva in the group stage and when 3-0 to the good in the home leg against Roma. If the search is restricted to Liverpool’s opening goal, the result is an average of 1.67 passes in 4.5 seconds in the build-up to goals. This gives credence to the theory that the top teams are the ones who can find an effective balance between direct attacking when looking to inflict damage before defensive blocks can be assembled and adopting a more elaborate approach when the match situation makes it more appropriate to retain possession.
There was a big drop in goals scored from set pieces.

**Penalties**
The number of goals derived from dead-ball situations provided one of the striking statistics to emerge from the season. In the previous three years, set plays had accounted for 24%, 23% and 26% respectively of the overall goal tally. In 2017/18, the figure dropped to 16.5%. Penalties generally account for a large slice of the dead-ball successes and this sector produced a downturn of six in comparison with the previous season’s 54 successful spot kicks.

**Direct Free-Kicks**
The most significant reduction, however, was related to free-kicks. Indirect successes were down by 32%, while direct strikes into the net were practically halved. They were few enough to list. Fernando’s opener for Spartak Moskva at home to Liverpool; the Marcus Rashford effort for Manchester United in Lisbon (gathered by the keeper but carried into his own net); Neymar’s effort for Paris during their visit to United in Lisbon (missed by the keeper but gathered by the striker); Lionel Messi’s strike that put Barcelona 2-0 up on the matchday after going 1-0 behind; and Arjen Robben’s shot from the spot in the knockouts. Indirect free-kicks tell a similar story. The only success in the knockouts was a goal from a corner by the goalkeeper Gorka Iraizoz of Athletic Bilbao — a fact which inevitably raises questions about the development of free-kick specialists in Europe.

**Corners**
Although corners can be presented as a significantly more fruitful source of goals by mentioning that they accounted for 36% of the set-play strikes compared with 26% the previous season, their importance was artificially enhanced by the shortfalls in the other dead-ball sectors. Numerically, goals attributable to corner kicks increased by four from 24 to 28. In other words, they accounted for only 7% of the season’s total.

<table>
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<th>Goal Type</th>
<th>Action</th>
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**Set Play**

**Indirect Free-Kicks**
Indirect free-kicks tell a similar story. The only success in the knockouts was a technical gem executed by Juve in the second minute of their home leg against Tottenham, Gonzalo Higuaín volleying home a well-rehearsed free-kick which also earned a place among the season’s top ten. In other words, the last six matchdays of the competition failed to produce another goal.

**Running with the Ball**
Further food for thought was served by the figures related to individual running with the ball. At the end of the group stage, the statistics were not far out of line with the previous season. They revealed an increase from 17 to 21. But, in 2016/17, solo runs had accounted for 11 goals in the knockouts whereas, in 2017/18, this figure fell dramatically to two, leaving the overall total five short of the previous year. This could, again, be thrown onto the debating table alongside the extent to which in-depth study of opponents is prevalent in the modern game. Or maybe pegged to injuries to solo artists such as Neymar, Arjen Robben or Gareth Bale.

**Combinations and Forward Passes**
For the first time, the total of open-play goals passed the 200 mark. The 2016/17 season had heralded an upward movement to 269 after surprisingly stable figures of 266, 267 and 268 in the previous three campaigns. Amid the generalised increases in the record total of 323, combination moves provided the most striking increase, although it has to be said that the category could be sub-divided into quick combinations after high-ball winning or the sort of much more elaborate moves which led to goals for teams such as Dortmund, Barcelona or Paris.
When the team of technical observers sat down to select the top goals of the season on the morning after the final in Kyiv, by and large the votes went to actions of individual brilliance rather than collective passing moves or copybook counterattacks that could earn space in coaching manuals.

Gareth Bale’s overhead finish a few hours earlier was a case in point – one of three outstanding bicycle kicks that even had opposition fans on their feet applauding. That was certainly the case for Cristiano Ronaldo in Turin in the first leg of the quarter-finals. Ronaldo was running away from goal, with three Juve defenders in close proximity, when he leapt to meet Dani Carvajal’s cross from the right with an astonishing, acrobatic strike.

It takes something special to beat Roma goalkeeper Alisson Becker and Antoine Griezmann produced just that to score Atlético de Madrid’s second goal in a 2-0 win in the group stage, the French striker jumping horizontally to the ground to powerfully volley in Ángel Correa’s cutback from the left.

Bale’s final strike continued the trend for the spectacular and stretched the technical observers’ long list of goals to 44 candidates. They added up to a colourful cocktail of diverse ingredients, ranging from the explosive one-touch action of a direct free-kick to a couple of patient, elaborate attacks by Borussia Dortmund: the 22-pass, 74-second move that culminated in Raphaël Guerreiro putting the German team 1-0 ahead against APOEL and the 16-pass combination from a free-kick in the defensive third that allowed Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang to give them the lead against Tottenham Hotspur.

Just over half of the candidates – 23 to be precise – received one vote or more and, as ever, there were some near misses. For example, Bernard’s right-footed shot from the left that put Shakhtar Donetsk ahead against Manchester City in Kharkiv. Or Harry Kane’s solo run from the left that gave Tottenham Hotspur a 2-1 lead against Borussia Dortmund at Wembley. But the jury delivered its verdict with surprising clarity. No casting votes were required to determine the top ten.

‘MY BEST GOAL’

Ronaldo’s blast in Turin

Ronaldo drifts in from the left and cuts between Juventus defenders Mattia De Sciglio and Andrea Barzagli before reacting quickest to Dani Carvajal’s cross from the right, darting back away from goal and propelling himself to meet the ball. ‘It was amazing, probably the best of my career,’ Ronaldo said.
“To score a goal like that on the biggest stage in world football is a dream come true. I remember Marcelo clipping the ball and it was just at the right height. It was great to get the right connection and see it hit the back of the net”

Gareth Bale

SUDDEN IMPACT

Bale’s Kyiv final stunner

Gareth Bale had only been on the pitch for three minutes when he scored one of the goals of the season. Marcelo cuts back on the left wing and delivers a dipping ball into the box with his right foot. It is slightly cleared but he adjusts his run to meet it with a stunning left-foot strike.

TOP TEN GOALS

1. Cristiano Ronaldo
   Juventus 3-1 Real Madrid
   Ronaldo’s second goal was a brilliant display of technique and athleticism.

2. Gareth Bale
   Real Madrid 3-1 Liverpool
   The crucial second goal in the final and another brilliant acrobatic finish.

3. Gonzalo Higuaín
   Juventus 2-2 Tottenham
   A technical gem, making a tough finish to a pre-planned free-kick look easy.

4. Antoine Griezmann
   Atlético 2-0 Roma
   A spectacular bicycle kick after Ángel Correa’s cross from the left.

5. Edin Džeko
   Chelsea 3-3 Roma
   An excellent side-footed volley to spectacularly convert a ball from the left.

6. Kevin De Bruyne
   Manchester City 2-0 Shakhtar
   A great long-range shot to break the deadlock early in the second half.

7. Fred
   Shakhtar 2-1 Roma
   A perfectly precise free-kick that gave Alisson Becker no chance.

8. Kevin De Bruyne
   Manchester City 2-0 Shakhtar
   A great long-range shot to break the deadlock early in the second half.

9. Lorenzo Insigne
   Napoli 3-0 Shakhtar
   A wonderful finish from distance to set Napoli on their way to victory.

10. Cristiano Ronaldo
    Real Madrid 3-1 Liverpool
    A powerful curling shot from distance, struck with minimal back-lift.

TOP TEN GOALS

1. Cristiano Ronaldo
   Juventus 3-1 Real Madrid

2. Gareth Bale
   Real Madrid 3-1 Liverpool

3. Gonzalo Higuaín
   Juventus 2-2 Tottenham

4. Antoine Griezmann
   Atlético 2-0 Roma

5. Edin Džeko
   Chelsea 3-3 Roma

6. Kevin De Bruyne
   Manchester City 2-0 Shakhtar

7. Fred
   Shakhtar 2-1 Roma

8. Kevin De Bruyne
   Manchester City 2-0 Shakhtar

9. Lorenzo Insigne
   Napoli 3-0 Shakhtar

10. Cristiano Ronaldo
    Real Madrid 3-1 Liverpool
SEASON BY NUMBERS
Key facts and figures from the 2017/18 campaign

47
Liverpool’s goal total (play-offs included) set a new season record

13
Liverpool’s 7-6 semi-final win on aggregate set a new goals record for a knockout tie

61:40
Average time the ball was in play

94:36
Average length of a match in minutes

1:09
Average added time at the end of the first half

3:27
Average added time at the end of the second half

28
Average minutes per goal

3.21
Goals per game (most since this format began in 2003/04)

MOST PASSES

990
Éver Banega
86% completion rate

903
Toni Kroos
94% completion rate

830
Sergio Busquets
95% completion rate

25
New group stage goals record for Paris Saint-Germain. Liverpool (23 goals) also surpassed the previous total of 21

19
Barcelona won their group for a record 19th time – and were unbeaten in the group stage for the 11th time

3
Roma became only the third team to win a tie after a first-leg loss by three goals or more

100
Lionel Messi scored his 100th goal in the round of 16 against Chelsea

9
New assists record for Liverpool’s James Milner

12
Successive victories for Bayern coach Jupp Heynckes, a competition record

10
Mohamed Salah, Roberto Firmino and Sadio Mané all scored ten goals – the first time three players from the same team reached double figures

6
Cristiano Ronaldo became the first player to score in all six group games

7
Consecutive seasons in which Cristiano Ronaldo has scored ten goals or more

11
Successive games in which Cristiano Ronaldo scored – a new record
ATTEMPTS ON GOAL

As well as winning rave reviews for their attack, Liverpool allowed the fewest shots on target per game.

From the 16 sides who came through the group stage, Bayern München were the most successful in terms of creating chances; the German club mustered an average of 18.25 goal attempts per game, more than any other club in the 2017/18 competition. Eventual champions Real Madrid managed 16.92 attempts per game, although their average of seven on target was the joint-highest – along with the side they beat in the final, Liverpool. Of the sides who made it through to the knockout rounds, Basel found creating chances hardest to come by with an average of 10.38 shots per match, while Porto had four shots on target on average – both fewer than any other side to have reached the last 16.

RESTRICTING OPPORTUNITIES

Of the teams who reached the last 16, eventual runners-up Liverpool – whose attacking football had caught the eye down the other end – had the most efficient defence in terms of overall shots on goal CONCEDED, at an average of just 3 per game. Manchester City and Bayern München (both 3.5 shots on target against per match) proved more effective in terms of overall shots on goal effective in terms of overall shots on goal – both the highest totals among the 16 sides who made it to the round of 16. Among the arts of defending, shot blocking continued to gain in relevance during the 2017/18 season, when 88 goal attempts (15% of the total were thwarted by defenders able to throw boots or bodies in the way.

**ATTEMPTS ON GOAL**

**FOR:**

**AGAINST:**

**GAMES:**

**REAL MADRID**

13 games

FOR: 220 (AVE 11.5)

AGAINST: 150 (AVE 9.37)

**BAYERN**

12 games

FOR: 219 (AVE 16.92)

AGAINST: 114 (AVE 9.46)

**LIVERPOOL**

13 games

FOR: 201 (AVE 15.46)

AGAINST: 140 (AVE 10.77)

**MASSIVE**

10 games

FOR: 128 (AVE 12.8)

AGAINST: 115 (AVE 11.13)

**BARCELONA**

10 games

FOR: 130 (AVE 13)

AGAINST: 101 (AVE 10.3)

**TOTTENHAM**

8 games

FOR: 118 (AVE 14.75)

AGAINST: 96 (AVE 12.2)

**MANCHESTER UNITED**

8 games

FOR: 113 (AVE 14.12)

AGAINST: 85 (AVE 10.62)

**CHELSEA**

8 games

FOR: 125 (AVE 15.63)

AGAINST: 119 (AVE 14.88)

**MANCHESTER CITY**

10 games

FOR: 120 (AVE 12)

AGAINST: 85 (AVE 8.5)

**SHAKHTAR**

8 games

FOR: 85 (AVE 10.63)

AGAINST: 107 (AVE 13.38)

**BASLE**

13 games

FOR: 83 (AVE 10.58)

AGAINST: 105 (AVE 12.13)

**BEŞİKTAŞ**

8 games

FOR: 85 (AVE 10.63)

AGAINST: 128 (AVE 15.8)

**PARIS**

7 games

FOR: 79 (AVE 11.29)

AGAINST: 99 (AVE 14.88)

**SEVILLA**

10 games

FOR: 158 (AVE 15.63)

AGAINST: 129 (AVE 12.9)

**ROMA**

12 games

FOR: 171 (AVE 14.25)

AGAINST: 158 (AVE 13.17)

**JUVENTUS**

11 games

FOR: 113 (AVE 14.12)

AGAINST: 101 (AVE 13.12)

**BAYERN**

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12 games

FOR: 171 (AVE 14.25)

AGAINST: 158 (AVE 13.17)
CROSSES

Playing on the flanks pays off when married to quality delivery

The relevance of wing-play in circumventing compact defensive blocks was, once again, underlined by the 2017/18 season. The global balance after the 125 matches was a total of 4,180 crosses at an average of 33.44 per game – figures that represent a modest downturn in comparison with the previous season, when the stats were 4,329 and 34.6 respectively. On the other hand, the success rate climbed fractionally from 22.7% to 23.37%, meaning that the ratio of crosses met by team-mates of the suppliers was one per 4.28. For the sake of argument, the shortfall could be linked to Liverpool – the competition’s most prolific supplier was one per 4.29. But for the sake of argument, the shortfall could be linked to Liverpool – the competition’s most prolific supplier was one per 4.29. But other teams have the reads, the ability to know how to play with, if these teams are not top-class in their defending, they can run into problems.” Thomas Schaaf agreed: “I think we’re seeing a trend where teams have developed strategies to play against possession football and to make themselves dangerous against opponents like Barcelona, Real Madrid, Manchester City or Paris Saint-Germain.”

This reflection, especially on the possession-based style, they defeated City 2-1 with a 28% share of the ball. The season’s averages reveal that 17 teams occupied a relatively narrow band between 46% and 54%. The table shows the teams that fell above or below those rangers on the possession ladder, but only two teams (Manchester City and Barcelona) could genuinely claim to be ‘possession teams’ by having the lion’s share of the ball in every game they played.

**CROSSES PER MATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLUBS</th>
<th>CROSSES PER MATCH</th>
<th>SUCCESS RATE %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>16.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sevilla</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>20.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seville</td>
<td>15.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shaktar</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>27.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>29.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PLAYERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLAYERS</th>
<th>CROSSES PER GAME</th>
<th>SUCCESS RATE %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alex Telles</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>32.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dangling</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dariel Akaka</td>
<td>5.14</td>
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<td>Éver Banega</td>
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<td>Christian Eriksen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aleksandar Kolarov</td>
<td>5.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>José Callejón</td>
<td>7.58</td>
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<td>Kevin-De Bruyne</td>
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<td>Marcelo</td>
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<td>Thomas Müller</td>
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<td>James Milner</td>
<td>4.42</td>
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<td>Trent Alexander-Arnold</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>21.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Kimmich</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>21.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Rodriguez</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>20.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Clubs in bold qualified for knockout stage

**CROSSES PER MATCH**

33.44

**SUCCESSFUL CROSSES**

23.37%

12 TEAMS HAD A SUCCESS RATE OF 25% OR HIGHER, UP 50% ON 2016/17

10.86 MOST CROSSES PER GAME BY BEŠIKTAŞ WINGER RICARDO QUARESMA

376 BAYERN DELIVERED MORE CROSSES THAN ANY OTHER TEAM

32% HIGHEST SUCCESS RATE BY PORTO LEFT-BACK ALEX TELLES

**POSISSION AREAS [AVERAGE %]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOP 6</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Midfield</th>
<th>Attack</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOEL</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maribor</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feyenoord</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qarabağ</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Celtic</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cuts in bold qualified for knockout stage; decimal points account for 1% discrepancies
The clock is ticking towards the 55-minute mark in Kyiv. Liverpool, anxious to rebound from the blow of Real Madrid’s soft opening goal, open play with James Milner on the left. His inswinging right-footed cross is nudged by the head of Raphael Varane just over Roberto Firmino, racing in at the far post. Milner notes his team-mate and the crowd, urging them to give more vocal support as he makes his way to take the corner on the Liverpool left. His delivery is met by Dejan Lovren, connecting with his head between Sergio Ramos and Casemiro. Sadio Mané plays the ball into the net from close range to equalise. It was the last of the season’s 28 successful corners.

The 2017/18 total of 1,257 corners meant that the average was a_smidge over 10 per game. Supporters in Germany arguably did the most shouting, with Bayern München hoping the chart with an average of 8.25 corners, followed by Borussia Dortmund with 7.67. Real Madrid, with 7.62, took the bronze medal in this specialised category. Whereas those numbers of corner kicks could justify training-ground investments in rearmament, the coaches of the nine clubs who earned three per game or fewer might easily have entertained doubts. And, at the 17 clubs who conceded more than they earned, there might easily have been reasons to practise defensive mechanisms – among them, surprisingly, Tottenham Hotspur and, more especially, Paris Saint-Germain who won 33 and had to deal with an average of 5.55 deliveries – significantly better than the 42.23 per 44.89 deliveries – significantly better than the 2015/16 and 2014/15 seasons respectively. Just over half of the 55.8 deliveries were not immediately intercepted. The coaches converted into movements on the scoreboard signified a success rate of one goal per 4.48 deliveries: 6.16% which technically makes the one per 5.18 in 2016/17 but worse than the 42.23 and 38.42 registered in the 2015/16 and 2014/15 seasons respectively. Just over half of the 112 corner contests (57) enjoyed success from corners, led by Liverpool with five, plus Sevilla and Manchester City with four apiece.

To be fair, the total could be inflated. CICA Mosalá’s equaliser at Benfica was a penalty originating in handball at a corner. Porto’s equaliser at home to Barcelona was a corner turned into an own goal. Roma’s opener away to Dortmund was a diagonal into the box after a corner. Napoli pulled level at home to Manchester City with a penalty after a corner had been cleared. Borussia Dortmund went 2-0 ahead at home to Roma with an own goal turned from a corner on the right. Paris’s second goal against Anderlecht in France was a Neymar run after a corner on the left. Chelsea’s equaliser at home to Atlético Madrid was an own goal derived from a cross following a corner on the left. And Williams long range opener against Barça came after a short corner on the left.

The short corner became more of a strategic option with 21.72% of the season’s total being executed in this fashion. Josep Guardiola’s teams have frequently preferred to take a short corner, retain possession and maintain the pressure on opponents, rather than call halt while centre-backs trundle up to the box. In attacking terms, the short corner can entice opponents out of position and offer possibilities to cross the ball from a different angle. In defensive terms, retaining possession with a short corner can reduce vulnerability to counterattacks while central defenders may be out of position. Guardian’s Manchester City illustrated both facets during the season. Against Feyenoord in Rotterdam, they broke the ice with a short corner in the second minute, and the subsequent cross was headed home by centre-back John Stones, who had moved up for the set play. At Napoli, they took a 3-2 advantage thanks to a solo counterattack after a Napoli corner. In Munich, Real Madrid similarly secured a priceless winner in the first leg of the semi-finals with a counterattack after a Bayern corner.

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When discussing the traditional longer version, Sir Alex Ferguson’s motto was “delivery is everything”. Quality in this specialist is difficult to assess but statistics can offer some sort of gauge. If we accept that a ‘successful’ delivery is one that is touched by a team-mate, 44.55% ticked the box – which evidently means that a majority did not. Among the 42 players who took 30 or more corners during the season, 11 had a success rate in excess of 50%, led by Manchester City’s Kevin De Bruyne with 72.26% and Chelsea’s Cesc Fàbregas with 75%. Behind them: Real Madrid’s Marco Asensio (72.12%), Bernard of Shakhtar Donetsk and Roman Yaremchuk of Rapid Bratislava (both 66.67%).

In numerical terms, Real Madrid’s Marco Asensio’s 75 goals and Fred's 51.8 per game were a team-mate. In terms of execution, the trend towards wrong-footed corners continued during a season when 294 of the 444 corners on the attacking team’s right were taken left-footed and 372 of the 613 on the left were delivered with the right foot.
Different job descriptions within the team framework mean that the only reasonably reliable comparisons on distance covered are the number of metres per minute played. Perhaps not surprisingly, the majority of the players who covered the highest average distance in the 2017/18 UEFA Champions League were midfielders, along with full-backs or wing-backs such as Marcos Alonso or Joshua Kimmich, whose job descriptions required them to cover a lot of ground.

As with distance covered, midfielders also feature prominently in the average number of sprints – although seven of the 15 players who made the highest average were deployed at full-back for at least some of the season. Of the remaining eight players in the top 15, six were usually used in midfield by their clubs, with Liverpool pair Roberto Firmino and Sadio Mané the only forwards to feature. The high-octane style favoured by Jürgen Klopp means Liverpool players figure prominently at the top of each of the three lists – for distance covered, average number of sprints, and fastest sprints. Perhaps not surprisingly, centre-backs are entirely absent from the top of the most-sprints list.

The 2017/18 season featured 307 sprints in excess of 30km/h compared with 288 in the previous season. The top speed of 2016/17 (32.6km/h) was bettered by five sprints in 2017/18 – two of them by Manchester United’s Marcus Rashford. Top place on the podium went to Liverpool striker Mohamed Salah with a sprint of 33.8km/h during the home leg of the quarter-final against Manchester City. The list of explosive performers offers a substantially different list of players who covered the most distance. And, among the top sprinters, midfielders and full-backs make rarer appearances than wingers, who make more appearances than full-backs. The tendency to underestimate the speed of centre-backs – these days encouraged to be positionally more conservative than the wide defenders – was belied by the likes of Kostas Manolas and Giorgio Chiellini.

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LONG DISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player</th>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Average MTR/min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Milner</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>162.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Elyounoussi</td>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>137.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesc Fàbregas</td>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>133.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pablo Sarabia</td>
<td>Sevilla</td>
<td>133.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin De Bruyne</td>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>131.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Shakhtar</td>
<td></td>
<td>131.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Henderson</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>130.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taras Stepanenko</td>
<td>Shakhtar</td>
<td>130.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Strootman</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>129.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos Alonso</td>
<td>Roma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joshua Kimmich</td>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>127.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Rodríguez</td>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>127.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toni Kroos</td>
<td>Real Madrid</td>
<td>126.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniele De Rossi</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>126.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego Perotti</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average minutes per match of 75 or more

FITNESS

Liverpool players topped the charts for both distance covered and top speed.

MOST SPRINTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player</th>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Average Sprints/Match</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>José Callejón</td>
<td>Napoli</td>
<td>58.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquín Correa</td>
<td>Sevilla</td>
<td>57.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dries Mertens</td>
<td>Napoli</td>
<td>57.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordi Alba</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>55.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshua Kimmich</td>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>54.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto Firmino</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>53.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadio Mané</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>52.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Elyounoussi</td>
<td>Basel</td>
<td>52.50</td>
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<td>Pablo Sarabia</td>
<td>Sevilla</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Aleksandar Kolarov</td>
<td>Roma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nacho</td>
<td>Real Madrid</td>
<td>49.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelson Martins</td>
<td>Sporting</td>
<td>49.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Aurier</td>
<td>Tottenham</td>
<td>49.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergi Roberto</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>49.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyle Walker</td>
<td>Manchester City</td>
<td>49.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>

At least six games played, average of 75 minutes or more

Average sprints per match of 75 or more

FASTEST SPRINTS (IN KM/H)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player</th>
<th>Average Speed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Salah</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus Rashford</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyle Walker</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Cuadrado</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandar Kolarov</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacho</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelson Martins</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Aurier</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergi Roberto</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyle Walker</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At least six games played, average of 75 minutes or more

As with distance covered, midfielders also feature prominently in the average number of sprints – although seven of the 15 players who made the highest average were deployed at full-back for at least some of the season. Of the remaining eight players in the top 15, six were usually used in midfield by their clubs, with Liverpool pair Roberto Firmino and Sadio Mané the only forwards to feature. The high-octane style favoured by Jürgen Klopp means Liverpool players figure prominently at the top of each of the three lists – for distance covered, average number of sprints, and fastest sprints. Perhaps not surprisingly, centre-backs are entirely absent from the top of the most-sprints list.
UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18

Matches: Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

Goals; = G
Minutes played; = M
Assists; = A
Appearances; = Ap
Unused substitutes: Robert Berić, Emmanuel Adjey Sowah,

FORWARDS

MIDFIELDERS

DEFENDERS

GOALKEEPERS

TEAM SHAPE

TEAM STATISTICS

Passes attempted; = P
Passes completed; = C
Passes completed in the final third; = C (min 100 touches)

PLAYER STATISTICS

SQUAD AVERAGE AGE: 26.2

GROUP B

BELGIUM ANDERLECHT

RSC ANDERLECHT

COACH

Hein Vanhaezebrouck

GROUP B

SQUAD

App: Number of appearances M: Minutes played G: Goals A: Assists

TEAM SHAPE

TEAM PROFILES

MATCH AVERAGES

POSSSESSION

Minutes

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED

ATTEMPTS ON GOAL

Max. 50% côte à côte
Max. 52% côte à côte

Max. 91% côte à côte

Max. 697 v Celtic (a)

Max. 91% v Celtic (a)

Min. 239 v Bayern (a)

Min. 69% v Bayern (a)

Max. 103,249m v Bayern (a)

Min. 110,896m v Qarabağ (a)

Max. 117,186m v Chelsea (a)

Min. 470 v Roma (h)

Min. 84% v Roma (h)

112,879m

TEAM PROFILES

GROUP C

SPAIN CLUB ATLÉTICO DE MADRID

COACH

Diego Simeone

GROUP C

SQUAD

App: Number of appearances M: Minutes played G: Goals A: Assists

TEAM SHAPE

TEAM PROFILES

MATCH AVERAGES

POSSSESSION

Minutes

PLAYER STATISTICS

SQUAD AVERAGE AGE: 25.7

GROUP C

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED

ATTEMPTS ON GOAL

Max. 563 v Chelsea (a)

Max. 88% v Chelsea (a), Qarabağ (h)

Min. 470 v Roma (h)

Min. 84% v Roma (h)

112,879m
**Apoel FC**

**GROUP H**

**COACH**

* Group stage to final

**TEAM SHAPE**

Example: 4-3-3 (3 outfield players)

**TEAM PROFILES**

---

**GROUP STAGE**

**JUV** 3-0 | **SCP** 1-0 | **Oly** 0-1 | **OLY** 3-3 | **JUV** 5-2 | **SCP** 2-1 | **Oly** 2-0 | **OLY** 1-0 | **JUV** 3-0 | **SCP** 1-0 | **Oly** 5-2 | **OLY** 2-0

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**PASSING ACCURACY** 79%

**GOAL ATTEMPTS PER MATCH**

**PASSES ATTEMPTED PER MATCH**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**POSSESSION** 36%

**POSSESSION POSITION**

**SUBSTITUTION TIME**

**CARDS**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALS**

1. Lionel Messi 213
2. Lionel Messi 190
3. Ousmane Dembélé 143
4. Ousmane Dembélé 142
5. Robert Lewandowski 135
6. Robert Lewandowski 125
7. Ousmane Dembélé 125
8. Ousmane Dembélé 122
9. Lionel Messi 114
10. Ousmane Dembélé 114

**CARDS**

---

**FC Barcelona**

**GROUP D**

**COACH**

* Group stage to final

**TEAM SHAPE**

Example: 4-2-3-1 (3 outfield players)

**TEAM PROFILES**

---

**GROUP STAGE**

**JUV** 0-1 | **SCP** 1-0 | **Oly** 0-0 | **OLY** 3-0 | **JUV** 2-0 | **SCP** 1-0 | **Oly** 0-0 | **OLY** 2-0 | **JUV** 3-0 | **SCP** 1-0 | **Oly** 3-0 | **OLY** 1-0

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**PASSING ACCURACY** 89%

**GOAL ATTEMPTS PER MATCH**

**PASSES ATTEMPTED PER MATCH**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**POSSESSION** 61%

**POSSESSION POSITION**

**SUBSTITUTION TIME**

**CARDS**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALS**

1. Robert Lewandowski 142
2. Ousmane Dembélé 135
3. Lionel Messi 102
4. Lionel Messi 101
5. Robert Lewandowski 83
6. Robert Lewandowski 78
7. Lionel Messi 78
8. Lionel Messi 77
9. Ousmane Dembélé 73
10. Lionel Messi 73

**CARDS**

---

**Key Features**

- 1-4-2-1-2 the default setting with occasional use of 1-4-3-3
- Excellent high-temps, time-touch combinations, ever-under pressure in own box
- Balanced central midfield; Rakitić boss-to-box; Busquets the stabiliser
- Ter Stegen very good with feet; shot-stopping
- Very high full-backs: 1v1 skills, good cutbacks
- Messi dribbling behind Suarez; outstanding free-kicks, match-winning skills
- Messi has 1-4-1-1/4-3-3, great cutbacks or cut in to shoot at goal
- Mixed repertoire: possession play changes with change of temp, or fast counters
- Collective press after loss of possession; high regains, immediate counterattacks
**TEAM PROFILES**

**TEAM SHAPE**

**FINAL**

**ROUND OF 16**

**SEMI-FINALS**

**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP A**

**GROUP B**

**SQUAD**

**AVG. AGE 24.6**

**App Mins G A**

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**POSSESSION AVERAGES**

**PASSING ACCURACY** 77%

**Max. 108,483m v Manchester United (h)**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**POSSSESSION POSITION**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP B**

**SQUAD**

**AVG. AGE 27.5**

**App Mins G A**

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**POSSESSION AVERAGES**

**PASSING ACCURACY** 88%

**Max. 117,216m v Real Madrid (a)**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP B**

**SQUAD**

**AVG. AGE 24.6**

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**TEAM STATISTICS**

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**CARDS**

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**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

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**GROUP B**

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**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

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**GROUP B**

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**AVG. AGE 27.5**

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**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**POSSESSION AVERAGES**

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**Max. 117,216m v Real Madrid (a)**

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**MATCH AVERAGES**

**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

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**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP B**

**SQUAD**

**AVG. AGE 24.6**

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**CARDS**

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**GROUP B**

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**App Mins G A**

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**POSSESSION AVERAGES**

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**Max. 117,216m v Real Madrid (a)**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP B**

**SQUAD**

**AVG. AGE 24.6**

**App Mins G A**

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**POSSESSION AVERAGES**

**PASSING ACCURACY** 77%

**Max. 108,483m v Manchester United (h)**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**TIME SCORED**

**CARDS**

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP B**
### Squad Statistics

#### Match Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Match Averages</th>
<th>App</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>A</th>
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#### Team Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Statistics</th>
<th>A</th>
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#### Time Scored

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#### Passes Attempted

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<th>Passes Committed</th>
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#### Possession

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#### Possession Position

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#### Cards

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#### Substitution Time

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#### Team Distance Covered

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#### Match Details

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<tr>
<th>Match Details</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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</table>

#### Team Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Profile</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Key Features

- 1-4-3-1-2 with fast transitions to 1-4-4-2 defensive block
- Possession-based game building through thirds
- Medial man distributor as centre-back or holding midfielder
- Good use of flanks with wingers cutting in and full-backs overlapping
- Özyakup the creative spark, well-timed passes, comfortable under pressure
- Fast, well-organised transitions in both directions, spells of high pressing
- Small midfield slaying tight to block routes through central midfield
- Structure based on 7-man defence, 4-man attack with space between units

---

**SL BENFICA**

**BEŞİKTAŞ JK**

---

**Group A**

**Group G**
**Borussia Dortmund**

**COACH:** Peter Bosz

**TEAM SHAPE:** 4-2-3-1

**Players:**
- **FORWARDS:**
  - 9 Andriy Yarmolenko
  - 10 Mario Götze
  - 27 Gonzalo Castro
  - 33 Julian Weigl
  - 23 Shinji Kagawa
  - 22 Christian Pulišić
- **DEFENDERS:**
  - 15 Jeremy Toljan
  - 14 Alexander Isak
  - 9 Łukasz Piszczek
  - 29 Marcel Schmelzer
  - 5 Marc Bartra
- **GOALKEEPERS:**
  - 1 Roman Weidenfeller
  - 1 Roman Bürki

**Squad Statistics**
- **Goals:**
  - 25 (9 home, 16 away)
- **Goals Against:** 18
- **Averages:**
  - Goals: 25
  - Assists: 18
  - Minutes Played: 25

**Goals Attempted:**
- 67

**Match Averages**
- **Possession:** 57%
- **Possession Position:** 62%

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:** 25
- **Goals:** 18
- **Assists:** 10

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:

**Goals Attempted per Match:**
- Max: 814 v APOEL (h)
- Min: 38% v Real Madrid (a)

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:**
  - 23
  - **Goals:**
  - 18
  - **Assists:**
  - 0
  - **Minutes Played:** 22

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:

**Goals Attempted per Match:**
- Max: 602 v Anderlecht (a)
- Min: 40% v Paris (h)

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:**
  - 20
  - **Goals:**
  - 17
  - **Assists:**
  - 1
  - **Minutes Played:** 20

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:

**Goals Attempted per Match:**
- Max: 552 v APOEL (h)
- Min: 40% v Paris (h)

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:**
  - 18
  - **Goals:**
  - 16
  - **Assists:**
  - 2
  - **Minutes Played:** 28

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:

**Goals Attempted per Match:**
- Max: 487 v APOEL (h)
- Min: 40% v Paris (h)

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:**
  - 17
  - **Goals:**
  - 15
  - **Assists:**
  - 1
  - **Minutes Played:** 25

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:

**Goals Attempted per Match:**
- Max: 487 v APOEL (h)
- Min: 40% v Paris (h)

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:**
  - 18
  - **Goals:**
  - 16
  - **Assists:**
  - 2
  - **Minutes Played:** 28

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:

**Goals Attempted per Match:**
- Max: 487 v APOEL (h)
- Min: 40% v Paris (h)

**Player Statistics**
- **Goals Attempted:**
  - 17
  - **Goals:**
  - 15
  - **Assists:**
  - 1
  - **Minutes Played:** 25

**Team Statistics**
- **Time Scored:**
  - 1-15: 11 goals
  - 16-30: 5 goals
  - 31-45: 7 goals
  - 45+:
SQUAD
AVERAGE AGE 26.2  App Miss G A
GOALKEEPERS
13 Thibaut Courtois 8 720
27 Willy Caballero 8 305
28 Kenedy 8 307
29 Callum Hudson-Odoi 8 309
Unused substitutes:
Willy Caballero, Kenedy, Callum Hudson-Odoi, Unused substitutes:
Willy Caballero, Callum Hudson-Odoi, Unused substitutes:
Willy Caballero
TEAM SHAPE
An example of how to look like

GROUP C
TEAM PROFILES
COACH
Antonio Conte
Born: 11/07/1971, Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Italian
Main clubs: Roma, Juventus, Real Madrid, FcB, Inter
Main clubs: Roma, Juventus, Real Madrid, FcB, Inter
TEAM SHAPE
An example of how to look like

GROUP A
TEAM PROFILES
COACH
Viktor Goncharenko
Born: 31/07/1969, Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Belarusian
Main clubs: Smena, Dnipro, Shakhtar, Zorya
Main clubs: Smena, Dnipro, Shakhtar, Zorya
SQUAD
AVERAGE AGE 23.5  App Miss G A
GOALKEEPERS
14 Ilya Pomazun 6 2
17 Aleksandr Makarov 6 3
27 Ilya Pomazun, Aleksandr Makarov
DEFENDERS
2 Antonio Rüdiger 6 1
3 Danny Drinkwater 6 1
4 Gary Cahill 6 3
5 Tiemoué Bakayoko 5 1
6 Danny Drinkwater, Gary Cahill, Tiemoué Bakayoko
7 N’Golo Kanté 6 2
8 Tiemoué Bakayoko 5 1
9 Álvaro Morata 7 1
21 Davide Zappacosta 5 1
31 Antonio Rüdiger, Tiemoué Bakayoko, Danny Drinkwater, Gary Cahill, Tiemoué Bakayoko, Danny Drinkwater
MIDFIELDERS
10 Eden Hazard 8 3
15 Victor Moses 4 1
16 Ilaix Moriba 4 1
66 Cesc Fàbregas 3 1
74 Timur Zhamaletdinov 5 1
75 Fedor Chalov 3 1
28 César Azpilicueta 8 1
36 Tiemoué Bakayoko, Danny Drinkwater, Eden Hazard, Victor Moses, Ilaix Moriba
FORWARDS
44 italy
Antonio Conte
Born: 11/07/1971, Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Italian
Main clubs: Roma, Juventus, Real Madrid, FcB, Inter
Main clubs: Roma, Juventus, Real Madrid, FcB, Inter
TEAM SHAPE
An example of how to look like

GROUP C
TEAM PROFILES
COACH
Antonio Conte
Born: 11/07/1971, Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Italian
Main clubs: Roma, Juventus, Real Madrid, FcB, Inter
Main clubs: Roma, Juventus, Real Madrid, FcB, Inter
TEAM SHAPE
An example of how to look like

GROUP A
TEAM PROFILES
COACH
Viktor Goncharenko
Born: 31/07/1969, Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Belarusian
Main clubs: Smena, Dnipro, Shakhtar, Zorya
Main clubs: Smena, Dnipro, Shakhtar, Zorya
SQUAD
AVERAGE AGE 23.5  App Miss G A
GOALKEEPERS
35 Ilya Pomazun 6 2
36 Ilya Pomazun, Aleksandr Makarov
DEFENDERS
2 Mario Fernandes 6 4
4 Sergei Ignashevich 4 1
5 Viktor Vasin 6 4
6 Aleksandr Golovin 5 1
7 Timur Zhamaletdinov 5 1
8 Fedor Chalov 3 1
2 Mario Fernandes, Sergei Ignashevich, Viktor Vasin
MIDFIELDERS
57 Igor Afinfeev 6 2
59 Fedor Chalov 3 1
61 Viktor Vasin 3 1
62 Aleksei Berezutski 4 1
63 Timur Zhamaletdinov 5 1
64 Fedor Chalov, Viktor Vasin, Aleksei Berezutski
FORWARDS
99 Aaron Olanare 1 67
100 Georgi Milanov 3 89
111 Vitinho 21 2
213 Mario Fernandes 6 1
222 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
224 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
226 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
228 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
Player statistics:
Ball recovered: 112,446m
Min. 108,889m v Benfica (a)
Max. 115,780m v Atlético (h)
TEAM DISTANCE COVERED
85 34 24 27
TEAM SHAPE
An example of how to look like

GROUP A
TEAM PROFILES
COACH
Viktor Goncharenko
Born: 31/07/1969, Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Belarusian
Main clubs: Smena, Dnipro, Shakhtar, Zorya
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SQUAD
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8 Fedor Chalov 3 1
2 Mario Fernandes, Sergei Ignashevich, Viktor Vasin
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59 Fedor Chalov 3 1
61 Viktor Vasin 3 1
62 Aleksei Berezutski 4 1
63 Timur Zhamaletdinov 5 1
64 Fedor Chalov, Viktor Vasin, Aleksei Berezutski
FORWARDS
99 Aaron Olanare 1 67
100 Georgi Milanov 3 89
111 Vitinho 21 2
213 Mario Fernandes 6 1
222 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
224 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
226 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
228 Mario Fernandes, Vitinho
Player statistics:
Ball recovered: 112,446m
Min. 108,889m v Benfica (a)
Max. 115,780m v Atlético (h)
TEAM DISTANCE COVERED
85 34 24 27
### Feyenoord

#### Team Profile
- **Coach:** Giovanni van Bronckhorst
- **Squad Averages:**
  - Age: 25.8
  - Apps: 3.0
  - Minutes: 26.8
  - Goals: 2.6
  - Assists: 0.8
- **Goalkeepers:**
  - Ciprian Tătărușanu, Jeroen Zoet, Stephanie van der Gragt
- **Defenders:**
  - Philipp Zlatić, Tonny Vilhena, Justin Bijlow, Emil Hansson, Lutsharel Geertruida
- **Midfielders:**
  - Giovanni Lo Celso, Mitchell Dijks, Egzon Kaja, Oscar Duarte
- **Forwards:**
  - Donyell Malen, Wout Weghorst, Ons Essien, Luuk de Jong

#### Match Statistics
- **Possession:** 55%
- **Possession Position:** Long 74 (37%), Medium 256 (63%), Short 123 (30%)
- **Goals Attempted:** 11
- **Goals Scored:** 10
- **Shots on Target:** 4
- **Shots Off Target:** 6
- **Passes Completed:** 273 (85%)
- **Passes Attempted:** 321
- **Passes Per Match:** 150
- **Minutes Played:** 90
- **Assists:** 1
- **Minutes on the Field:** 120

#### Key Features
- **High-Corner:**
  - Set plays delivered by Dybala and Pjanić;
  - Dybala a linking element in wide offensive areas;
  - Pjanic the forward passers;
  - Excellent defensive block denying spaces against the lines;
  - Fast defence-to-offense transitions with direct supply from centre-back to striker;
  - Passenger control through third, Pjanic and Khedira the forward passers;
  - Dybala a linking element in wake of mobile target striker Higuaín;
  - Cautionous advances by full-backs depending on match situation;
  - Danger on flanks; Costa with pace, 1v1 skills on right; Manduziç in from left;
  - Set plays well delivered by Dybala and Pjanič;
  - Buffon an influential keeper

### Juventus

#### Team Profile
- **Coach:** Massimiliano Allegri
- **Squad Averages:**
  - Age: 25.8
  - Apps: 2.7
  - Minutes: 25.8
  - Goals: 2.5
  - Assists: 0.6
- **Goalkeepers:**
  - Gianluigi Buffon, Costel Pantilimon, Andrea Consigli
- **Defenders:**
  - Miralem Pjanić, Paulo Dybala, Andrea Barzagli, Blaise Matuidi
- **Midfielders:**
  - Giorgio Chiellini, Paulo Dybala, Sami Khedira, Medhi Benatia
- **Forwards:**
  - Ciro Immobile, Cristiano Ronaldo, Paulo Dybala, Paulo Dybala

#### Match Statistics
- **Possession:** 51%
- **Possession Position:** Long 123 (37%), Medium 358 (63%), Short 115 (30%)
- **Goals Attempted:** 13
- **Goals Scored:** 11
- **Shots on Target:** 5
- **Shots Off Target:** 8
- **Passes Completed:** 273 (85%)
- **Passes Attempted:** 321
- **Passes Per Match:** 150
- **Minutes Played:** 90
- **Assists:** 2
- **Minutes on the Field:** 120

#### Key Features
- **Variations in 4-4-2, 1-4-4-1, 3-4-3 options according to game situation:**
  - Compact, efficient defensive block denying opposition spaces between lines;
  - Fast defence-to-offense transitions with direct supply from centre-back to striker;
  - Patient construction through thirds, Pjanic and Khedira the forward passers;
  - Dybala a linking element in wake of mobile target striker Higuaín;
  - Cautionary advances by full-backs depending on match situation;
  - Danger on flanks; Costa with pace, 1v1 skills on right; Manduziç in from left;
  - Set plays well delivered by Dybala and Pjanič; Buffon an influential keeper

---

**Visual Content:**
- Feyenoord's final team shape.
- Juventus' final team shape.
- Match statistics and player performance data.

---
## Team Profiles

### RB Leipzig

#### Squad Age: 21.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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#### Squad Statistics

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### Liverpool FC

#### Squad Age: 25.1

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#### Squad Statistics

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<td>Time Scored</td>
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MANCHESTER CITY FC

COACH
Josep Guardiola

TEAM SHAPE
4-3-3

Squad

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<th>Player</th>
<th>Appearances</th>
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Team Statistics

- **Goals Attempted**: 140
- **Goals Scored**: 47
- **Possession Position**: 90%
- **Passing Accuracy**: 90%
- **Minutes Covered**: 112,261

Key Features

- **Goals Attempted**: 140
- **Goals Scored**: 47
- **Possession Position**: 90%
- **Passing Accuracy**: 90%
- **Minutes Covered**: 112,261

Substitutions

- **Time Substituted**: 12
- **Substitution Time**: 47 minutes

MANCHESTER UNITED FC

COACH
José Mourinho

TEAM SHAPE
3-5-2

Squad

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Team Statistics

- **Goals Attempted**: 113
- **Goals Scored**: 42
- **Possession Position**: 80%
- **Passing Accuracy**: 80%
- **Minutes Covered**: 106,174

Key Features

- **Goals Attempted**: 113
- **Goals Scored**: 42
- **Possession Position**: 80%
- **Passing Accuracy**: 80%
- **Minutes Covered**: 106,174

Substitutions

- **Time Substituted**: 12
- **Substitution Time**: 47 minutes
**NK Maribor**

**GROUP E**

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SQUAD AVERAGE AGE 27.2**

**TEAM SHAPE**

**Time scored**

![Image](image1.png)

**Goals scored**

![Image](image2.png)

**Player statistics**

![Image](image3.png)

**Team statistics**

![Image](image4.png)

**Group stage**

![Image](image5.png)

**Quarter-finals**

![Image](image6.png)

**Semi-finals**

![Image](image7.png)

**Final**

![Image](image8.png)

**COACH**

Darko Milanič

**Unused substitutes**

Matko Obradović, Aljaž Cotman, Žiga Grošelj, Matija Mitjača, Balsa Juričević, Matjaž Štajner, Marko Šuler, Damjan Bohar, Ognjen Popović

**FORWARDS**

Jasmin Mešanović, Valon Ahmedi, Valter Lisčanec, Linz, Mladen Kramberger, Dino Hotić, Martin Milec, Lilyan Télèsco, Aljaz Zavresek

**MIDFIELDERS**

Dario Breza, Davide Vršič, Žiga Ščuše, Žiga Kranjec, Zlatan Arslanagić, Aljaz Zavresek, Mitja Vilenšek, Vincent Pajnič, Aljaž Cotman, Matjaž Štajner, Predrag Rajčević, Bijeli, Andraž Cimpean, Matija Obradović, Filip Škugec

**DEFENDERS**

Marko Šuler, Primož Tabak, Tadej Vucic, Mario Bakšič, Damjan Bohar, Matic Tavčar, Ronja Žeželj, Martin Milec, Miha Zupan, Matija Obradović, Aljaž Cotman, Marko Šuler, Žiga Ščuše, Žiga Kranjec, Zlatan Arslanagić, Aljaz Zavresek, Matjaž Štajner, Predrag Rajčević, Bijeli, Andraž Cimpean, Matija Obradović, Filip Škugec

**GOALKEEPERS**

Matjaž Ogrin, Aljaž Marušič, Marko Šuler, Matic Tavčar, Ronja Žeželj, Martin Milec, Miha Zupan, Matija Obradović, Aljaž Cotman, Žiga Ščuše, Žiga Kranjec, Zlatan Arslanagić, Andraž Cimpean, Matija Obradović, Filip Škugec

**Team report**

**GROUP E**

**NK Maribor**

**GROUP G**

**AS Monaco FC**

**GROUP F**

**AS Monaco FC**

**GROUP G**

**AS Monaco FC**

**MATCH AVERAGES**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Team</th>
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<th>Goals</th>
<th>Assists</th>
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<tr>
<td>NK Maribor</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>270</td>
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<tr>
<td>AS Monaco</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>270</td>
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</table>

**Goal attempts per match**

![Image](image9.png)

**Time scored**

![Image](image10.png)

**Player statistics**

![Image](image11.png)

**Team statistics**

![Image](image12.png)

**GROUP G**

**AS Monaco FC**

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**Goal attempts per match**

![Image](image13.png)

**Time scored**

![Image](image14.png)

**Player statistics**

![Image](image15.png)

**Team statistics**

![Image](image16.png)

**GROUP G**

**AS Monaco FC**

**GROUP G**

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**Goal attempts per match**

![Image](image17.png)

**Time scored**

![Image](image18.png)

**Player statistics**

![Image](image19.png)

**Team statistics**

![Image](image20.png)
**SSC NAPOLI**

**GROUP F**

**COACH**
Maurizio Sarri

**TEAM SHAPE**
Example: at home to Manchester City

**TEAM STATISTICS**

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**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

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- SHK (H) vs. FEY (A): 2-1
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PARIS SAINT-GERMAIN

COACH
Unai Emery

TEAM SHAPE
4-3-3

GROUP B

TEAM PROFILES

SQUAD AVERAGE AGE 25.8
App Mins G A

GOALKEEPERS
16 Alphonse Areola 8 720

DEFENDERS
2 Thiago Silva 6 522
3 Presnel Kimpembe 5 198
5 Marquinhos 8 720
12 Thomas Meunier 1 24
5 Varane 8 720
3 Presnel Kimpembe 3 198
16 Alphonse Areola 8 720

MIDFIELDERS
32 Dani Alves 8 720
20 Layvin Kurzawa 6 540
12 Thomas Meunier 1 24

FORWARDS
11 Ángel Di María 5 143

MATCH AVERAGES

TEAM STATISTICS

GOAL ATTEMPTS (7 per match)

POSESSION (52%)

POSESSION POSITION

TIME SCORED

PLAYERS SUBSTITUTED

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED

108,817m

KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-3-1-1 defensive block
- Wide midfielder supply to striker Aboubakar
- Fast attacks after regains
- Possession-focused game based on high-tempo combination moves
- Two wingers running deep or cutting inside, support from full-backs
- Cautious running on lead to attack, meet deliveries from wingers
- Aggressive pressing in midfield, fast, direct action after regains
- Dangerous set plays, aerial power and free-kick specialists

Goalkeepers
1 Iker Casillas 3 270
12 José Sá 5 450

Defenders
2 Maxi Pereira 3 198
15 Álvaro Fernández 5 450
12 José Sá 5 450

Midfielders
2 Ömer Toprak 3 198

Forwards
1 Neymar 28 14
2 Kylian Mbappé 25 11

Match Averages

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED

108,654m

KEY FEATURES

- Sharp switching from 4-1-3-4 to 4-2-3-1 to 4-4-2 with two switching midfielders
- Wide midfielders dropping back into 4-4-2-1 defensive block
- Sporadic high-pressing, mostly in mid-third; fast attacks after regains
- Set-up to play through thirds but rarely dominated possession
- Extensive use of counterattacks via direct supply to striker Aboubakar
- Passing interchanges between centre-backs and central midfielders
- Longer supply to Flanks or main striker; combinations with support striker
- General preference for long distribution by goalkeeper

Goalkeepers
1 Hugo Lloris 339 277 82%
2 Idrissi Kane 8 1 25%
1 Hugo Lloris 339 277 82%

Defenders
2 Alisson Becker 29 13
2 Marquinhos 15 4
2 Sidnei 1 2

Midfielders
2 Maxi Pereira 3 198

Forwards
1 Neymar 28 14
2 Francisco Soares 19 1

Match Averages

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED

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Forwards
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2 Francisco Soares 19 1

Match Averages

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED

108,654m
TEAM PROFILES

QARABAĞ FK
AZERBAIJAN

GROUP C

COACH
Gurban Garibov

FORWARDS
99 Dani Quintana 4 39
77 Donald Guerrier 6 354 1
91 Joshgun Diniyev 2 65
90 Ramil Sheydaev 2 77
44 Agabala Ramazanov 1 5
18 Tarik Elyounoussi 3 32
11 Mahir Madatov 5 321

TEAM SHAPE

GROUP STAGE

SQUAD

Pos
Name
Age
App
Min
G
A
Unused substitutes:
FORWARDS
MIDFIELDERS
DEFENDERS
GOALKEEPERS

Goal Shooter
1. Dani Quintana
2. Donald Guerrier
3. Joshgun Diniyev
4. Ramil Sheydaev
5. Agabala Ramazanov
6. Tarik Elyounoussi
7. Mahir Madatov

Midfielder
8. Dani Ceballos
9. Sergio Ramos
10. Marco Asensio
11. Marcelo
12. Isco
13. Casemiro
14. Toni Kroos

Defender
15. Keylor Navas
16. Raphaël Varane
17. Sergio Ramos
18. Sergio Ramos
19. Nacho
20. Marco Asensio
21. Casemiro

Goalkeeper
22. Thibaut Courtois
23. Thibaut Courtois
24. Thibaut Courtois
25. Thibaut Courtois

GROUP STAGE

SQUAD

Pos
Name
Age
App
Min
G
A
Unused substitutes:
FORWARDS
MIDFIELDERS
DEFENDERS
GOALKEEPERS

Goal Shooter
1. Cristiano Ronaldo
2. Karim Benzema
3. Danilo
4. Marco Asensio
5. Vinícius Jr.
6. Luka Jović
7. Rodrygo

Midfielder
8. Donny van de Beek
9. Modric
10. Toni Kroos
11. Fede Valverde
12. Casemiro
13.刑事责任

Defender
14. Thibaut Courtois
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MIDFIELDERS
DEFENDERS
GOALKEEPERS

Goal Shooter
1. Cristiano Ronaldo
2. Karim Benzema
3. Danilo
4. Marco Asensio
5. Vinícius Jr.
6. Luka Jović
7. Rodrygo

Midfielder
8. Donny van de Beek
9. Modric
10. Toni Kroos
11. Fede Valverde
12. Casemiro
13.刑事责任

Defender
14. Thibaut Courtois
15. Thibaut Courtois
16. Thibaut Courtois
17. Thibaut Courtois
18. Thibaut Courtois
19. Thibaut Courtois
20. Thibaut Courtois

Goalkeeper
21. Thibaut Courtois
22. Thibaut Courtois
23. Thibaut Courtois
24. Thibaut Courtois
25. Thibaut Courtois

GROUP STAGE

SQUAD

Pos
Name
Age
App
Min
G
A
Unused substitutes:
FORWARDS
MIDFIELDERS
DEFENDERS
GOALKEEPERS

Goal Shooter
1. Cristiano Ronaldo
2. Karim Benzema
3. Danilo
4. Marco Asensio
5. Vinícius Jr.
6. Luka Jović
7. Rodrygo

Midfielder
8. Donny van de Beek
9. Modric
10. Toni Kroos
11. Fede Valverde
12. Casemiro
13.刑事责任

Defender
14. Thibaut Courtois
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17. Thibaut Courtois
18. Thibaut Courtois
19. Thibaut Courtois
20. Thibaut Courtois

Goalkeeper
21. Thibaut Courtois
22. Thibaut Courtois
23. Thibaut Courtois
24. Thibaut Courtois
25. Thibaut Courtois

GROUP STAGE

SQUAD

Pos
Name
Age
App
Min
G
A
Unused substitutes:
FORWARDS
MIDFIELDERS
DEFENDERS
GOALKEEPERS

Goal Shooter
1. Cristiano Ronaldo
2. Karim Benzema
3. Danilo
4. Marco Asensio
5. Vinícius Jr.
6. Luka Jović
7. Rodrygo

Midfielder
8. Donny van de Beek
9. Modric
10. Toni Kroos
11. Fede Valverde
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Defender
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15. Thibaut Courtois
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18. Thibaut Courtois
19. Thibaut Courtois
20. Thibaut Courtois

Goalkeeper
21. Thibaut Courtois
22. Thibaut Courtois
23. Thibaut Courtois
24. Thibaut Courtois
25. Thibaut Courtois

TEAM STATISTICS

Goal Attempts
20
GOALS SCORED
2
GOALS CONCEDED
0
GOAL DIFFERENCE
+2

MATCH AVERAGES

Possession
12%
Possession Position
34%

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED
106,400m

TIME SCORED

20 PLAYERS USED
18 SUBSTITUTIONS
1 CARD

PLAYER STATISTICS

Passes
30
A
2
C
0
%
34%

PASSING ACCURACY
88%

LONG 4 (36%)
MEDIUM 277 (29%)
SHORT 124 (27%)

POSSESSION

TIME

0-60
61-120
121-180
181-240
241-300
301-360
361-420
421-480
481-540
541-600
601-660
661-720
721-780
781-840
841-900
901-960
961-1020
1021-1080
1081-1140
1141-1200
1201-1260
1261-1320
1321-1380
1381-1440
1441-1500
1501-1560
1561-1620
1621-1680
1681-1740
1741-1800
1801-1860
1861-1920
1921-1980
1981-2040
2041-2040

TEAM SHAPE

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED
108,333m
### AS ROMA

**Group C**

**Coach:** Eusebio Di Francesco

**Team Shape:** 4-3-3

**Player Statistics**

- **Goals Attempted:** 21
- **Goal Attempts:** 171
- **Passing Accuracy:** 84%

**Team Distance Covered:** 110,609m

**Key Features**

- Variations on 1-4-3-3 or 1-3-4-1-2 when attacking
- Eliaquim Mangala and Joaquín Correa the organisers; mix of long
- And short passing
- Bad structure; central midfielders and full-backs

**Team Statistics**

- **Goals Scored:** 15
- **Goals Attempted:** 150

**Team Profiles**

- **Squad Averages:** Age 27.5
- **Average Age:** 27.5

**Group Stage**

- **Round of 16:**
  - **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+
- **Substitutions:** 33, 31, 33, 33, 33, 33

**Quarter-Finals**

- **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+

**Semi-Finals**

- **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+

**Final**

- **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+

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### SEVILLA FC

**Group E**

**Coach:** Vincenzo Montella

**Team Shape:** 3-4-3

**Player Statistics**

- **Goals Attempted:** 22
- **Goal Attempts:** 38
- **Passing Accuracy:** 90%

**Team Distance Covered:** 111,152m

**Key Features**

- **Squad Averages:** Age 27.5
- **Average Age:** 27.5

**Group Stage**

- **Round of 16:**
  - **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+
- **Substitutions:** 31, 31, 31, 31, 31, 31

**Quarter-Finals**

- **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+

**Semi-Finals**

- **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+

**Final**

- **Total:** 1-15 16–30 31–45 Half-time 46–60 61–75 76–90 90+

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### Match Analysis

- **Goals Scored:** 43
- **Goals Attempted:** 42
- **Passing Accuracy:** 86%

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**Team Profiles**

- **Squad Averages:** Age 27.5
- **Average Age:** 27.5

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**Note:** The information provided is based on the UEFA Champions League Technical Report 2017/18.
TEAM PROFILES

**TEAM SHAPE**

**GROUP F**

*Example: at home to Roma*

- Paulo Fonseca
- manga: 1-4-2-3-1
- Classic 1-4-2-3-1 formation with two disciplined controlling midfielders.
- In possession play based on two very attack-minded full-backs.
- Wide players cutting in to make room for their overlaps running up.
- Taison, the creative element; narrow attacking play with wide midfielders.
- In-possession play with two disciplined controlling midfielders.
- Plenty of quality in middle-to-forward areas.
- Dangerous set plays, delivery of free-kicks; aerial power at the back.

**GROUP E**

*Example: at home to Sevilla*

- Massimo Carrera
- manga: 1-4-2-3-1
- Basic formation with two disciplined controlling midfielders.
- In possession play based on two very attack-minded full-backs.
- Wide players cutting in to make room for their overlaps running up.
- Taison, the creative element; narrow attacking play with wide midfielders.
- In-possession play with two disciplined controlling midfielders.
- Plenty of quality in middle-to-forward areas.
- Dangerous set plays, delivery of free-kicks; aerial power at the back.

**PASS CHARTS**

*example: at home to Sevilla*

- Classic 1-4-2-3-1 formation with two disciplined controlling midfielders.
- In possession play based on two very attack-minded full-backs.
- Wide players cutting in to make room for their overlaps running up.
- Taison, the creative element; narrow attacking play with wide midfielders.
- In-possession play with two disciplined controlling midfielders.
- Plenty of quality in middle-to-forward areas.
- Dangerous set plays, delivery of free-kicks; aerial power at the back.

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

*Example: at home to Roma*

- Max. 116,370m v Manchester City (a)
- Min. 105,944m v Liverpool (a)
- Max. 589 v Roma (a)
- Min. 329 v Liverpool (h)

**TEAM STATISTICS**

**GROUP F**

- Max. 116,370m v Manchester City (a)
- Min. 74% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 111,320m v Liverpool (a)
- Min. 105,944m v Liverpool (a)

**GROUP E**

- Max. 116,370m v Manchester City (a)
- Min. 74% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 111,320m v Liverpool (a)
- Min. 105,944m v Liverpool (a)

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GROUP F**

- Max. 472 v Maribor (a)
- Min. 40% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 56% v Maribor (a)
- Min. 329 v Liverpool (h)

**GROUP E**

- Max. 472 v Maribor (a)
- Min. 40% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 56% v Maribor (a)
- Min. 329 v Liverpool (h)

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

**GROUP F**

- Max. 116,370m v Manchester City (a)
- Min. 74% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 111,320m v Liverpool (a)
- Min. 105,944m v Liverpool (a)

**GROUP E**

- Max. 116,370m v Manchester City (a)
- Min. 74% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 111,320m v Liverpool (a)
- Min. 105,944m v Liverpool (a)

**MATCH AVERAGES**

**GROUP F**

- Max. 49% v Manchester City (h)
- Min. 38% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 60% v Roma (a)
- Min. 589 v Roma (a)

**GROUP E**

- Max. 47% v Maribor (a)
- Min. 40% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 56% v Maribor (a)
- Min. 329 v Liverpool (h)

**POSSESSION**

**GROUP F**

- Max. 49% v Manchester City (h)
- Min. 38% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 60% v Roma (a)
- Min. 589 v Roma (a)

**GROUP E**

- Max. 47% v Maribor (a)
- Min. 40% v Liverpool (h)
- Max. 56% v Maribor (a)
- Min. 329 v Liverpool (h)

**SQUAD**

**GROUP F**

- 37 players in total.
- 20 in the Extended Squad.
- 17 in the Matchday Squad.

**GROUP E**

- 37 players in total.
- 20 in the Extended Squad.
- 17 in the Matchday Squad.

**STATS**

**GROUP F**

- Goals: 85
- Assists: 33
- Minutes: 2,928

**GROUP E**

- Goals: 74
- Assists: 23
- Minutes: 2,928

**GROUP STAGE**

**GROUP F**

- NAP W 2-3
- MC L 2-0
- FEY W 1-2
- FEY W 5-3

**GROUP E**

- MBR D 1-1
- MCR D 1-1
- SEV W 2-1
- SEV W 1-2

**QUARTER FINALS**

**GROUP F**

- NAP W 2-3
- MC L 2-0
- FEY W 1-2
- FEY W 5-3

**GROUP E**

- MBR D 1-1
- MCR D 1-1
- SEV W 2-1
- SEV W 1-2

**SEMI FINALS**

**GROUP F**

- NAP W 2-3
- MC L 2-0
- FEY W 1-2
- FEY W 5-3

**GROUP E**

- MBR D 1-1
- MCR D 1-1
- SEV W 2-1
- SEV W 1-2

**FINALS**

**GROUP F**

- NAP W 2-3
- MC L 2-0
- FEY W 1-2
- FEY W 5-3

**GROUP E**

- MBR D 1-1
- MCR D 1-1
- SEV W 2-1
- SEV W 1-2
**SPORTING CLUBE DE PORTUGAL**

**GROUP D**

**COACH**
Jorge Jesus

**TEAM SHAPE**

**GROUP STAGE**

- OLY: 2 wins, 1 draw, 1 loss
- BAR: 1 win, 1 draw, 2 losses
- JUV: 1 win, 1 loss

**MATCHES**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - W 2-3 L 0-1 L 2-1 D 1-1 W 3-1 L 2-0

**TEAM STATISTICS**

- **GOALS**
  - 19
- **GOAL ATTEMPTS**
  - 407
- **GOAL ATTEMPTS ON TARGET**
  - 18

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 106,876m

**GROUP HENGLAND**

**ENGLAND**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

**GROUP H**

**COACH**
Mauricio Pochettino

**TEAM SHAPE**

**GROUP STAGE**

- DOR: 1 win, 1 loss
- APO: 3 wins, 1 draw, 1 loss
- RM: 1 win, 2 losses
- D1: 1 win, 2 losses

**MATCHES**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - W 3-0 D 0-0 L 2-1 L 3-0

**TEAM STATISTICS**

- **GOALS**
  - 18
- **GOAL ATTEMPTS**
  - 503
- **GOAL ATTEMPTS ON TARGET**
  - 19

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 114,926m

**KEY FEATURES**

- Variations on 3-4-2-1 with quick transitions to compact 1-4-4-2-1 defending
- Flexible attacking; often 1-3-5-2 with Dier dropping alongside centre-backs
- Construction via high-tempo ball circulation; patient build in midfield
- Eriksen the attacking catalyst, movement, passing, dead-ball expertise
- Wide midfielders cutting in to make space for two-advancing full-backs
- All-air screening midfielders to defend; near striker when attacking
- Kane a very mobile striker, combining fluently with support attackers
- High-intensity game played with strong team ethic, mental strength

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**SQUAD**

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 12 goals

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 18 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 5 passes completed per match

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 saves

---

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 2 goals

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP (VS OLYMPIACOS (A))**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC (VS APOEL (H))**

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**UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18**

**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

**GOALS;**

**Minutes played;**

**Appearances;**

**Assists**

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**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

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**SUBSTITUTION TIME (including one double substitution)**

**BALLS RECOVERED**

**PASSES COMPLETED IN THE FINAL THIRD**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 save

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes completed per match

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 goal

---

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 121,936m

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

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**UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18**

**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

---

**SUBSTITUTION TIME (including one double substitution)**

**BALLS RECOVERED**

**PASSES COMPLETED IN THE FINAL THIRD**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 save

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes completed per match

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 goal

---

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 121,936m

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

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**UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18**

**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

---

**SUBSTITUTION TIME (including one double substitution)**

**BALLS RECOVERED**

**PASSES COMPLETED IN THE FINAL THIRD**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 save

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes completed per match

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 goal

---

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 121,936m

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

---

**UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18**

**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

---

**SUBSTITUTION TIME (including one double substitution)**

**BALLS RECOVERED**

**PASSES COMPLETED IN THE FINAL THIRD**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 save

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes completed per match

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 goal

---

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 121,936m

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

---

**UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18**

**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

---

**SUBSTITUTION TIME (including one double substitution)**

**BALLS RECOVERED**

**PASSES COMPLETED IN THE FINAL THIRD**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 save

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes completed per match

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 goal

---

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 121,936m

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

---

**UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT 2017/18**

**MATCHES:** Blue = home, white = away; See page 5 for full club names

---

**SUBSTITUTION TIME (including one double substitution)**

**BALLS RECOVERED**

**PASSES COMPLETED IN THE FINAL THIRD**

**PLAYER STATISTICS**

**GOALKEEPERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 save

**DEFENDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes attempted per match

**MIDFIELDERS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 10 passes completed per match

**FORWARDS**

- **GROUP STAGE**
  - 1 goal

---

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

- 121,936m

---

**TEAM PROFILES**

**SPORTING CP**

**TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR FC**

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Real Madrid’s Karim Benzema shields the ball from Virgil van Dijk of Liverpool in the final in Kyiv.