This technical report sets out to provide a permanent record of the 2011/12 UEFA Champions League – the competition’s 20th season. In addition to recording factual and statistical information, it seeks to offer analysis, reflections and debating points which, it is hoped, will give technicians food for thought. By highlighting tendencies and trends at the peak of professional club football, it also sets out to provide coaches who are active in the development levels of the game with information that may be helpful in terms of working on the qualities which will be needed by the UEFA Champions League performers of the future.
A sell-out crowd settles into seats at the Fussball Arena in Munich as the Chelsea FC and FC Bayern München players line up for the competition’s 20th final.
During the 2010/11 season, the form book had been, by and large, respected during the group stage. This was not the case during the 2011/12 campaign, which featured 17 clubs who had not been on the starting grid in the previous season. In terms of the coaching profession, there was almost unprecedented stability, in that none of the eliminated teams changed their head coach during the group stage. Curiously, the most notable mid-season changes were registered at clubs which were still in action after the winter break, with FC Basel 1893 and FC Internazionale Milano making managerial substitutions, along with the eventual champions, Chelsea FC. However, the unusually low level of volatility in the technical area was accompanied by a high level of interest.

The most striking example was the elimination of the 2011 silver medallists, Manchester United FC, during a period when Sir Alex Ferguson was obliged to shuffle his lineup in order to cope with an extraordinary run of injuries. Much the same applied to Villarreal CF who, unusually for any Spanish competitor, finished the group stage without winning a point. The underlying factor was also a long injury list which often left Juan Carlos Garrido without seven or eight of his starters in contests against FC Bayern München, SSC Napoli and Manchester City FC in an exceptionally tough Group A. Most coaches are aware of the need to rotate their squads in order to cope with UEFA Champions League and domestic demands (the majority use 20 or more different players during the six-game group stage), but the vagaries of the injury list can often signify the difference between success and failure. Villarreal, in fact, were relegated at the end of the season.

In terms of on-the-pitch performances, differences between success and failure were frequently minimal. In Group A, Roberto Mancini’s Manchester City FC lost out despite taking ten points, while five teams qualified with fewer. In a Group B which produced five draws, PFC CSKA Moskva reached the last 16 by beating FC Internazionale in Milan on the final matchday, to pip Turkish debutants Trabzonspor AS, who had also won at San Siro on the opening day but failed to win another game. In Group C, Basel, having raised eyebrows with a courageous 3-3 draw at Old Trafford earlier in the campaign, needed to beat Manchester United FC at home in their closing fixture — and did so on a night when very little went right for Sir Alex Ferguson’s team. In Group D, where Real Madrid CF were unique among the 32 starters in winning all six group games, the drama was also reserved for the final matchday, when Olympique Lyonnais, having scored twice in their previous five fixtures, scored six in the second half against ten-man GNK Dinamo in Zagreb to edge ahead of AFC Ajax on goal difference.

In the other half of the draw, Chelsea needed to beat Valencia CF at home in their final match — and did so with a convincing 3-0 scoreline. The London club, during the run to the title (in which Andre Villas-Boas was replaced by Roberto Di Matteo after matchday 7) conceded only two goals in six games at Stamford Bridge. In Group F, Didier Deschamps’ Olympique de Marseille reached the last 16 thanks to two goals in the last five minutes of their last match, which enabled them to come from 2-0 down to beat Borussia Dortmund 3-2 in Germany. In Group G, where 5 of the 12 games were drawn and a single point separated the top three, APOEL FC claimed first place despite scoring only six goals in as many games. By defeating Olympique Lyonnais in a penalty shoot-out in the next round, the side coached by Serbia’s Ivan Jovanović made history by becoming the first Cypriot team to reach the quarter-finals. Group H was unique in that almost all issues were settled before the final matchday, with Pep Guardiola’s FC Barcelona scoring 20 and conceding only 4 — all of them scored by second-placed AC Milan. By the end of the group stage, four of the five debutants (Manchester City FC, FC Otelul Galati, Trabzonspor and FC Viktoria Píšťal) had been eliminated and only SSC Napoli had earned a place among the top 16.

The exceptions were José Mourinho’s Real Madrid (4-1 home winners against CSKA after a 1-1 draw in icy Moscow) and Bayern and Barcelona, who scored seven
apiece in their home games against Basel and Bayer 04 Leverkusen respectively. Such striking results prompted international critics to confirm the trio as favourites to compete for the title.

Events in the quarter-finals supported this theory, with Real Madrid emphatically ending APOEL's adventure and Bayern equalling them in recording home and away victories (against Olympique de Marseille), while Barcelona were made to work hard for a 3-1 aggregate win against AC Milan in a contest between clubs which had won the title 11 times between them. The semi-final quartet was completed by Chelsea, who, after a 1-0 win in Lisbon, played 50 minutes of the return leg with a one-man advantage after SL Benfica had had captain Maxi Pereira dismissed. Javi García's 85th-minute equaliser for the visitors left Roberto Di Matteo's side one goal from elimination – only for an added-time goal from Raul Meireles to post a deceptively comfortable-looking 3-1 aggregate victory.

The Londoners also teetered on a tightrope during a semi-final against the defending champions, in which Pep Guardiola's Barça had 72% of the ball – even at Stamford Bridge – and dominated 46 to 12 in terms of goal attempts. Chelsea, playing 53 minutes with ten at Camp Nou, relied on deep defending, last-ditch tackling or blocking … and the woodwork, with Lionel Messi striking a penalty against the crossbar in the return leg. Chelsea scored three goals during periods of added time at the end of each half to secure an against-the-odds 3-2 aggregate win.

The other semi-final was also a story of resilience prevailing. The pendulum initially swung in Real Madrid's favour in both legs – in Munich when Mesut Özil struck a precious away goal, only for Mario Gomez to snatch a 2-1 win for Bayern in the 90th minute, and in Madrid after the home side went 2-0 up in 14 minutes at the Santiago Bernabéu. But there were no further goals during the 95 minutes subsequent to Arjen Robben's 27th-minute penalty and, with 3-3 on the aggregate scoreboard, it was ultimately Bastian Schweinsteiger who clinched a 3-1 win for the visitors during a shoot-out in which four penalties failed to hit the net. As Chelsea prepared to travel to Munich to take on Bayern in their own lair, the critics who had predicted an all-Spanish final had been confounded by the narrowest of margins. It had been that sort of season.
It was like a film script. The underdog, against all the odds, triumphing in the end, with a hero having the final say as he drifted off into a glorious sunset. The losers on this occasion were known as FC Hollywood (they acquired the name in the 1990s as a result of their celebrity status), and were viewed by the critics as Oscar winners-in-waiting. It was the Reds against the Blues; FC Bayern München versus Chelsea FC. Bayern had won four previous UEFA Champions League finals, while Chelsea were still searching for their first title at this level. The Bavarians were on home soil in Munich – it was their stage, their supporters (the majority), even their stadium announcer. But football has a habit of being unpredictable, and fate was on hand to deliver an ending that few would have foreseen as they made their way into the Fussball Arena München.

The game started as anticipated, with Bayern taking the initiative and Chelsea showing the kind of caution often displayed by investors operating in the depressed money markets of recent years. The starting shapes were similar (both 4-2-3-1), but the approach was diametrically opposite. UEFA technical team member Gérard Houllier (former boss of Liverpool FC and Olympique Lyonnais) has, from time to time, expressed the view that “some teams keep the ball – some keep the result.” On a perfect football night in Munich, the home team wanted both, while the visitors were happy to take the spoils, unconcerned about points for artistic impression. In a first half which resembled a training exercise based on waves of attack, those in red dominated possession (60%), but apart from one driving run and shot by Arjen Robben, which Petr Čech deflected onto the post, their 13 efforts on goal failed to produce a breakthrough. Chelsea did have one impressive flowing counterattack, which concluded with Salomon Kalou forcing a save from Manuel Neuer at his near post. And Juan Mata did take a free-kick on the edge of the Bayern penalty box, but the end product was disappointing and on a par with much of the finishing by both teams during the first 45 minutes.

The weight of expectation on the German side was palpable and manifested itself in uncharacteristic anxiety when they entered the attacking third of the pitch. This, added to the resolute defending of the Londoners, ensured that the score sheet was blank when Portuguese referee Pedro Proença blew for half-time. Chelsea, without stalwart defenders John Terry and Branislav Ivanović through suspension, were comfortable playing their contain-and-counter style – the method that had seen them eliminate FC Barcelona in the semi-finals. Meanwhile, Bayern were showing signs of increasing frustration.

The second period started with smoke spreading from the red and white end of the stadium – it was fireworks on the pitch that were required, not in the stands. On the hour mark, Ashley Cole made a brilliant challenge to thwart Arjen Robben, which Petr Čech deflected onto the post, their 13 efforts on goal failed to produce a breakthrough. Chelsea did have one impressive flowing counterattack, which concluded with Salomon Kalou forcing a save from Manuel Neuer at his near post. And Juan Mata did take a free-kick on the edge of the Bayern penalty box, but the end product was disappointing and on a par with much of the finishing by both teams during the first 45 minutes.

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from Chelsea’s repertoire of blocks, interceptions and tackles (and the occasional foul), much of which took place in their own half of the pitch. When the Blues did spring forward, Didier Drogba often found himself in isolation, left to his own devices.

Midway through the second half, Bayern earned another corner, their 13th of the game. Robben delivered, and, Chelsea’s Ryan Bertrand, making his Champions League debut following the suspension of Ramires, headed the ball behind his own goal. Shortly afterwards, the exhausted youngster gave way to the experienced Florent Malouda. As Chelsea gradually increased their share of possession, Bayern continued to squander chances, although Thomas Müller did hit the target with a solid header, following a left-wing cross from Arjen Robben, but Petr Čech saved comfortably and the match remained goalless.

With 83 minutes gone, Bayern put one hand on the trophy. Thomas Müller’s “rehearsal” a few moments earlier was about to prove invaluable. Again, a cross from the left, this time by Toni Kroos. David Luiz, Mario Gomez and Ashley Cole (blue, red and blue) all jumped to make contact with the ball, but they found themselves under its flight. Meanwhile, ghosting in at the back post was Müller—the Bayern No25 headed the ball down, and it bounced up into the roof of the net past a startled Petr Čech. Bayern were ahead and the contest looked like a fait accompli!

Fernando Torres replaced Salomon Kalou on the Chelsea right wing, while euphoria engulfed the red and white section of the crowd. David Luiz was yellow carded for a clumsy challenge on Arjen Robben, and Bayern felt confident enough to replace their goalscoring hero, Thomas Müller, with central defender Daniel van Buyten, who had been injured for months and who had played only in a reserve game eight days previously. Anatoliy Tymoshchuk went into his normal midfield role, alongside Bastian Schweinsteiger, in order to let the substitute take his position at right centre-back. Bayern were in control and ready to defend their lead. But the Chelsea players had proved during the campaign that they were resilient and while there was time, there was hope. As Fabio Capello said afterwards: “This Chelsea team never gave up.”

Big games need big players in decisive moments, and Didier Drogba was certainly in that category. With two minutes of regulation time remaining, Chelsea’s No11 exploded towards the front post area to meet an inswinging corner from Juan Mata. While Frank Lampard inadvertently blocked Drogba’s marker, Jérôme Boateng, Chelsea’s Ivorian striker powered a header past Manuel Neuer. The Bayern goalkeeper was rooted to the spot, Thomas Müller appeared to have given FC Bayern the title after his strong downward header put the German club 1-0 ahead in the 83rd minute.
unable to take the step forward which would have reduced the target. Suddenly the momentum changed: the phenomenon of losing the lead came into play, where those who have conceded become startled, even nervous. The force was with Chelsea.

With the game tied at 1-1, extra time ensued, and within five minutes, Bayern had the chance to regain the advantage. Drogba, back in his own penalty box, fouled Franck Ribéry and the referee immediately pointed to the spot. Ex-Chelsea player Arjen Robben took the kick only to see Petr Čech read his body movement and make the save to his left-hand side. Scepticism about fate and destiny was beginning to evaporate, but if a penalty shoot-out was to decide the match, the Germans would win – wouldn’t they? Bayern substitute Ivica Olić had the chance to score a late winner from a diagonal pass from his captain Philipp Lahm, but the Croatian side-footed the ball past the far post and it was time to face what many describe as the “lottery”.

Bayern had history: three previous UEFA Champions League games won on penalties, including the final in 2001. Chelsea, on the other hand, had participated twice and lost both times, including in the 2008 final against Manchester United FC. As the two coaches, Jupp Heynckes and Roberto Di Matteo, made their shoot-out selections, Didier Drogba received intensive massage on his tired calf muscles. Bayern captain Lahm scored first, Mata missed (to be accurate Neuer saved to his left); then Gomez, Luiz, Neuer and Lampard all found the net. Ivica Olić’s effort was saved, before Ashley Cole restored parity with a well-struck, left-footed shot into the corner. And then two remained: Bastian Schweinsteiger hesitated on the run-up and his shot struck the post (the Chelsea goalkeeper appeared to get the slightest of touches on the ball). Bayern’s midfield dynamo hid his head inside his jersey. Finally, almost inevitably, Didier Drogba stepped into the spotlight. Chelsea’s talisman proceeded to send Manuel Neuer, the Bayern keeper, the wrong way, and the big striker’s right-footed shot swept into the unguarded corner of the net. Chelsea, against all the odds, were champions.

The blue and white end of the ground went crazy. The Chelsea players ran to their frenzied fans and threw themselves to the ground in joyous abandonment. Their opponents were already on the turf, prostrate and in despair — this was not the script they had imagined. Their opponents were already on the turf, prostrate and in despair — this was not the script they had imagined. After the trophy presentation by the UEFA president, Michel Platini, I made the man of the match award to Didier Drogba. As one coaching colleague remarked: “If Drogba had been on Bayern’s side, they would have won — such was his impact on the game.” While we waited in a packed press conference for the plaque handover to begin, I asked Didier what had been the key moment for him: his headed equaliser or the final penalty? “Definitely, the penalty,” he said. Of course, the header had saved the day — the penalty had won it. That decisive act was to be Didier’s last in a Chelsea shirt, and he drifted off, Hollywood-style, into the sunset, a “larger-than-life” star and a winner.
Before the start of the 2011/12 UEFA Champions League semi-finals, three out of the four competing coaches had already won gold medals in the competition: Jupp Heynckes (with Real Madrid CF in 1998), Pep Guardiola (with FC Barcelona in 2009 and 2011) and José Mourinho (with FC Porto in 2004 and FC Internazionale Milano in 2010). By the end of the campaign, the fourth, former Italian international Roberto Di Matteo, had joined them in his capacity as interim manager of Chelsea FC. Taking over after the dismissal of André Villas-Boas, he guided the side for the remaining three months of the season, winning both the FA Cup (against Liverpool) and the Champions League by eliminating FC Barcelona in the semi-finals and beating FC Bayern München in the final (4-3 on penalties). On the European stage, Di Matteo’s Italian background was evident in the style his Chelsea adopted. Not exactly catenaccio, but drifting in that direction. Like Inter under Mourinho in 2010, his winning formula was based on solid defence, counterattacking and set plays. He also had big-match players, such as Didier Drogba, Frank Lampard and Petr Čech, who proved to be inspirational when it mattered.

Jupp Heynckes, the losing finalist with FC Bayern München, must have thought that he was in line for the title after his team eliminated Real Madrid CF in the semi-finals, and then when he faced a depleted Chelsea team in the final at home in Munich. His confidence must have soared when his side led 1-0 against Chelsea in the final with eight minutes to go, and again when his team went 3-1 ahead in the penalty shoot-out. But football’s unpredictability, its capacity for last-minute twists of fate, left the Bayern coach the victim of a hard-luck story.

José Mourinho lost out on penalties to Bayern in the semi-finals, but the Real Madrid boss still remains the hot favourite to be the first coach to win the title three times with three different teams. And Pep Guardiola, the champion of progressive possession football, stepped down from his post at Barcelona at the end of the season, having won 14 titles in four years, including the Champions League, the UEFA Super Cup and the FIFA Club World Cup twice each. He gained the respect of his coaching colleagues for his incredible results, but it was the style which he created that gained him universal admiration. Although his side fell at the penultimate hurdle in the 2011/12 season, his contribution to UEFA’s benchmark competition has been extraordinary.
A KING WITHOUT A CROWN

For the fourth season in a row, Lionel Messi of FC Barcelona was the king of the UEFA Champions League goalscoring chart but, because of his club’s elimination at the semi-final stage, there was no champion’s crown this time for the world’s best player. The Argentine goalscorer surpassed himself with 14 goals, two more than Mario Gomez of FC Bayern München, four more than Cristiano Ronaldo of Real Madrid CF, and an increase of two on his previous record total of 12. Barça’s diminutive No10 had the distinction of scoring five goals in one match (against Bayer 04 Leverkusen) and, along with Kaká, Karim Benzema, Nicolás Gaitán and Franck Ribéry, was equal top of the assists table with five. His third goal against Bayer 04 Leverkusen (in the round of 16, second leg), a magnificent chip over the advancing goalkeeper using his “weaker” right foot, was voted the third-best open play goal of the season by UEFA’s technical team. Team-mate Andrés Iniesta’s brilliant inter-play and finish at Camp Nou against FC Viktoria Plzeň was first, and Ivan Perišić’s late volley to tie Borussia Dortmund’s home match with Arsenal FC was placed second.

Barcelona and Real Madrid were the top-scoring sides of the 2011/12 season with 35 goals each, a remarkable return considering that neither reached the final. Chelsea FC, the champions, and Bayern, the runners-up, scored 25 and 26 respectively. In a season with some high-scoring matches (Barcelona, Olympique Lyonnais, Bayern and Valencia CF all scored seven in a single match), the grand total of 345 goals was 10 short of the previous season, but 25 up on 2009/10. The semi-finalists (Barça, Real, Bayern and Chelsea) accounted for 35% of all goals scored, excluding penalties taken in shoot-outs.

Once again, based on personal interpretation, the following goalscoring chart details the technical and tactical action which led to the 345 goals.

Lionel Messi lobs Bayer 04 Leverkusen keeper Bernd Leno to score his (and his team’s) third goal at the Camp Nou, going on to score a record five goals in Barça’s 7-1 win.
More than three-quarters of the goals scored during the season (78%) were the result of open play. Over recent years, the pattern of goalscoring in this section has remained fairly stable, particularly in relation to long-range shooting, dribbling and finishing, as well as diagonal balls into the penalty box. The difference in the figures registered for own goals and defensive errors was also negligible.

However, there was a slight decrease in the number of goals emanating from combinations and through/forward passes. But, the drop in this category could not be attributed to the top four sides: Barcelona, Real Madrid, Chelsea or Bayern. Apart from the quantity, each produced, from time-to-time, penetrating passing and collective play of an extraordinary level. Two great examples of this central penetration were Lionel Messi’s through-the-eye-of-a-needle pass to Xavi Hernández for the winning goal away to AC Milan in the group stage, and Bayern’s intricate combination play which culminated in Mario Gomez scoring his, and his team’s, third goal in their home victory against SSC Napoli.

With a number of teams playing on a narrow front, notably the Italians, crossing and finishing was not quite the fertile source of goals it was a few seasons ago, although it did remain one of the top two ways of creating goalscoring opportunities, on a par with incisive passing. But there was an increase, for the third season running, in goals being scored as the result of cutbacks (i.e. getting to the byline and playing the ball back into the path of a supporting player). This was often the end product of effective flank play, the kind highlighted by Chelsea and Real Madrid. Mesut Özil’s cutback to Karim Benzema for Madrid’s opening goal in the 6-2 victory over GNK Dinamo Zagreb was a fine example of the art, while Chelsea’s extra-time winner against SSC Napoli by Branislav Ivanović, from Didier Drogba’s assist, illustrated the move to perfection. Interestingly, the delivery in both cases was not from a traditional winger, but an attacking midfielder and a striker respectively. The increased mobility of middle-to-front players and the high quality of overlapping full-backs maintained the importance of flank play in a season when wide players often operated out-to-in, as was seen with Arjen Robben and Franck Ribéry of FC Bayern, Xherdan Shaqiri of FC Basel 1893, Juan Mata and Daniel Sturridge of Chelsea, and Mesut Özil of Real Madrid.

Overall, there was a balance between goals set up from the wings and those originating from central-area attacks. In the latter category, solo play was a factor, with long-range shooting and running with the ball leading to 16% of open-play goals. Shooting from distance was championed by Real Madrid, Napoli, Bayern, Borussia Dortmund and FC Shakhtar Donetsk – Ivan Perišić’s volley for Dortmund against Arsenal and David Silva’s low drive for Manchester City FC at home to Bayern were two of the best. Meanwhile, Mathieu Valbuena’s dribbling run and shot for Olympique de Marseille to beat Dortmund away, and Gonzalo Higuaín’s individual effort at Santiago Bernabéu for Real Madrid in their 6-2 defeat of Dinamo Zagreb highlighted the value of those who can single-handedly make and take a chance, particularly in an age of sophisticated, compact defending.

For the second successive season, FC Barcelona provided two of the top three, though AC Milan’s Kevin-Prince Boateng was the only player to feature twice in the top ten with a stunning strike against FC BATE Borisov and an equally impressive near-post finish against Barça. Andrés Iniesta claimed top spot with a double wall-pass and a flick over the last FC Viktoria Plzeň defender. Ivan Perišić earned second place with a magnificent volley after a set play had been partially cleared. And Lionel Messi’s trademark run culminating in a right-footed chip over the keeper was voted into third place.

**BEST OPEN-PLAY GOALS**

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<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>GOALSCORER</th>
<th>HOME TEAM</th>
<th>AWAY TEAM</th>
<th>TIME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Iniesta</td>
<td>FC Barcelona</td>
<td>FC Viktoria Plzeň</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Perišić</td>
<td>Borussia Dortmund</td>
<td>Arsenal FC</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Messi</td>
<td>FC Barcelona</td>
<td>Bayer 04 Leverkusen</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Drogba</td>
<td>Chelsea FC</td>
<td>SSC Napoli</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Cardozo</td>
<td>SL Benfica</td>
<td>Manchester United FC</td>
<td>24</td>
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SET PLAYS

There was a modest drop in the number of set-play goals (76 in 2011/12), in comparison with the previous seasons (82 in each). In percentage terms, therefore, the last three campaigns have seen a gradual decrease from 25% to 23% to 22%.

On the other hand, the number of penalty goals, not including those taken during a shoot-out, has risen year on year, from 14 to 24 to 28. This has coincided with the introduction of the additional referees at either end of the pitch, and their influence on refereeing decisions could be part of the reason for this trend. Goals from throw-ins also increased, but this was only from one up to the grand total of two – SL Benfica and Dortmund were the successful exponents of this particular move.

Although the rate of scoring remained stable, the return on investment from corner kicks was again unimpressive. For the second season in a row, it took, on average, 46 corners to produce one goal – i.e. 1,250 efforts to deliver 27 goals. Four times in 125 games, the winning goal came from a corner, four times it contributed to a draw, and nine times it provided a significant contribution to a successful result. Real Madrid even scored twice from corners when they beat Olympique Lyonnais 4-0 at the group stage. As usual, corners were a valuable weapon in some teams’ armouries but, in an aspect of the game where delivery of the ball is everything, the figures provided some food for thought. The Munich final was a case in point: Bayern took 20 corners with nothing to show for them, while Chelsea were awarded one and Didier Drogba proceeded to score with a header from an inswinging cross by Juan Mata. A lot of effort goes into preparing corners, but often with little return.

Cristiano Ronaldo of Real Madrid and Hulk of FC Porto were the only players to score twice in the competition from direct free-kicks. The Madrid maestro’s 75th-minute strike against APOEL FC in the quarter-final home match was voted the best set-play goal of the season. From wide on the left, the Portuguese international sent the ball, right footed, over everyone in the goalmouth area and into the far corner of the net. Real went on to win 5-2 and 8-2 on aggregate.

Both in terms of quality and quantity, goalscoring in the UEFA Champions League, especially in open play, was once again impressive. As Pep Guardiola remarked: “In recent years, we have seen more daring teams and an even better spectacle in the Champions League.” Few would argue with his assessment, particularly with the scoring exploits of Messi, Ronaldo, Drogba, Boateng, Cardozo and others providing the icing on a very rich cake.
The 2010/11 season had registered the highest total of goals since the elimination of the second group stage from the fixture list, and although the 2011/12 figures reveal a slight decrease, the scoring rate remained high. The last two seasons occupy first and sixth positions in terms of the all-time goalscoring rankings. However, the 2011/12 campaign was one of peaks and troughs. The 96 matches played in the group stage accounted for only 244 of the goals at an average of 2.54 per game. The mean for the season was pulled up to 2.76 by knockout rounds which yielded 101 goals at 3.5 per fixture, helped by FC Barcelona’s and FC Bayern München’s seven-goal tallies in their home legs of the round of 16. A total of 38.5% of the season’s goals were scored by visiting teams. During the group stage, the percentage was 44%, helped by the final matchday in Group D, when Olympique Lyonnais and Real Madrid scored ten away goals between them. During the knockout rounds, only 25% of the goals were scored away from home, compared with the 56:44 ratio in 2010/11 and 63:35 in 2009/10. During the first knockout round, 45 goals were scored by home teams and 11 by visitors. In the first legs of the quarter-finals, no home team managed to score and all four ties were won by the team playing the second leg at home. On the other hand, both semi-finals produced victories for the side playing the first leg at home. Only one knockout tie (Olympique de Marseille v FC Internazionale) was won on away goals.

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<th>GOALS SEASON BY SEASON</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2010/11</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total goals</td>
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<td>Total games</td>
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### Goals per Match

**2.76 Goals per match**
Something old, something borrowed, something new

One of the many charms of the UEFA Champions League is that it provides enough contrasts and shades of meaning to convert it into something akin to a re-education course for members of the coaching profession. There can be no doubt that Josep “Pep” Guardiola’s FC Barcelona has been setting benchmarks. But, interspersed with the blaugrana victories in 2009 and 2011 there have been two title winners of a substantially different footballing complexion. Chelsea FC, just as FC Internazionale Milano had done in 2010, demonstrated that there is not only a place for non-possession-oriented teams amid the diversities of football, but also that the two opposing schools of thought can be equally valid in terms of obtaining results – and titles. However, the 2011/12 season also provided food for thought in areas such as the role of the striker, the qualities required by goalkeepers, the use of wingers, or the adoption by teams such as Barça and Italian debutants SSC Napoli of the three-man defence, which was commonplace a decade ago but has since become an endangered species.

1/ CHANGING SHAPES

The fact that categorical statements about team shapes are becoming increasingly difficult to make offers a clear indication of greater flexibility from game to game and even within the 90 minutes. FC Barcelona, for instance, experimented with three at the back in some games or in some situations within games. As Howard Wilkinson, one of UEFA’s technical observers, commented: “There is no doubt that team shapes have become more flexible over the last decade.” Analysis of the entire season therefore focuses on “default settings”. Among the top 16, the general trend was towards a 4-3-3 structure, with variations. The default settings of AC Milan, APOEL FC, Barcelona, Inter and FC Zenit St Petersburg were 4-3-3, with six more teams (Arsenal FC, FC Bayern München, Chelsea FC, the two Olympiques (Lyon and Marseille) and Real Madrid CF) usually starting in 4-2-3-1 formation. FC Basel 1893, SL Benfica, PFC CSKA Moskva and Bayer 04 Leverkusen operated an increasingly infrequent 4-4-2 structure though, as discussed later on, attacking partnerships usually featured target and shadow strikers rather than two attackers in tandem. SSC Napoli were alone in using 3-4-3 as their default structure (although it may be significant that Italian champions Juventus operated in a similar formation). However, there are nuances behind the resurgence of “something old”. Three-at-the-back systems traditionally relied on three central defenders, with a pair of wing-backs working the flanks. When Pep Guardiola’s Barça opted for their Plan B structure, the back three often comprised two full-backs alongside Javier Mascherano, a screening midfielder for much of his professional career. Even with only three defenders, the emphasis was clearly on building from the back.

“The season demonstrated that team shapes matter,” commented UEFA’s technical director, Andy Roxburgh, “and that the top teams are equipped to adapt during games with a view to maintaining a disciplined defensive order and providing the best framework for attacking freedom.”

2/ THE PASSING PARADOX

In the 2008/09 season, Barcelona based their title win on 65% ball possession and something between 600 and 700 passes per game. In 2009/10, Inter won the competition with 64% of the ball (only 32% in the final against Bayern) and marginally over 400 passes per game. In 2010/11, Barça reconquered the summit with 68% possession and 791 passes per game. In the 2011/12 season, Chelsea FC borrowed some of Inter’s statistics, taking the title with an average of 47% of the ball and 509 passes per match – an average boosted substantially by their tally of 781 passes when they entertained KRC Genk at Stamford Bridge during the group stage.

The trend towards a passing game was highlighted by the fact that 17 of the 32 starters in the UEFA Champions League averaged in excess of 500 passes per match. Pep Guardiola maintains that this is not unrelated to the general improvements in the quality of playing surfaces. “The pitch is a vital element,” he insists. “The better the pitch, the better the passing and the better the game as a spectacle.”

Barça apart, Arsenal and Real Madrid provided prime examples of teams who excelled at high-tempo short passing combinations. However, the alternating victories over the last four seasons suggest that the top-level game is polarising into a duel between positive possession and contain-and-counter philosophies. The three Italian teams – Inter, AC Milan and Napoli – were not averse to direct back-to-front attacking. It would be wrong to associate the victories for Inter and Chelsea with something borrowed from catenaccio. But Inter were unequivocally identifiable with an Italian philosophy – and was Chelsea’s change of style once Italy’s Roberto Di Matteo had taken over a matter of pure coincidence?

The trend towards a positive possession philosophy was visible in the playing styles of three of the season’s four semi-finalists. But Chelsea’s ultimate victory provided a reminder that dominating the ball offers no guarantee of success.

3/ PRESSURE GAUGE

Pep Guardiola ventured the opinion that, like his Barcelona side, a greater number of teams in the 2011/12 UEFA Champions League were prepared to hold a high line and adopt a more adventurous approach. The number of attackers among the list of the competition’s most-yellow-carded players certainly confirms that forwards were generally expected to be the first line of defence. Nevertheless, the teams opting for a high-pressure game fell short of the majority. Barça apart, Real Madrid, Arsenal, Benfica and Chelsea (during the first part of the season) were equipped to press hard in advanced areas, along with, occasionally, FC Zenit, CSKA and Leverkusen. As Gérard Houllier commented: “A lot of players and teams have learned how to cope with high pressure and to play out of tight situations. So fewer teams are prepared to expend vast quantities of energy on advanced pressing.”
The general tendency was to assemble compact defensive blocks as quickly as possible, to draw the opposition into advanced positions, and then to press aggressively with well-coordinated, collective, vertical and horizontal movements aimed at pressing the ball carrier and his immediate vicinity, with an emphasis on cutting off the short passing options and restricting space. Few of the top teams exerted sustained upfield pressure but many of them had the potential to do so tucked away among their weaponry.

4/ THE WING WONDERS

Ten of the top 16 teams operated with wingers. But it would be misleading to allege that APOEL, Arsenal, Basel, Bayern, Barça, Chelsea, Real Madrid, FC Zenit and the two Olympiques used them in the same fashion—or, indeed, that their wingers had similar personalities. Some coaches opted to deploy one winger rather than two, and the trend towards “wrong-footed” wingers became even more prevalent. Apart from FC Barcelona, who initiated the trend by fielding Lionel Messi on the right wing before moving him into a more central position, Cristiano Ronaldo at Real Madrid, Xherdan Shaqiri at FC Basel, Bruno Cesar at SL Benfica, Daniel Sturridge at Chelsea (and Juan Mata when used in his more advanced role) provided prime examples, along with FC Bayern’s pairing of the left-footed Arjen Robben on the right and the right-footed Franck Ribéry on the left.

This policy has marked a trend away from the wingers’ traditional modus operandi of running in more or less straight lines with the corner flag or the byline as the objective. The “wrong-footed” winger starts wide and then cuts inside to create havoc in the danger areas. This movement generally takes the ball on to his stronger foot and opens the door for powerful shooting or a deadly, perfectly weighted pass. The wingers’ infield runs also open spaces for the overlapping full-backs who, in many cases, have become the main suppliers of crosses. As Arsène Wenger points out: “The demands on the players in the wing positions have become so great that many of them struggle to sustain the pace over the full 90 minutes.” The days of the indolent or under-utilised winger are over.

5/ MOBILITY IN ATTACK

Eleven of the top 16 teams operated with a single striker; the other five fielded two in a 4–4–2 structure—but not with two strikers in parallel. At Basel, Alexander Frei worked in the slipstream of Marco Streller. At Benfica, Pablo Aimar was usually shadow striker behind Óscar Cardozo, as was Alan Dzagoev in relation to Seydou Doumbia at CSKA Moskva. In the Leverkusen attack, André Schürrle alternated the spearhead role with Renato Augusto. However, even though the roles of Didier Drogba and Mario Gomez in the Munich final could inspire debate, the tendency was for teams to veer away from the traditional figure of the target man and to introduce variations and mobility into their front lines.

The trend away from the easily marked target man was highlighted by Sir Alex Ferguson: “The role of the striker these days,” he commented, “is more about movement aimed at creating space for runs from deep positions.” Twelve of the top 16 teams generally operated with three forwards who attempted to create difficulties for defenders with continuous lateral and back-to-front movements. Napoli provided an outstanding example,
6/ BEATING THE BLOCK

The challenge facing many of today’s coaches – and this applies right through youth development stages in addition to the peak of the professional pyramid – is to help players to unlock defensive blocks. As Fabio Capello remarks: “When we talk about ‘defensive blocks’ we’re basically talking about everybody dropping back at speed to defend in 9-1 formation.” This, evidently, doesn’t mean a “flat back nine”. But it has become commonplace to see teams making rapid transitions into a 4-5-1 defensive structure when the ball is lost.

AC Milan’s Massimiliano Allegri comments: “The into a 4-5-1 defensive structure when the ball is lost. It’s very much alive, along with the solo counter (as illustrated by the run from his own half by Raul Meireles during the quarter-final against Benfica) the trend is towards collective counters based on a group of players breaking forward at high speed when the ball is won in midfield or can be sensibly played out from the back after a set piece. In the Champions League, the willingness to offer sprint-speed support to this type of counter was impressive. Barcelona, despite preferring a more patient build-up when the ball is won in the defensive third, are highly accomplished in converting the dividends obtained from their high pressure into immediate scoring opportunities, with lightning-fast reactions to regained possession.

Napoli, Inter, AC Milan, Benfica, Chelsea (in the latter stages of the competition), CSKA and, among the eliminated teams, AFC Ajax especially impressive in terms of rapid transitions from defence to attack.

Although the classic counter (via a rapid back-to-front pass) is still very much alive, along with the solo counter it has become commonplace to see teams making rapid transitions into a 4-5-1 defensive structure when the ball is lost.

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8/ TECHNICAL AND EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

Arsène Wenger made the observation: “Running is OK, but understanding of the game is more important”. In other words, speed of movement and the tempo of the play are important elements but a high percentage of the speed of the game is in the head. In the Champions League, various types of speed are in the head. Speed of perception needs to be allied with physical speeds and the mental challenges also stretch into the realms of emotional intensity. Big games require big players, and the ability to master emotions becomes a major asset. The 2011/12 season confirmed that one of the basic requirements is above-average mental strength, i.e. the ability to cope with all types of pressure and match situations. The challenge for the coach is to create a never-give-up attitude and to prepare players for all the vicissitudes of top-level competition. Chelsea, the 2012 champions, provided a graphic illustration that resilience and mental toughness can be vital ingredients in recipes for success.
9/ HANDS AND FEET

The final in Munich provided an invitation to reflect on the changing role of the goalkeeper. Post-match statistics revealed that Chelsea’s Petr Čech had been required to make six saves during two hours of football and Bayern’s Manuel Neuer just two. Neither of them was bombarded with high crosses either. The facts emphasised the need for goalkeepers to be coached in the art of maintaining concentration during periods of inactivity. On the other hand, the minimal need to deal with shots at goal did not signify “inactivity”. The modern goalkeeper is expected to be an integral part of attack-building processes and is usually required to take decisions and react quickly in order to fulfil duties as “sweeper” behind the defence. For today’s goalkeeper, the traditional virtues of bravery and a safe pair of hands are not enough. There is increasing emphasis on an ability to read the game and to be equipped to make the subtle adjustments, the minute details of movement and awareness which can make the difference when it comes to making the save. Having said that, shot-stopping evidently remains the priority – and this means dealing with matchballs that can swerve and dip when goalbound.

10/ KEEPING THE BALL

It is a blindingly obvious statement that possession play is based on the ability to keep the ball. A former club champion in England, Howard Wilkinson notes the trend towards a ball possession style that is linked to “a significant improvement of technique over the last decade and, especially, the ability to play out of tight situations”. UEFA’s technical director, Andy Roxburgh, adds: “The standard of combination play, both centrally and on the flanks, has improved beyond recognition.”

FC Barcelona have set benchmarks by dominating the UEFA Champions League ball possession charts season after season. The passing, shooting and dribbling abilities of Messi, Xavi Hernández and Iniesta are well known, but one of their less acclaimed virtues is their ability to retain possession by turning, screening the ball and making abrupt changes of direction and pace. As the AFC Ajax coach, Frank de Boer, commented: “It takes guts to keep the ball like Barça do and wait for the passing opportunity to come along.” It could be argued that the South American influences which have permeated teams such as Milan, Napoli, Inter, Benfica or APOEL have aided developments in technique – which has also contributed to the trend towards defenders who are technically equipped to play from the back through accurate forward passing and switches of play. Chelsea, although not designed as a possession-oriented team, demonstrated this in the final. In the words of Fabio Capello: “[They] always played the ball when under pressure and looked confident and aware of their technical capabilities.”

But the bottom line is that, although coaches try to minimise the possibilities of the chance elements working against them, the outcome of a 2011/12 UEFA Champions League which offered some things old, some things borrowed and some things new, underlined the unpredictable nature of football.
THE SPALLETTI MOMENTS

There are some moments in UEFA Champions League football which, although they are seemingly unimportant, offer food for thought. FC Zenit St Petersburg’s Italian coach, Luciano Spalletti, supplied a couple of them during the course of the season. When an aggressive supporter, for example, started hammering on the roof of the bench during a game, Luciano’s reaction was to come out of the dugout, smile at the fan and shake his hand. The gesture provoked a round of applause in that area of the crowd – and a potentially explosive situation had been very simply defused.

When the Russian club travelled to Lisbon with a 3-2 advantage for the return leg of the round of 16 tie with SL Benfica, Luciano told the English referee, Howard Webb, before that game that he was happy to see top officials appointed for such a game. As it happened, Zenit were defeated 2-0 by goals scored during added time at the end of the first and second halves. Undeterred by the cruel ending and elimination, Luciano shook hands with the English referee and told him that nothing he had seen during the game had changed his mind about the quality of the match officials.

Hats off to Luciano Spalletti for keeping his cool at moments which, in the heat of the fray, could easily have been the straws to break the camel’s back. He merits applause for reactions based on respect and fair play which, if it has to be said, are not the qualities that always come to the fore when stress and pulse rates are high. Within the coaching profession, where a degree of passion for the game is a sine qua non, a question to ask ourselves is whether we have reacted in the same way as Luciano, and whether we think it is feasible to retain a sense of respect and fair play within the high-pressure context of Champions League football.

Further questions emerge from those “Spalletti moments”. What is the degree of awareness among top-level coaches of the desirability of adopting role-model behaviour? How many coaches would achieve pass marks if they were examined for the sort of attitudes they try to impart to their players? Footballers are constantly reminded of the need to master the extreme emotions which can be generated during a Champions League season. Should coaches pay the same degree of attention to their mastering of emotions? Who helps them to do so? How many coach education courses prepare students to handle Spalletti moments with the same coolness and class as Luciano?

SHUFFLING THE CARDS

Still on the subject of fair play, the fact that no fewer than seven players missed the UEFA Champions League final through suspensions resuscitates the perennial debate on the current disciplinary system. OK, John Terry’s direct red card for an off-the-ball foul during the return leg of the semi-final in Barcelona leaves little room for discussion. But one of the unanswerable questions to arise in Munich was to what extent the absences of Ramires, Branislav Ivanović, Raul Meireles, David Alaba, Luiz Gustavo and Holger Badstuber affected the big game as a spectacle – with the last two having had the misfortune to receive their fateful yellow card during extra time in Bayern’s semi-final return leg in Madrid, having completed the 90 minutes without mishap.

The cases are difficult to judge by the same yardstick. Ramires, for example, received three yellow cards on matchdays 10, 11 and 12 after seven previous appearances without being cautioned. Alaba played eight full matches and received yellow cards on matchdays 9, 10 and 12. The card shown to Meireles in Barcelona was his fifth of the campaign. On the other hand, Luiz Gustavo had been cautioned on matchdays 6, 9 and 12; Ivanović on matchdays 5, 10 and 12. In other words, they missed the final on account of three yellow cards spread over the 12-match campaign leading to Munich. Is this fair?
There are many counter-arguments, starting with the fact that preparing for the biggest event in world club football implies enormous requirements in terms of advance planning. Those responsible for organising the event would argue that waiting till the end of the previous season for a final decision on the venue would present serious problems. Should there be a Plan B? Should there be a shortlist of venues for the final, with the definitive choice made once the participants are known? Would it be fair for regular participants, such as Bayern, to have their magnificent stadium barred from staging the final?

Ongoing debate about the topic features a basic question about whether fair play should be encouraged, as opposed to focusing on castigating the lack of it. Should players be offered incentives to “keep a clean sheet” when it comes to cards? Among the proposals is the idea that, if a player goes, say, four games without being cautioned, one yellow card could be removed from his record. This would entail a degree of regulation in terms of how many minutes on the field constitute an appearance in order to avoid situations where a player could claim his reward after a few token minutes as sub. It also entails an additional administrative burden. But would it be worth the trouble?

Home advantage

How is it possible to have home advantage in a Champions League final? Is it positive in a tactical sense that the finalists are clearly defined as a home team and an away team? Isn’t a final meant to be played at a neutral venue? This is a good topic to provoke debate – and the first point to emphasise is that no criticism of Bayern is implied. The Bavarian club engaged in the 2011/12 campaign with legitimate ambitions to play the final in their home city just as, for example, Real Madrid CF had done in the 2009/10 season which culminated in the final at Estadio Santiago Bernabeu. But the venue for the 2011 and 2013 finals offers a stark contrast in that Wembley Stadium in London is not home to a club side and therefore offers guarantees in terms of neutrality. Should this always be the case? Should the clubs who participate in the Champions League season be barred from staging the final?
Bastian Schweinsteiger’s shot cannoned off the post; Didier Drogba steps up to convert the winning penalty. Once again, the title was decided by a penalty shoot-out – as have 20% of the finals played since the Champions League was introduced. The shoot-out is undeniably dramatic, but is it football? For many years, alternatives have been sought, notable people within the game have come up with ideas and experiments have been made. But the formula has remained unchanged.

European Championships have been decided via the sudden-death formula of the golden goal – but no goal has ever been scored during extra time in a Champions League final. One school of thought is to adjudicate a winner on the basis of statistics, such as corners or fouls – maybe those committed in the defensive third. Another idea is to raise the bar in terms of difficulty by having an attacker set off from the halfway line with the target of beating one defender and the goalkeeper. The difficulty level would be so high that the winner would be a hero rather than the unsuccessful penalty-taker, who becomes a villain. Another idea is to share responsibility between two players by making one cross the ball and the other volley goalwards first time. Or should the penalty shoot-out take place after 90 minutes before the 30 minutes of extra time are played?
As has become a tradition at the close of a UEFA Champions League season, UEFA’s technical observers selected a squad of players who, in their opinion, had made impressive contributions to the campaign. Ultimate victory, albeit by the narrowest of margins, for Chelsea FC meant that the London club is represented in every department of a squad which highlights the qualities of the four teams which reached the semi-finals, AC Milan’s Swedish striker, Zlatan Ibrahimović, the only “intruder”. By nationality, Spain is the main provider with six players, while only four play their national team football for non-European countries. Seven of the 2011/12 squad were also selected in the previous season. Continuity at the top of the game is further underlined by the fact that eight of the 2011/12 squad were also named as far back as the 2008/09 season. Special credit is also due to Frank Lampard, who has been a regular in the star squad since the 2005/06 campaign.

**TECHNICAL TEAM SELECTION**

**GOALKEEPERS**

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**ATTACKERS**

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Chelsea FC goalkeeper Petr Čech ushers Bastian Schweinsteiger’s spot kick on to the post at the critical moment of the penalty shoot-out in Munich.
### RESULTS

#### GROUP STAGE

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RESU L TS

ROUND OF 16

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<td>Chelsea FC – SSC Napoli</td>
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<td>FC Internationale Milano – Olympique de Marseille</td>
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* after extra time  
** APOEL FC win 4-3 on penalties

QUARTER-FINALS

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<td>AC Milan – FC Barcelona</td>
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SEMI-FINALS

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** FC Bayern München win 3-1 on penalties

THE FINAL – SATURDAY 19 MAY 2012
FC BAYERN MÜNCHEN – CHELSEA FC 1-1 (0-0)  
AFTER EXTRA TIME; 3-4 IN PENALTY SHOOT-OUT

1-0 Thomas Müller 83, 1-1 Didier Drogba 88  
Penalty shoot-out (FC Bayern started):  
1-0 Philipp Lahm, 1-0 Juan Mata (saved), 2-0 Mario Gomez, 2-1 David Luiz,  
3-1 Manuel Neuer, 3-2 Frank Lampard, 3-2 Ivica Olić (saved), 3-3 Ashley Cole,  
3-3 Bastian Schweinsteiger (post), 3-4 Didier Drogba

ATTENDANCE

6,500 at Fussball Arena München, Munich

YELLOW CARDS

FC Bayern München: Bastian Schweinsteiger 2  
Chelsea FC: Ashley Cole 81, David Luiz 86, Didier Drogba 93,  
Fernando Torres 120

FC BAYERN MÜNCHEN

Manuel Neuer – Philipp Lahm (C), Anatoliy Tymoshchuk, Jérôme Boateng,  
Diego Contento – Bastian Schweinsteiger, Toni Kroos – Arjen Robben,  
Thomas Müller (Daniel Van Buyten 87), Franck Ribéry (Ivić Olić 90) –  
Mario Gomez

HEAD COACH

Jupp Heynckes

UNUSED SUBSTITUTES

Jörg Butt, Rafinha, Nils Petersen, Danijel Pranjic, Takashi Usami

CHELSEA FC

Petr Čech – José Bosingwa, Gary Cahill, David Luiz, Ashley Cole – John  
Obi Mikel, Frank Lampard (C) – Salomon Kalou (Fernando Torres 84),  
Juan Mata, Ryan Bertrand (Florent Malouda 73) – Didier Drogba

INTERIM MANAGER

Roberto Di Matteo

UNUSED SUBSTITUTES

Ross Turnbull, Michael Essien, Oriol Romeu, Paulo Ferreira,  
Daniel Sturridge

REFEREES

REFEREE

Pedro Proença (Portugal)

ASSISTANT REFEREES

Bertino Miranda, Ricardo Santos

ADDITIONAL ASSISTANT REFEREES

Manuel De Sousa, Duarte Gomes

FOURTH OFFICIAL

Carlos Velasco Carballo (Spain)

TOP SCORERS

14 GOALS Lionel Messi (FC Barcelona)

12 GOALS Mario Gomez (FC Bayern München)

10 GOALS Cristiano Ronaldo (Real Madrid CF)

7 GOALS Karim Benzema (Real Madrid CF)

6 GOALS Didier Drogba (Chelsea FC)

5 GOALS José Callejón (Real Madrid CF), Edinson Cavani (SSC Napoli),  
Seydou Doumbia (PFC CSKA Moskva), Alexander Frei (FC Basel), Bafétimbi Gomis  
(Olympique Lyonnais), Zlatan Ibrahimović (AC Milan), Roman Shirokov (FC Zenit),  
Roberto Soldado (Valencia CF)
HEAd coAcH
IVAN JOVANOVIĆ
Date of birth 08/07/1962 in Dojnica
Nationality Serbian
Matches in UEFA Champions League 16
Head coach since 01/07/2008
Players used 23
Substitutions 30 / 30
HEAcoAcH

ARsèNE WeNGer
Date of birth 22/10/1949 in Strasbourg
Nationality  French
Head coach since 28/09/1996
Matches in UEFA Champions League 144
Players used 29
Substitutions 23 / 24

G oALs SCored 
1-15 mins 2
16-30 mins 2
31-45 mins 2
46-60 mins 2
76-90 mins 2
90+ 1

subStitUtioNS MADe 23 / 24
16-30 mins 1
31-45 mins 1
Half-time 1
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 10
76-90 mins 9
Including 1 double substitution

Arsenal v Milan

4-2-3-1, usually with wingers
Outstanding progressive possession play
Great use of the flanks, including by the full-backs
Fast ball speed and quick players
Often a high line and intense pressing
Van Persie the main threat, also in the air
Mesmerising combination play
Very good attitude, mentally strong
Threat on set plays, with inswinging corners
Rapid transition on the counter

APPEARANCES

No Player Dor Oly OM OM Dor Oly Mil Mil G

GOALKEEPERS
13 Wojciech SZCZESNY 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
21 Lukasz FABIAŃSKI
24 Vito MANNONE 65+

DEFENDERS
3 Bacary SAGNA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
5 Thomas VERMAELEN 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
6 Laurent KOSCIELNY 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
11 André SANTOS 4 90 90 90 90 51 90 90 90
12 Sebastien SOUILLACI 1 7 90 90 90 90 90
20 Johan DJOUROU 1 28 7 90 46+ 1
25 Carl JENKINSON 62 90 90 90 90 90
28 Kieran GIBBS 90 7 90 90 90 90
49 Ignasi MIQUEL 39

MIDFIELDERS
Abou SABA
7 Tomáš ROSICKÝ 1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
8 Mikel ARTEA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
15 Alex OXLADE-CHAMBERLAIN 68 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
16 Aaron RAMSEY 22 12 66 90 90 90 90 90 90
17 Alexander SONG 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
19 Jack WILSHIRE 1 7 90 90 90
26 Emmanuel FRIMPONG 14 90 90
30 Yossi BENAYOUN 90 1 90 90
39 Francis COQUELIN 67 1

FORWARDS
9 PARK Ju-Young 62 6
10 Robin VAN PERSIE 86 19 90 90 90 90 4
12 Thierry HENRY 45+
14 Theo WALCOTT 76 1 67 90 85 90 45* 84
23 Andrey ARSHAVIN 83 78 13 90
27 GERVINHO Yao Kouassi 86 23 77 74 90
29 Marouane CHAMAKH 4 71 90 90 15

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/Ill

APPARITIOnS

POSSession 52%
Max. 58% v Dortmund (h)
Min. 47% v Dortmund (a), Milan (h)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 110,996 METRES
Max. 114,693 in Dortmund
Min. 105,555 v Olympiacos (a)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 559
Max. 632 in Milan
Min. 462 v Milan (h)

PASSING ACCURACY 72%
Max. 79% in Marseille
Min. 66% in Dortmund

PASSES PER GAME
Long 75 (13% of total)
Medium 365 (63%)
Short 119 (21%)
(decimal points account for the missing 1%)

APPEARANCES
STATISTICS

POSSESSION  68%
Max.  72% v Plzen (h), v Leverkusen (a)
Min.  60% v Milan - group (a), v Milan ½-final (h)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED  109,082 METRES
Max.  116,641 v BATE (h)
Min.  100,941 in Milan (¼-final)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 827
Max.  988 v Leverkusen (h)
Min.  554 in Milan (group stage)

PASSING ACCURACY 86%
Max.  91% v Plzen (h)
Min.  80% v Milan ¼-final (h)

PASSES PER GAME:
Long  66 (8% of total)
Medium  543 (66%)
Short  218 (26%)

GOALS SCORED  35
1-15 mins  3
16-30 mins  4
31-45 mins  9
45+  1
46-60 mins  8
61-75 mins  4
76-90 mins  5
90+  1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 34 / 36
16-30 mins  1
31-45 mins  1
46-60 mins  4
61-75 mins  17
76-90 mins  10
90+  1

APPEARANCES

No Player  Mil  BAT  Plz  Plz  Mil  BAT  Lev  Lev  Mil  Mil  Che  Che  G
1 VÍCTOR VALDÉS  90 90 90 90  90 90 90 90  90 90 90 90
13 José PINTO  90
36 OIER Olazábal

DEFENDERS
2 Daniel ALVES  90 90 90 71 S  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 26*
3 Gerard PIQUÉ  1 1 1 90 90 90 90 75 26*
5 Carles PUYOL  23 90 1 90 1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
14 Javier MASCHERANO  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
19 MAXWELL Scherer  1 21 19 90 - - - - - - - -
21 ADRIANO Correia  29 90 90 1 1 70 63 1 15 90
22 Eric ABIDAL  90 61 90 73 90 90 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
24 AndréuFONTAS  90 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
26 MarcMUNIESA  52 27
32 MarcBARTRA  90 1
55 MartinMONTOYA  90

MIDFIELDERS
4 CescFÀBREGAS  51+ 30 1 90 80 90 90 90 78 78 76 1
6 XAVI Hernández  90 60 90 90 1 54 90 63 87 90 1
8 Andrés INIESTA  39 1 85 1 1 61 53 65 90 90 90 3
11 THIAGO Alcântara  90 90 89 90 29 1 27 12
15 SeydouKEITA  67 90 5 25 90 A 36 90 12 16
16 SERGIO BUSQUETS  90 90 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
20 Ibrahim AFELLAY  6 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1
28 Jonathan DOS SANTOS  1 58
29 Martí RIVEROLA  11
50 SERGI ROBERTO  79
54 Rafael Alcântara RAFINHA  70

FORWARDS
7 David VILLA  84 90 88 68 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
9 ALEXIS Sánchez  1 1 1 17 22 86 1 76 66 90 2
10 Lionel MESSI  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 14
17 PEDRO Rodríguez  90 69 90 1 10 90 20 90 14 24 4
27 GERARD Deulofeu
37 Cristian TELLO  27 25 22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
39 Isaac CUENCA  29 90 4 90 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill; A = Absent
2 own goals were scored by BATE’s Aleksandr Volodko (in Minsk) and AC Milan’s Mark van Bommel (MD5)

HEAD COACH

JOSEP GUARDIOLA
Date of birth 18/01/1971 in Santpedor (Barcelona)
Nationality  Spanish
Head coach since 01/07/2008
Matches in UEFA Champions League 50
Players used 31
Substitutions 34 / 36

Barcelona v Leverkusen

- 4-3-3 with Busquets the midfield screen
- Messi magic often makes the difference
- Xavi, the ultimate schemer, dictates the tempo
- Brilliant combination play in central areas, often one touch
- Outstanding counters: dangerous when being attacked
- Constant interchange and incisive through passes
- High-quality direct and indirect free kicks (Xavi Hernández, Messi, Alves)
- Great use of the flanks, especially Alves on the right
- Remarkable quality in personal and collective possession play
- Advanced pressing the norm: a major weapon
HEIKO VOGEL
Date of birth 21/11/1975 in Bad Dürkheim
Nationality German
Head coach since 13/10/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 6
Players used: 20
Substitutions 24 / 24

THORSTEN FINK
(Date of birth Dortmund 29/10/1967)
was in charge for the first two matchdays.

Basel v Bayern
• Basically 4-4-2, defending in 4-5-1 structure
• Twin strikers (A. Frei and Streller) – Frei usually deeper
• Left-footed Shaqiri a threat from the right
• Big impact on crosses and cut-backs
• Calmness in possession through midfield (Xhaka)
• Disciplined, resolute and hard-working
• Valuable attacking support from full-backs
• Sometimes long to Streller: good distribution from Sommer
• Attacking mobility and incisive passing
• Good delivery on set plays

HEAD COACH

POSSESSION 51%
Max. 63% v Galati (h)
Min. 41% in Munich

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 118,507 METRES
Max. 121,813 in Manchester
Min. 114,624 in Munich

PASSES ATTEMPTED 553
Max. 615 v Galati (h)
Min. 483 v Manchester Utd (h)

PASSING ACCURACY 75%
Max. 77% v Galati (h)
Min. 70% in Manchester, Munich

PASSES PER GAME
Long 89 (17% of total)
Medium 351 (62%)
Short 113 (21%)

GOALS SCORED 12
1-15 mins 3
16-30 mins 2
31-45 mins 2
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 1
76-90 mins 2
90+ 4

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 24 / 24
31-45 mins 1
61-75 mins 5
76-90 mins 16
90+ 4

No Player Gal Man Ben Ben Gal Man Mun Mun G
GOALKEEPERS
1 Yann SOMMER 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
23 Massimo COLOMBA

DEFENDERS
3 PARK JOO HO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
4 Philipp DEGEN 20
5 Aleksandar DRAGOVIĆ 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
16 Taulant XHAKA 1
19 David ABRAHAM 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
21 Genséric KUSUNGA 1 2
27 Markus STEINHOFER 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 70
29 Radoslav KOVÁC 1

MIDFIELDERS
8 Benjamin HUGGEL 87 5 85 90 44* 1 90 1
11 Scott CHIPPERFIELD 1 13 5 89 16 7
14 Valentin STOCKER 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 29
17 Xherdan SHAQIRI 5 5 90 82 89 83 80
20 Fabian FREI 89 77 66 90 90 66 61 3
24 Adison Varela CABRAL 90 90 10 9 46+ 90 1 90
31 Jacques ZOUA 12 90 24 89 8 7 10
34 Granit XHAKA 78 90 80 81 90 83 90 90

FORWARDS
9 Marco STRELLER 90 81 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
13 Alexander FREI 89 89 90 74 88 89 90 5
35 Kwang Ryong PAK 1 9 1
G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; ** = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

STATISTICS

APPEARANCES

Switzerland
BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN
Germany

STATISTICS

POSSESSION 44%
Max. 65% v Genk (h)
Min. 28% v Barcelona (h)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 116,329 METRES
Max. 120,550 at Genk
Min. 110,989 in Valencia

PASSES ATTEMPTED 470
Max. 608 v Genk (h)
Min. 350 v Barcelona (h)

PAS SiNG ACCUrAcY 69%
Max. 80% at Genk
Min. 59% v Barcelona (h)

PASS es per GAmE
Long 72 (15% of total)
Medium 288 (61%)
Short 112 (24%)

GOALs SCOREd 10
16-30 mins 1
31-45 mins 1
46-60 mins 2
61-75 mins 2
76-90 mins 2
90+ 1

SUBstiTUTIO NS MADE 24 / 24
Half time 1
46-60 mins 5
61-75 mins 7
76-90 mins 10
90+ 3
Including 1 double substitution

APPEARANCES

No Player Che Gen Val Val Che Gen Bar Bar G
22 David YELLDELL 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
23 Bernô LENO 90 90 45* 11 87 90 90
36 Fabian GIEFER 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

DEFENDERS
2 Daniel SCHWAAB 1 57 90 90 90
3 Stefan REINARTZ 90 90 45* 11 87 90 90
4 Bastian OCZIPKA 7 17 23
5 Manuel FRIEDRICH 90 90 90 90 90
14 Vedran CORLUKA 89 1
21 Ömer TOPRAK 90 90 90 90 90 90
24 Michal KADLEC 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
27 Gonzalo CASTRO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
6 Simon ROLFES 90 90 90 90 90 90 77 90
8 Lars BENDER 80 90 90 79 90 90 90 90 55 1
10 Renato AUGUSTO 24 65 90 67
13 Michael BALLACK 66 10 90 90 90 90 1 1 1 1
18 Sidney SAM 73 90 89 84 90 90 90 1 1 1
20 DANNY Da Costa 1
38 Karim BELLARABI 1 55 1

FORWARDS
9 Andreas SCHÜRRLE 90 90 90 90 33 68 89 35 1
11 Stefan KIESSLING 90 89 81 77 83 22 13 90 1
19 Eren DERDIYOK 17 1 9 13 19 90 1 55 2
31 Nicolai JÆRGENSEN 1 3
G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

Leverkusen v Barcelona
• 4-4-2 or 4-5-1 with zonal back four
• Compact defensive block of eight or nine players
• Effective on crosses and corners
• Frequent back-to-front direct play
• Threatening on indirect frees (Castro) and long throws (Balitsch)
• Good one-two combinations in front third
• Deep, disciplined defending, but sometimes press high
• Capable of classic fast counters
• Hard-working midfield - Rolfes the leader
• Aerial prowess in attack and defence

HEAD COACH

ROBIN DUTT
Date of birth 24/01/1965 in Cologne
Nationality German
Head coach since 01/07/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 8
Players used 20
Substitutions 24 / 24
Germany

**FC BAYERN MÜNCHEN**

### STATISTICS

**POSESSION**
- Max.: 64% v Villarreal (h)
- Min.: 48% v Manchester City (a)

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**
- 113,075 METRES
  - Max.: 117,280 in Basel
  - Min.: 108,434 v Napoli (a)

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**
- 618
  - Max.: 813 v Villarreal (h)
  - Min.: 551 in Villarreal

**PASSING ACCURACY**
- 79%
  - Max.: 87% v Villarreal (h)
  - Min.: 73% v Real Madrid (h)

**PASSES PER GAME**
- Long: 79 (12% of total)
- Medium: 412 (67%)
- Short: 129 (21%)

**GOALS SCORED**
- 26
  - 1-15 mins: 5
  - 16-30 mins: 5
  - 31-45 mins: 6
  - 45+ mins: 1
  - 46-60 mins: 4
  - 61-75 mins: 4
  - 76-90 mins: 4

**SUBSTITUTIONS MADE**
- 29 / 39
  - 1-15 mins: 1
  - 16-30 mins: 1
  - Half-time: 1
  - 46-60 mins: 1
  - 61-75 mins: 8
  - 76-90 mins: 13
  - 90+: 2
  - Extra time: 2

### APPEARANCES

**GOALKEEPERS**
- 1 Manuel NEUER
- 2 Jörg BUTT
- 5 Daniel VAN BUYTEN
- 13 Rafael de Souza RAFINHA
- 17 Jérôme BOATENG
- 21 Philipp LAHM
- 26 Diego CONTENTO
- 27 David ALABA
- 28 Holger BADSTUBER

**DEFENDERS**
- 7 Franck RIBÉRY
- 10 Arjen ROBBEN
- 14 Takashi USAMI
- 23 Danijel PRANJIĆ
- 30 LUIS GUSTAVO
- 31 Bastian SCHWEINSTEIGER
- 33 Mario GOMEZ

**MIDFIELDERS**
- 5 Daniel VAN BUYTEN
- 9 Rafael de Souza RAFINHA
- 10 Arjen ROBBEN
- 14 Takashi USAMI
- 23 Danijel PRANJIĆ
- 30 LUIS GUSTAVO
- 31 Bastian SCHWEINSTEIGER
- 33 Mario GOMEZ

**FORWARDS**
- 9 Nils PETTERSEN
- 11 Ivica OLIĆ
- 25 Thomas MÜLLER
- 33 Mario GOMEZ

**HEAD COACH**

**JUPP HEYNCKES**
- Date of birth: 09/05/1945 in Mönchengladbach
- Nationality: German
- Head coach since: 01/07/2011
- Matches in UEFA Champions League: 24
- Players used: 21
- Substitutions: 29 / 39

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- 4-2-3-1 with double midfield screen
- Outstanding wingers (Robben and Ribéry)
- Brilliant combination play
- Mobility in attack, overlapping full-backs (e.g. Lahm)
- Dangerous long-range shooting and incisive running corners (e.g. Robben)
- Fast, effective counterattacking
- Top finisher and lone striker Gomez
- Midfield pressing a feature
- Impressive delivery on free-kicks and inswinging corners (e.g. Robben)
- Switch of play to create one-on-one situations
**STATISTICS**

**POSSESSION**
- Max.: 65% v Galati (a)
- Min.: 36% in Manchester

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**
- 115,715 METRES
- Max.: 120,754 v Zenit (h)
- Min.: 110,317 v Zenit (a)

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**
- 521
- Max.: 679 v Galati (a)
- Min.: 398 in Manchester

**PASSING ACCURACY**
- 70%
- Max.: 80% v Galati (h)
- Min.: 63% in Manchester

**PASSES PER GAME**
- Long: 68 (13% of total)
- Medium: 327 (63%)
- Short: 126 (24%)

**GOALS SCORED**
- Long: 2
- Medium: 2
- Short: 9

**SUBSTITUTIONS MADE**
- 30 / 30
- 16-30 mins: 1
- 46-60 mins: 4
- 61-75 mins: 14
- 76-90 mins: 10
- 90+: 1

Including 1 double substitution

---

**APPEARANCES**

**GOALKEEPERS**
- 1 ARTUR Moraes Gusmão
- 47 EDUARDO Carvalho

**DEFENDERS**
- 3 EMERSON da Conceição
- 4 Anderson da Silva LUISÃO
- 14 ‘MAXI’ PEREIRA
- 24 Ezequiel GARAY
- 33 JARDEL Vieira
- 36 LUIS MARTINS
- 38 Joan CAPDEVILA

**MIDFIELDERS**
- 5 Ruben AMORIM
- 6 JAVI GARCÍA
- 8 BRUNO CESAR
- 10 Pablo AIMAR
- 20 Nicolás GAITÁN
- 21 Nemanja MATIĆ
- 28 Axel WITSEL

**FORWARDS**
- 7 Oscar CARDOZO
- 9 Manuel Durán ‘NOLITO’
- 12 Yannick DIJALO
- 16 NELSON OLIVEIRA
- 19 RODRIGO Moreno
- 30 Javier SAVIOLA

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill
1 goal was an own goal by Manchester United’s Phil Jones at Old Trafford

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**HEAD COACH**

**JORGE JESUS**
- Date of birth: 24/07/1954 in Amadora
- Nationality: Portuguese
- Head coach since: 16/06/2009
- Matches in UEFA Champions League: 16
- Players used: 22
- Substitutions: 30 / 30

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**Benfica v Zenit**

• 4-4-2 (4-4-1-1) or 4-2-3-1 with midfield screening player
• South American technique and flair
• Luísão the leader of a zonal back four
• Set-play threat: long throw (Maxi Pereira), free-kicks (Cardozo), corners (Bruno César)
• Brilliant combination play, central and wide
• Full-backs provide attacking width
• High backline, often advanced pressing
• Impressive fast breaks, classic and collective
• Varied scoring options: top finishers Cardozo, Nélson Oliveira, Rodrigo
• Great attacking mobility: Bruno César, Witsel and Gaitán from midfield
CHELSEA FC

STATISTICS

POSESSION 47%
Max.  62% v Genk (h)
Min.  28% in both games v FC Barcelona

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 111,498 METRES*
Max.  119,040 at Genk
Min. 103,186 v Napoli (h)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 509
Max.  781 v Genk (h)
Min. 297 in Barcelona

PASSING ACCURACY 70%
Max.  84% v Genk (h)
Min. 46% in Barcelona

PASSES per GAME
Long 70 (14% of total)
Medium 331 (65%)
Short 108 (21%)

* For sake of comparisons, figures for MD8 v Napoli (h) and the final in Munich converted pro rata to 90-minute values and semi-final 2nd leg v Barcelona (when Chelsea played 53 mins with 10) excluded

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS
1 Petr ČECH 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 90 90 90 90 120
2 Ross TURBULL 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 90 90 90

DEFENDERS
2 Branislav IVANOVIĆ 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 90 90 90 90 120
3 Ashley COLE 90 90 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
4 DAVID LUIZ Marinho 90 90 90 90 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
7 José BOSINGWA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
10 John Terry 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
5 Michael ESSIEN 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
6 ORIOL ROMEU 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
7 RAMIRES Santos 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
12 John Obi MIKEL 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
15 Florent MALOUDA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
16 Raúl MEIRELES 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

FORWARDS
9 Fernando TORRES 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
10 Juan MATA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
11 Didier DROGBA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
21 Salomon KALOU 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
23 Daniel STURRIDGE 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
39 Nicolas ANELKA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

Chelsea v Napoli

GOALSCORERS (AVB) 14
1-15 mins 3
16-30 mins 4
31-45 mins 1
46-60 mins 2
61-75 mins 2
76-90 mins 1
90+ 1

GOALSCORERS (rDM) 11
16-30 mins 2
45+ 2
61-65 mins 1
66-70 mins 2
71-75 mins 1
76-80 mins 1
81-85 mins 2
86-90 mins 1
90+ 2

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE (AVB) 21 / 21
1-15 mins 1
Half-time 1
61-75 mins 12
76-90 mins 7
Including 2 double substitutions

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE (rDM) 16 / 18
1-15 mins 1
Half-time 1
61-75 mins 12
76-90 mins 7
Including 2 double substitutions

HEAD COACH

ANDRÉ VILLAS-BOAS
Date of birth 17/10/1977 in Porto
Nationality Portuguese
Head coach from 01/07/2011 to 04/03/2012
Players used 22
Substitutions 21 / 21

ROBERTO DI MATTEO
Date of birth 29/05/1970 in Schaffhausen
Nationality Swiss/Italian
Head coach from 04/03/2012
Players used 20
Substitutions 16 / 18

• 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1
• Highly mobile middle-to-front (Mata and Lampard)
• Top-quality crosses, usually by full-backs
• Very strong, aerially, on set plays: deliveries by Mata and Lampard
• Breaks from the back, especially via David Luiz
• Zonal back four, with Terry the leader
• Imposing goalkeeper (Čech), with good distribution
• Very experienced group: mentally strong
• Slick combination play and incisive passes
• Excellent use of the flanks: goals from cut-backs

17/10/1977 in Porto
Portuguese
01/07/2011 to 04/03/2012
7
22
21 / 21
29/05/1970 in Schaffhausen
Swiss/Italian
04/03/2012
20
16 / 18
Russia

STATISTICS

**POSESSION**
- 47%
- Max. 56% v Inter (h)
- Min. 39% in Madrid

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**
- 113,765 METRES
- Max. 118,934 in Lille
- Min. 106,599 in Milan

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**
- 466
- Max. 561 v Inter (h)
- Min. 341 in Trabzon

**PASSING ACCURACY**
- 68%
- Max. 75% v Inter (h)
- Min. 60% in Trabzon

**PASSES PER GAME**
- Long 80 (18% of total)
- Medium 270 (61%)
- Short 9b (21%)

**GOALS SCORED**
- 11
- 16-30 mins 1
- 46-60 mins 1
- 61-75 mins 1
- 76-90 mins 6
- 90+ 1

**SUBSTITUTIONS MADE**
- 21 / 24
- Half time 2
- 46-60 mins 2
- 61-75 mins 8
- 76-90 mins 8
- 90+ 2

**APPEARANCES**

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</tbody>
</table>

**GOALKEEPERS**
- 1 Sergei CHEPCHUGOV
- 30 Vladimir GABULOV
- 95 Sergei REVYAKIN

**DEFENDERS**
- 2 Deividas SEMBERAS
- 4 Sergei IGNASHEVICH
- 6 Alexei BEREZUTSKI
- 14 Kirill NABABKIN
- 24 Vasili BEREZUTSKI
- 42 Georgi CHENNIKOV
- 59 Semen FEDOTOV

**MIDFIELDERS**
- 3 Pontus WERNBLOOM
- 7 Keisuke HONDA
- 10 Alan DZAGOEV
- 17 Pavel MAMAEV
- 18 Ahmed MUSA
- 19 Aleksandrs CAUNA
- 21 Zoran TOŠIĆ
- 22 Evgeni ALDONIN
- 25 Efer RAHIMIC
- 26 Sekou OLUSEH

**FORWARDS**
- 8 Seydou DOUMBIA
- 9 VÁGNER LOVE
- 61 Serder SERDEROV
- 89 Tomáš NECID

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

**HEAD COACH**

LEONID SLUTSKY

- Date of birth 04/05/1971 in Volgograd
- Nationality Russian
- Head coach since 26/10/2009
- Matches in UEFA Champions League 15
- Players used 23
- Substitutions 21 / 24

- 4-4-2 and variations; 4-5-1 when defending
- Compact block defending, with double screen
- Technically good middle-to-front
- Composed build-up from the back
- Capable of pressing high
- Try to play quickly when deep
- Dangerous soloists (e.g. Doumbia and Vagner Love)
- A threat on free kicks (Dzagoev) and corners (Berezutski)
- Successful combination play in front third
- Outstanding counterattacking options

CSKA v Madrid
ClAUDIO RANIERI
Date of birth 20/10/1951 in Rome
Nationality Italian
Head coach since 21/09/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 40
Players used 25
Substitutions 23 / 24
GIAN PIERO GASPERINI
Date of birth 26/01/1958 (Grugliasco)
was in charge for the first matchday

STATISTICS

POSSSESSION 46%
Max. 52% v Trabzonspor (h)
Min. 41% in Lille

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 108,073 METRES
Max. 115,500 in Moscow
Min. 101,555 v Trabzonspor (h)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 474
Max. 549 v Trabzonspor (h)
Min. 389 in Lille

PASSING ACCURACY 70%
Max. 78% in Lille
Min. 59% in Marseille

PASSES PER GAME
Long 78 (16% of total)
Medium 292 (62%)
Short 104 (22%)

GOALS SCORED 10
1-15 mins 1
16-30 mins 4
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 2
76-90 mins 1
90+ 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 23 / 24
Half-time 3
46-60 mins 5
61-75 mins 7
76-90 mins 7
90+ 1
Including 3 double substitutions

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS
1 JULIO CESAR 90 90 90 90 1 90 90 90 90
12 Luca CASTELLAZZI 90 90

DEFENDERS
6 LUCIO Da Silva 90 90 90 90 90 90 1 90 90 1
13 MAICON Douglas 1 1 90 1 1 1 45+* 90
16 Luca CALDIROLA 1 45+
23 Andrea RANOCCHIA 90 90 1
25 Walter SAMUEL 90 1 90 90 90 90 90 1
26 Christian CHIVU 89 90 90 90 45+* 90 5
42 JONATHAN Moreira 90 6
55 Yuto NAGATOMO 90 90 90 90 90 45+ 90

MIDFIELDERS
4 Javier ZANETTI 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
5 Dejan STANKOVIC 1 23 90 90 90 90 90
8 Thiago MOUTA 1 1 90 90 23 90 20
10 Wesley SNEIJDER 90 1 67 67 1 1 90 58
11 Ricardo ALVAREZ 35 84 25 89 20
18 Andrea POLI 76
19 Esteban CAMBIASSO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 16 1
20 Joel OBI 55 90 27 1 70 26 32
29 Philippe COUTINHO 13 1 21 45+
37 Marco FARAGGI 1 90
48 Lorenzo CRISTETIG 1

FORWARDS
7 Giampaolo PAZZINI 55 49 81 11 4 32 3
9 Diego FORLAN 90 58
22 Diego MILITO 35 90 9 89 86 90 90 2
28 Mauro ZÁRATE 77 41 79 69 45+ 64 1
G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

HEAD COACH

• 4-3-3, with Sneijder off the front
• Very experienced group: Zanetti a great leader
• Uncompromising at the back (e.g. Lucio and Samuel)
• Major South American influence
• Long passes from deep-lying Stankovic
• Extremely mobile and hard-working up front
• Aerial threat on well-delivered set plays (e.g. Lúcio, Samuel)
• Sneijder, the creator, with incisive passes
• Excellent setup play (Forlán and Milito)
• Good crosses and cut-backs from full-backs or midfielders
AC MILAN
Italy

STATISTICS

POSSESSION 45%
Max. 59% v BATE (a)
Min. 31% in Barcelona (MD1)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 103,457 METRES
Max. 110,584 v Plzen (a)
Min. 97,186 in Barcelona (MD1)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 517
Max. 663 v BATE (a)
Min. 294 in Barcelona (MD1)

PASSING ACCURACY 73%
Max. 80% v Plzen (h)
Min. 64% in Barcelona (MD1)

PASSES PER GAME
Long 79 (15% of total)
Medium 332 (64%)
Short 106 (21%)

GOALS SCORED
1-15 mins 2
16-30 mins 2
31-45 mins 3
46-60 mins 5
61-75 mins 2
76-90 mins 1
90+ 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 29 / 30
1-15 mins 1
31-45 mins 2
Half-time 1
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 13
76-90 mins 11

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS

No Player Bar Plz BAT BAT Bar Plz Ars Ars Bar Bar G
1 Marco AMELIA 90
30 Flavio ROMA
32 Christian ABBATI 90 90 90 90 90 1 90 90 90 90
DEFENDERS

2 Taye TAIWO 1 12 90 90 89
5 Philippe MEXÈS 5 1 6 1 90 90 90 90 90 90
13 Alessandro NESTA 90 90 84 67 66 1 90 90 75 90
15 Djamel BESBAH 1 15
19 Gianluca ZAMBROTTA 90 90 1
20 Ignazio ABATE 90 87 90 90 90 90 1 90 90 90 90
25 Daniele BONERA 90 23 24 90 1 90
33 THIAGO Silva 90 90 1 90 90 50+ 90 90 1 1 1
52 Mattia DE SCIGLIO 3 90
77 Luca ANTONINI 78 1 90 90 90 90
MIDFIELDERS

4 Mark VAN BOMMEL 78 90 90 72 1 90 90 5 1
10 Clarence SEEDORF 90 71 1 21 90 90 12* 1 90 61
18 Alberto AQUILANI 12 39 90 69 30 5 1 20 1 29
22 Antonio NOCERINO 90 90 90 90 18 40* 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
23 Massimo AMBROSINI 57+ 1 90 90 20 5 90 90
27 Kevin-Prince BOATENG 33* 1 78 90 90 70 1 67 69 3
28 Urby EMANUELSON 28 90 12 90 78+ 90 23
34 Bryan CHRISTANTE 9
FORWARDS

7 Alexandre Rodrigues ‘PATO’ 90 1 1 45+ 90 6 1 1 14 2
11 Zlatan IBRAHIMOVIC 1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 5
21 ‘MAXI’ LOPEZ 1 7
56 Simone GANZ 7
70 Rohson De Souza ROBINHO 1 1 28 83 45* 81 84 90 52 90 3
92 Stephan EL SHAARAWY 70 38
99 Alberto CASSANO 62 90 62 1 1 1 1 1 1 G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

HEAD COACH

MASSIMILIANO ALLEGRI

Date of birth 11/08/1967 in Livorno
Nationality Italian
Head coach since 25/06/2010
Matches in UEFA Champions League 18
Players used 27
Substitutions 29/30

• Basically 4-3-3, but adaptable (e.g. 4-4-2)
• Exceptional attacking individuals (e.g. Ibrahimovic, Robinho)
• In midfield, Van Bommel the leader and screen
• Clever, unpredictable and mobile in attack
• Counterattack in numbers and at speed
• Quick delivery to the front
• Technical quality, cope well with pressure
• Able to change the rhythm
• Width supplied by the full-backs
• Excellent combinations and through passes
Walter MAZZARRI
Date of birth 01/10/1961 in San Vincenzo (Livorno)
Nationality Italian
Head coach since 06/10/2009
Matches in UEFA Champions League 8
Players used 19
Substitutions 22 / 24

Team Distance Covered
Max. 115,300 v Chelsea (h)
Min. 105,525 v Villarreal (h)

PasseS AttemPteD
Max. 507 at Chelsea
Min. 386 in Munich

Passing Accuracy
Max. 76% v FC Bayern (h)
Min. 63% v Chelsea (h)

Possession
Max. 49% v Chelsea (h), v Villarreal (a)
Min. 38% v Man City (h), in Munich

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 110,454 METRES
Max. 115,300 v Chelsea (h)
Min. 105,525 v Villarreal (h)

PASSeS per GAMe
Long 74 (17% of total)
Medium 276 (63%)
Short 88 (20%)

* For sake of comparison, figures for game at Chelsea converted pro rata to 90-minute values

Goals Scored
1-15 mins 1
16-30 mins 2
31-45 mins 3
45+ 1
46-60 mins 2
61-75 mins 3
76-90 mins 2

Substitutions Made 22 / 24
31-45 mins 2
46-60 mins 2
61-75 mins 2
76-90 mins 12
90+ 2
Extra time 2

Napoli v Chelsea
• Generally 3-4-3, with one attacker deeper than the strikers
• Defend with five at the back, including wing-backs
• Quick delivery to the front
• Very talented, dangerous front three
• Extremely hard-working in midfield (e.g. Gargano)
• Good hold-up play and attacking mobility
• Extremely quick to counterattack
• Committed defending and interceptions
• Willing to shoot from long range
• Highly effective on corners and indirect free kicks

StatIstIcS

GOLKEEPERS
1 Morgan DE SANCTIS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
83 Antonio ROSATI

DEFENDERS
2 Gianluca GRAVA 90 1
6 Salvatore ARONICA 90 90 42* 90 90 90 110
14 Hugo CAMPAGNARO 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
21 Federico FERNANDEZ 90 1
28 Paolo CANNARO 90 90 90 90 90 90 120

MIDFIELDERS
8 Andrea DOSSENA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
11 Christian MAGGIO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
17 Marek HAMŠIK 89 79 89 90 90 79 82 106 2
18 Juan ZUNIGA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
19 Mario Alberto SANTANA 1 2 1
20 Blerim DZEMAILI 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
23 Walter GARGANO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
88 Gökhan INLER 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120

FORWARDS
7 Edinson CAVANI 84 81 90 83 82 90 120 5
9 Giuseppe MASCARA 11 1
16 Eduardo VARGAS 1 10
22 Ezequiel LAVEZZI 58 88 90 90 90 90 74 120 2
29 Goran PANDEV 6 19 1 6 7 8 8 14

1 goal was an own goal in Naples by FC Bayern München’s Holger Badstuber

No Player ManC Vill Mun Mun ManC Vill Che Che G
1 Morgan DE SANCTIS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
83 Antonio ROSATI
2 Gianluca GRAVA 90 1
6 Salvatore ARONICA 90 90 90 90 90 90 110
14 Hugo CAMPAGNARO 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
21 Federico FERNANDEZ 90 1
28 Paolo CANNARO 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
8 Andrea DOSSENA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
11 Christian MAGGIO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
17 Marek HAMŠIK 89 79 89 90 90 79 82 106 2
18 Juan ZUNIGA 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
19 Mario Alberto SANTANA 1 2 1
20 Blerim DZEMAILI 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
23 Walter GARGANO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
88 Gökhan INLER 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
7 Edinson CAVANI 84 81 90 83 82 90 120 5
9 Giuseppe MASCARA 11 1
16 Eduardo VARGAS 1 10
22 Ezequiel LAVEZZI 58 88 90 90 90 90 74 120 2
29 Goran PANDEV 6 19 1 6 7 8 8 14

1 goal was an own goal in Naples by FC Bayern München’s Holger Badstuber

HEAD COACH
WALTER MAZZARRI
Date of birth 01/10/1961 in San Vincenzo (Livorno)
Nationality Italian
Head coach since 06/10/2009
Matches in UEFA Champions League 8
Players used 19
Substitutions 22 / 24
Rémi Garde
Date of birth 03/04/1966 in l’Arbresle (Rhône)
Nationality French
Head coach since 22/06/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 8
Players used 20
Substitutions 17 / 24

No Player Ajx Zag Mad Mad Ajx Zag APO APO G
1 Hugo LLORIS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
28 Mathieu VALVERDE
30 Remy VERCOUTRE 1 1
3 Cristiano Marques CRIS 1 1 1 90 90 90 120
4 Bakari KONE 90 90 90 52* 90 90 120 1
5 Dejan LOVREN 90 90 90 38* 90 54 1
13 Anthony REVEILLERE 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
14 Mouhamadou DABO
15 Gueida FOFANA 1 90 90
20 Aly CISSOKHO 90 90 90 1 90 90 90 120
8 Kim KALLSTRÖM 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
7 Clément GRENIER 90 79 1 1
8 Yoann GOURCUFF 1 1 66 90 90 90 19 1
10 Honorato Campos EDERSON 1 1 24 84 17 25 71 73
11 Michel BASTOS 90 90 90 1 90 90 120
21 Maxime GONALONS 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
24 Jérémy PIED 11 1

Lyon v APOEL
• 4-2-3-1, with Lisandro at the apex
• High back line, with advanced pressing
• Defensive discipline: Cris the leader
• Patient build-up through midfield
• Technical quality with South American influence
• Hard-working, constructive midfielders
• Good combinations, one and two touches
• Individual quality in attack, dribbling and shooting
• Effective use of the flanks: crosses and cut-backs
• A threat on corner kicks

HEAD COACH
Rémi Garde
Date of birth 03/04/1966 in l’Arbresle (Rhône)
Nationality French
Head coach since 22/06/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 8
Players used 20
Substitutions 17 / 24
France

Olympique de Marseille

Statistics

Possession: 48%

Max. 56% vs Olympiacos (h)
Min. 42% vs FC Bayern (h)

Team Distance Covered: 108,061 Metres

Max. 119,039 in Dortmund
Min. 102,079 in Milan

Passes Attempted: 489

Max. 623 in Munich
Min. 365 vs Dortmund (h)

Passing Accuracy: 69%

Max. 78% in Munich
Min. 59% in Dortmund

Passes per Game

Long: 72 (15% of total)
Medium: 299 (61%)
Short: 118 (24%)

Goals Scored

16-30 mins: 1
45+: 1
45-60 mins: 1
61-75 mins: 2
76-90 mins: 3
90+: 1

Substitutions Made: 29/30

Half-time: 2
61-75 mins: 17
76-90 mins: 9
90+: 1

 Including 1 double substitution

Appearances

No Player Oly Dor Ars Ars Oly Dor Int Int Mun Mun G

Goalkeepers
1. Gennaro Bracigliano 1
16. Elinton Andrade 90
30. Steve Mandanda 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 89 S 90

Defenders
2. César Azpilicueta 90 90 90 90 80 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
3. Nicolas N’Koulou 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
13. Djimi Traoré 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
15. Jérémy Morel 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
21. Souleymane Diawara 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
24. Rod Fanni 8 5 5 90 10 90 90
26. Jean-Philippe Sabo 1

Midfielders
4. Alou Diarra 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 71 S
7. Benoît Cheyrou 82 87 90 61 45+ 84 14 19 90
8. Lucas González 77 73 73 16 18 67 1
12. Charles Kabore 13 90 3 90 90 6
17. Stéphane Mbia 90 29 45+ 1 90 90 90
18. Morgan Amalfitano 90 17 17 21 90 90 90 68 45+
28. Mathieu Valbuena 90 90 74 72 17 90 76 90 90 1

Forwards
9. Evraeverson Brandão 73 22 22 71 2
10. André-Pierre Gignac 23 6 29 1 1 16
11. Loïc Rémy 68 71 69 69 90 73 1 88 90 63 2
12. André Ayew 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 89 90 90 90 4
13. Jordon Ayew 22 19 5 84 61 23 17

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

Head Coach

Didier Deschamps

Date of Birth: 15/10/1968 in Bayonne
Nationality: French
Head Coach Since: 01/06/2009
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 45
Players Used: 22
Substitutions: 29/30

Marseille v Inter

• 4-2-3-1 with Valbuena off the front
• Very good combination play on the wings
• Technically competent, composed and cautious
• Highly efficient midfield screen (Diarra and Mbia)
• Set-play threat: Azpilicueta long throw and Valbuena free/corners
• Aerial power (e.g. Diarra, Diawara and Mbia)
• Good delivery on crosses, also from full-backs
• Generally short-passing possession style
• Some impressive shot-stopping and distribution by Mandanda
• Solo solutions from André Ayew, Valbuena or Brandão
STATISTICS

POSESSION 56%
Max. 70% v APOEL (a)
Min. 45% v Ajax (a), Bayern (h)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 111,197 METRES
Max. 115,844 v Ajax (a)
Min. 109,006 in Zagreb

PASSES ATTEMPTED 647
Max. 838 v APOEL (h)
Min. 492 v CSKA (a)

PASSING ACCURACY 80%
Max. 88% v Dinamo Zagreb (h)
Min. 69% in Munich

PASSES PER GAME:
Long 83 (13% of total)
Medium 418 (65%)
Short 146 (22%)
* For sake of comparisons, figures for semi-final v FC Bayern (h) converted pro rata to 90-minute values

GOALS SCORED 35
1-15 mins 6
16-30 mins 7
31-45 mins 3
46-60 mins 7
61-75 mins 3
76-90 mins 2
90+ 2

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 36 / 36
16-30 mins 1
Half-time 4
46-60 mins 3
61-75 mins 15
76-90 mins 11
Extra time 2
Including 3 double substitutions + 1 triple change at half-time

APPEARANCES

No Player Zag Ajax OL OL Zag Ajax CSKA CSKA APO APO Mun Mun G
1 Iker CASILLAS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
2 Sergio RAMOS 90 90 90 90 45* 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
3 Fabio COENTRAO 90 1 29 64 90 90 1 64 90
4 Marcelo Vieira da Silva 73 5 90
5 Nuri ŞAHIN 90 61 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
6 Sami KHEDIRA 1 90 64 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
7 Mesut ÖZIL 78 84 66 90 45* 84 88 90 69 111
8 Ricardo Izecson ‘KAKA’ 90 1 29 64 90 90 1 64 90
9 Mesut ÖZIL 78 84 66 90 45* 84 88 90 69 111
10 Esteban GRANERO 1 65+ 90 1 65+ 90 1 65+ 90 1 65+ 90
11 Xabi ALONSO 90 90 90 90 45* 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
12 Hamit ALTINTOP 1 6 45+ 36 1 90
13 José CALLEJÓN 7 90 90 75 1 45+ 5
14 Raphaël VARANE 90 90 90 90
15 Angel DI MARÍA 7 90 90 83 1
16 Gonzalo HIGUAIN 12 15 18 19 90 90 74+ 69 64 55 6 14 3

GOALKEEPERS
1 Iker CASILLAS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
12 Sergio RAMOS 90 90 90 90 45* 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
13 Fabio COENTRAO 90 1 29 64 90 90 1 64 90
17 Alvaro ARBELOA 8 90 90 90 1 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 120
18 Raúl ALBIOL 1 26 45+ 90 6 25
19 Raphaël VARANE 90 90 90 90

DEFENDERS
1 Ricardo CARVALHO 90 90 90 90 45* 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
3 Kepler Ferreira ‘PEPE’ 90 1 90 90 1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
4 Sergio RAMOS 90 90 90 90 45* 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
5 Nuri ŞAHIN 90 61 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
6 Sami KHEDIRA 1 90 64 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 120 1
7 Mesut ÖZIL 78 84 66 90 45* 84 88 90 69 111
8 Ricardo Izecson ‘KAKA’ 90 1 29 64 90 90 1 64 90
9 Mesut ÖZIL 78 84 66 90 45* 84 88 90 69 111
10 Esteban GRANERO 1 65+ 90 1 65+ 90 1 65+ 90 1 65+ 90
11 Xabi ALONSO 90 90 90 90 45* 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
12 Hamit ALTINTOP 1 6 45+ 36 1 90
13 José CALLEJÓN 7 90 90 75 1 45+ 5
14 Raphaël VARANE 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
15 Angel DI MARÍA 7 90 90 83 1
20 Gonzalo HIGUAIN 12 15 18 19 90 90 74+ 69 64 55 6 14 3
21 José CALLEJÓN 7 90 90 75 1 45+ 5
23 Pedro MENDES 23
24 LASSana DIARRA 12 90 90 1 2 1 1

FORWARDS
7 Cristiano RONALDO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
9 Karim BENZEMA 82 75 72 71 90 54 16* 21 90 84 106 7
20 Gonzalo HIGUAIN 12 15 18 19 90 90 74+ 69 64 55 6 14 3
22 Angel DI MARÍA 78 75 72 71 90 54 16* 21 90 84 106 7
G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/Ill
1 goal was an own goal by Hugo Lloris in Lyon on MD3

HEAD COACH
JOSÉ DOS SANTOS MOURINHO
Date of birth 26/01/1963 in Setúbal
Nationality Portuguese
Head coach since 31/05/2010
Matches in UEFA Champions League 95
Players used 24
Substitutions 36 / 36

Real Madrid v CSKA

- 4-2-3-1, but can alter (e.g. 4-3-3)
- Exceptional combinations and incisive passes
- Outstanding individualists (e.g. Ronaldo, Özil)
- Very dangerous on set plays: Ronaldo, Xabi Alonso
- Lightning counterattacks
- Great mobility in attack, especially Ronaldo and Özil
- Solid screen in midfield – Alonso the schemer
- Resolute zonal defence with great goalkeeper (Casillas)
- Positive possession: change of tempo
- Excellent use of the flanks, including Marcelo from left-back
Russia

STATISTICS

POSSESSION 51%
Max. 63% v APOEL (h)
Min. 42% in Porto

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 115,018 METRES
Max. 117,553 v Benfica (a)
Min. 107,368 v APOEL (a)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 527
Max. 679 v APOEL (h)
Min. 372 in Donetsk

PASSING ACCURACY 69%
Max. 79% v APOEL (h)
Min. 58% in Porto

PASSES PER GAME
Long 85 (16% of total)
Medium 315 (60%)
Short 127 (24%)

GOALS SCORED 10
16-30 mins 2
31-45 mins 1
45+ 1
60-75 mins 4
76-90 mins 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 20 / 24
Half time 3
45-60 mins 3
61-75 mins 4
76-90 mins 9
90+ 1

APPEARANCES

No Player APO Por Don Don APO Por Ben Ben G
16 Vyacheslav MALAFEEV 90 90 90 90 90 90 1 90
30 Yuri ZHEVNOV 90 90

DEFENDERS
2 Aleksandr ANYUKOV 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 53
3 BRUNO ALVES 76 5 90 8 90 37
4 Domenico CRISCITO 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 1 90
6 Nicolas LOMBAERTS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
14 Tomas HUBOCAN 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
15 Roman SHIROKOV 75 90 90 90 87 45+ 90 90 5
17 Alessandro ROSINA 1
18 Konstantin ZYRYANOV 80 86 89 90 55 45+ 45+ 70 1
20 Viktor FAYZULIN 15 90 90 90 90 58 89 20 1
23 Szabolcs HUSZTI 4
25 Sergei SEMAK 1 1 9 90 45+ 90 1
27 Igor DENISOV 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
34 Vladimir BYSTROV 1 1 55 32 24 45+

FORWARDS
8 Danko LAZEVIC 10 16 5 3 82 45+
9 Aleksandr BUKHAROV 1 1 74 81 90 1 1
10 Daniel Alves ‘DANNY’ 90 90 90 85 90 90 1 1 1
11 Aleksandr KERZHAKOV 90 89 1 1 1 1 90 90
99 Maksim KANUNNIKOV 66

G = Goals, S = Suspended, * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

HEAD COACH

LUCIANO SPALLETTI
Date of birth 07/03/1959 in Certaldo
Nationality Italian
Head coach since 11/12/2009
Matches in UEFA Champions League 36
Players used 20
Substitutions 20 / 24
The fact that FC Basel 1893 and APOEL FC made history by reaching the knockout stage provided a clear indication that some of the pre-season favourites had failed to make the cut and, arguably suffering a psychological rebound, none of them went on to prosper in the UEFA Europa League, where Valencia CF were the only UEFA Champions League starters who progressed beyond the last 16.

The 2011/12 campaign belied the traditional theory among UEFA Champions League coaches that ten points offer a guarantee of progress beyond the group stage. Manchester City FC achieved this target but found it insufficient to improve on third place in a strong Group A which featured teams from England, Germany, Italy and Spain. On the other hand, three clubs reached the knockout stage despite taking only half of the 18 points available in the group stage, and two teams advanced with eight points (two wins and two draws) from their six matches. Five of the eliminated teams failed to win a match, three of whom (GNK Dinamo Zagreb, FC Oţelul Galaţi and injury-hit Villarreal CF) lost all six games.
However, the profile of the pre-Christmas fallers differed substantially in comparison with the 2010/11 season, when one of the salient statistics of the teams that failed to make the cut had been, by and large, those who did not focus on a possession-and-passing philosophy. As the statistics on the following pages will reveal, this no longer prevailed as a clear tendency during 2011/12. The 16 fallers did include sides who were not obsessed with possession or elaborate passing combinations (for example, FC Viktoria Plzeň with 39% of the ball and 327 passes per game; KRC Genk with 39% and 396; and FC Oţelul Galaţi with 40% and 431). On the other hand, seven of the eliminated teams averaged in excess of 500 passes per match (four of them over 600), with Manchester City FC (67% and 697 passes) and Valencia CF (61% and 626) providing the most extreme examples. In other words, domination and possession play were not always readily translated into results. During the 2011/12 group stage, only 3 of the 32 sides (Real Madrid CF, FC Barcelona and FC Bayern München) won more than half of their six group fixtures.

The elimination of the two Manchester clubs (first and second in England’s Premier League) along with the champions of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Ukraine (FC Shakhtar Donetsk had been quarterfinalists in 2010/11) provides a clear indication of the competitive nature of the UEFA Champions League group stage, in which “taking your eye off the ball” can expose any team to premature elimination.
APPEARANCES

STATISTICS

POSSESSION  55%
Max.  61% v Lyon (h)
Min.  46% in Lyon

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED  118,225 METRES
Max.  124,385 in Lyon
Min.  114,517 v Lyon (h)

PASSES ATTEMPTED  625
Max.  701 v Dinamo Zagreb (h)
Min.  549 in Lyon

PASSED PER GAME
Long  87 (14% of total)
Medium  419 (67%)
Short  119 (19%)

GOALS SCORED  6
16-30 mins  2
46-60 mins  1
61-75 mins  1
76-90 mins  1
90+  1

GOALKEEPERS
1 Kenneth VERMEER  90 90 90 90 90 90
22 Jasper CILLESSEN

DEFENDERS
2 Gregory VAN DER WIJL  90 90 90 90 67 90 1
3 Toby ALDERWEIRELD  90 90 90 90 90 90
4 Jan VERTONGHEN  90 90 90 90 90 90 90
5 Vurnon ANITA  20 90 90 90 90 90 90
15 Nicolai BOILESSEN  90 1 1 1 1 1
17 Daley BLIND  23 90

MIDFIELDERS
6 Eyong ENOH  39 90 90 90 90 90 90
7 Miralem SULEJMANI  85 71 90 72 90 90 90
8 Christian ERIKSEN  90 90 89 80 90 90 90
10 Siem DE JONG  90 90 90 90 90 90 90
11 Lorenzo ERIKILD  5 19 13 85 90
16 Theo JANSSEN  70 31 90 90 90 90 76
25 Thulani SERERO  7

FORWARDS
9 Kolbeinn SIGTHORSSON  81 90 1 1 1 1 1
18 Nicolas LODEIRO  1 10 89 74 1
19 Dmitri BULYKIN  9 20 1 16
21 Derk BOERRIGTER  90 83 70 77 1 1 1
57 Andy LUKAKO  18 1
39 Davy KLAASSEN  5 14

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE  16 / 18
16-60 mins  1
61-75 mins  1
76-90 mins  1
90+  1

HEAD COACH
FRANK DE BOER
Date of birth  15/05/1970 in Hoorn
Nationality  Dutch
Head coach from  06/12/2010
Matches in UEFA Champions League  7
Players used  20
Substitutions  16 / 18

APPEARAncES
FC BATE BORISOV
Belarus

STATISTICS

POSSESSION 45%
Max.: 60% v Plzen (h)
Min.: 30% in Barcelona

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 115,027 METRES
Max.: 119,561 v Milan (h)
Min.: 104,329 v Plzen (h)

PASSES ATTEMPTED: 403
Max.: 587 v Plzen (h)
Min.: 313 v Plzen (h)

PASSING ACCURACY 68%
Max.: 76% v Plzen (h)
Min.: 59% in Barcelona

PASSES PER GAME
Long 85 (23% of total)
Medium 239 (59%)
Short 79 (20%)

GOALS SCORED 2
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 18 / 18
46-60 mins 2
61-75 mins 8
76-90 mins 8

APPEARANCES

No Player Plz Bar Mil Mil Plz Bar G
GOALKEEPERS
16 Andrei SCHERBAKOV 90 90 90 90 90 90
30 Aleksandr GUTOR 90 90 90 90 90 90

DEFENDERS
5 Aleksandr YUREVICH 1 1 90 90 90 90
14 Artyom RADOV 90 90
18 Maksim BORDACHEV 90 90 90 90 90 90
21 Yegor FILIPENKO 90 90 1 1 90 90
22 Marko SIMIC 90 90 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
2 Dmitri LIKHTAROVICH 1 66 63 67
7 Artyom KONTSEVOI 18 90 90 84 75 90
8 Aleksandr VOLODKO 90 90 90 90 90 90
10 RENAN BRESSAN 72 82 77 90 90 77
11 Mokhail GORDEYCHUK 8 6 21 26
17 Aleksandr PAVLOV 1 1 13 14 69 64
19 Kirill ALL EKAN 30
23 Edgar OLEKHNOVICH 90 90 26 27 23
25 Dmitri BAGA 90 90 90 76 90 90
26 Vadim KURLOVICH 8
29 Maksim VOLODKO 90 90 90 90 90 90

FORWARDS
9 Alex PORFIRIO 14
15 Maksim SKNYSH 39 39 90 77
99 Mateja KEZMAN 76 58 71 13 13

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

HEAD COACH
VIKTAR HANCHARENKA
Date of birth 10/06/1977 in Khoiniki (Gomel)
Nationality Belarusian
Head coach since 13/11/2007
Matches in UEFA Champions League 12
Players issued 21
Substitutions 18 / 18
**STATISTICS**

**POSESSION**
- 51%
- Max. 56% v Olympiacos (a), Marseille (h)
- Min. 42% at Arsenal

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**
- 121,965 METRES
- Max. 124,991 v Arsenal (h)
- Min. 116,370 in Marseille

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**
- 515
- Max. 554 v Arsenal (h)
- Min. 420 v Arsenal (a)

**PASSES PER GAME**
- Long 82 (16% of total)
- Medium 314 (61%)
- Short 119 (23%)

**GOALS SCORED**
- 6
- 1-15 mins 1
- 16-30 mins 2
- 31-45 mins 1
- 76-90 mins 1
- 90+ 1

**GOALKEEPERS**
- 1 Roman WEIDENFELLER 90 90 90 90 90 90
- 20 Mitchell LANGERAK

**DEFENDERS**
- 4 Neven SUBOTIĆ 90 90 90 90 I I
- 15 Mats HUMMELS 90 90 90 90 90 90 1
- 24 Chris LOWE
- 26 Łukasz PIŚCZĘCZ
- 27 Felipe SANTANA 90 90 90 90 90 90
- 29 Marco SCHEMELER

**MIDFIELDERS**
- 5 Sebastien KEHL 68 90 90 64 32*
- 7 Moritz LEITNER 34 86 65+ I
- 8 Antônio DA SILVA
- 11 Mario GOTZE 90 90 82 66 29* 45*
- 16 Jakub BLASZCZYKOWSKI 22 27 24 15 90
- 19 Kevin GROSSKREUTZ 68 63 8 90 90
- 21 Ilkay GUNDOGAN 56* 90
- 22 Sven BENDER 90 90 90 25* I
- 44 Ivan PERIŠIĆ 22 27 90 75 61+ 45+ 1

**FORWARDS**
- 9 Robert LEWANDOWSKI 90 72 90 90 90 90 1
- 10 Mohamed ZIDAN 5
- 18 Lucas BARRIOS I 18 26 63
- 23 Shintaro KAGAWA 85 63 66 24 90 27 1

**APPEARANCES**

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**HEAD COACH**

**JÜRGEN KLOPP**

Date of birth 16/06/1967 in Stuttgart
Nationality German
Head coach since 01/07/2008
Players used 20
Substitutions 18 / 18
HEAd coAcH
DorINel MUNteANU
Date of birth  25/06/1968 in Caraş-Severin
Nationality Romanian
Head coach since  01/07/2009
Matches in UEFA Champions League  9
Players used  22
Substitutions 18 / 18

STATISTICS
POSSession  40%
Max.  53% v Basel (h)
Min.  35% v Benfica (h)
TEAM DISTANCE COVERED  123,178 METRES
Max.  125,334 v Basel (h)
Min.  120,618 v Man Utd (h)
PASSES ATTEMPTED  431
Max.  569 v Basel (h)
Min.  352 v Man Utd (h)
PASSING ACCurACY  66%
Max.  74% v Basel (h)
Min.  55% v Benfica (h)
PASSES PEr GAME
Long  70 (16% of total)
Medium  255 (59%)
Short  106 (25%)
GOALS SCORED
16-30 mins  3
31-45 mins  1
46-60 mins  1
SUBSTITUTIONS MADE  18 / 18
GOALKEEPERS
1 Cristian BRANET
12 Branko GRAHOVAC
DeFeNDERS
2 Nejc SKUBIČ
3 Cornel RÂPA
5 Zoran LJUBINKOVIĆ
6 Alexandru BENGA
16 Cristian SÂRGHI
18 Sergiu COSTIN
23 Adrian SALAGEANU
55 Milan PERENDIJA
MiDFielDERs
4 Ioan FILIP
7 Laurentiu IORGA
8 Liviu ANTAI
9 Gabriel PARASCHIV
10 Sorin RUNZA
14 Silviu ILIE
15 John IBEH
17 Laurentiu BUŞ
26 Ionut NEAGU
29 Gabriel GIURGIU
37 Gabriel VIGLIANTI
FoRWArDS
19 Bratislav PUNOŠEVAC
27 Marius PENA

GOALKEEPERS
No Player Bas Ben Man Man Bas Ben G
1 Cristian BRANET 90 90 90 90 90 90
12 Branko GRAHOVAC 90 90 90 90 90 90
DeFeNDERS
No Player Bas Ben Man Man Bas Ben G
2 Nejc SKUBIČ 90
3 Cornel RÂPA 90 90 90 90 90 90
5 Zoran LJUBINKOVIĆ 90
6 Alexandru BENGA 90
16 Cristian SÂRGHI 90 90 90
18 Sergiu COSTIN 90 90 90 90 90 90
23 Adrian SALAGEANU 87 8 90 90 90
55 Milan PERENDIJA 90 90 90 90 90 90
MiDFielDERs
No Player Bas Ben Man Man Bas Ben G
4 Ioan FILIP 86 90 90 90 90 90
7 Laurentiu IORGA 29 66 90
8 Liviu ANTAI 90 90 90 90 90 90
9 Gabriel PARASCHIV 19 1 25 93 37 9
10 Sorin RUNZA 1 25 83 37 9
14 Silviu ILIE 89 7 53 24 21*
15 John IBEH 90 45*
17 Laurentiu BUŞ 65 1 1 1 1
26 Ionut NEAGU 72 90 67 70
29 Gabriel GIURGIU 90 90 90 81 90 90
37 Gabriel VIGLIANTI 4 45+ 3 17
FoRWArDS
No Player Bas Ben Man Man Bas Ben G
19 Bratislav PUNOŠEVAC 21 87
27 Marius PENA 71 69 18 90 90 20 1
G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/Ill

FC OTELUL GALAŢI
Romania

APPEARANCES

HEAD COACH
DORINel MUNTEANU
Date of birth  25/06/1968 in Caraş-Severin
Nationality Romanian
Head coach since  01/07/2009
Matches in UEFA Champions League  9
Players used  22
Substitutions 18 / 18
### STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Possession</th>
<th>Team Distance Covered</th>
<th>Passes Attempted</th>
<th>Passing Accuracy</th>
<th>Passes Per Game</th>
<th>Goals Scored</th>
<th>Substitutions Made</th>
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<th>71-75 mins</th>
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### APPEARANCES

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**GOALKEEPERS**

1. Grzegorz SANDOMIERSKI
2b. Laslo KOTELES

**DEFENDERS**

2. Abel MASUERO
11. Anthony VANDENBORRE
16. Anele NGONGCA
17. Jeroen SIMAEYS
20. José MADSON Ferreira
23. Mohammed SARR
35. Daniel PUDIL

**MIDFIELDERS**

6. David HUBERT
7. Khaleem HYLAND
8. Daniel TOZER
14. Kevin DE BRUYNE
15. Fabienc CAMUS
19. Thomas BUFFEL
21. Dugary NDBASHINZE
35. Anthony LIMBOMBE

**FORWARDS**

9. Jelle VOSSEN
18. Elyanv BARDA
27. Kennedy NWANGANGA
31. Marvin OGUNJIMI

**HEAD COACH**

MARIO BEEN

- Date of birth: 11/12/1963 in Rotterdam
- Nationality: Dutch
- Head coach since: 29/08/2011
- Matches in UEFA Champions League: 0
- Players used: 20
- Substitutions: 17 / 18
LOSC LILLE MÉTROPOLE
France

STATISTICS

POSSESSION 55%
Max. 62% v Trabzonspor (h)
Min. 44% v Trabzonspor (a)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 114,027 METRES
Max. 120,064 in Moscow
Min. 108,718 v Inter (a)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 541
Max. 653 v CSKA (h)
Min. 435 in Trabzon

PASSING ACCURACY 76%
Max. 84% v CSKA (h)
Min. 70% in Trabzon

PASSES PER GAME
Long 81 (15% of total)
Medium 330 (61%)
Short 130 (24%)

GOALS SCORED
16-30 mins 1
31-45 mins 1
46-60 mins 2
61-75 mins 1
76-90 mins 1

GOALKEEPERS
1 Mickael LANDREAU 90 90 90 90 90
16 Vincent ENYEAMA 90
30 David MOURU

DEFENDERS
2 Mathieu DEBUCHY 90 90 90 90 90 90
14 David ROZEHNAL 90 90 90 90 90 84
18 Franck BERIA 90 90 90 90 90 90
21 Laurent BONNART 90 90 90 90 90 90
22 Aurélien CHEDJOU 1 1 90 90 90 90
25 Mario BASA 90 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
4 Florent BALMONT 90 90 81 1 90 90
5 Idrissa GUEYE 13 9 90 1
10 Eden HAZARD 90 90 90 90 89 90
11 Ludovic OBRANIAK 77 14 16 30 21
17 Béntih PEDRETTI 77 90 62 90 1 1
24 Rio MAVUBA 90 90 90 90 90 90
26 Joe COLE 13 76 74 71 87 69

FORWARDS
7 Dimitri PAYET 1 28 19 3 89
8 Moussa SOW 86 90 90 60 74 90 3
9 Tulio DE MELO 1 1 1 45+ 1 1 1
20 Ronny RODELIN 4 1
27 Terentev JELIN 45* 16

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill
1 goal was an own goal by CSKA’s Vasil Berezutskii in Moscow

HEAD COACH

RUDI GARCIA
Date of birth 20/02/1964 in Nemours
Nationality French
Head coach since 18/06/2008
 Matches in UEFA Champions League 6
Players used 20
Substitutions 16 / 18

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS

DEFENDERS

MIDFIELDERS

FORWARDS

No Player CSK Tra Int Int CSK Tra G
1 Mickael LANDREAU 90 90 90 90 90
2 Mathieu DEBUCHY 90 90 90 90 90 90
14 David ROZEHNAL 90 90 90 90 90 84
18 Franck BERIA 90 90 90 90 90 90
21 Laurent BONNART 90 90 90 90 90 90
22 Aurélien CHEDJOU 1 1 90 90 90 90
25 Mario BASA 90 90 90 90 90
4 Florent BALMONT 90 90 81 1 90 90
5 Idrissa GUEYE 13 9 90 1
10 Eden HAZARD 90 90 90 90 89 90
11 Ludovic OBRANIAK 77 14 16 30 21
17 Béntih PEDRETTI 77 90 62 90 1 1
24 Rio MAVUBA 90 90 90 90 90 90
26 Joe COLE 13 76 74 71 87 69
7 Dimitri PAYET 1 28 19 3 89
8 Moussa SOW 86 90 90 60 74 90 3
9 Tulio DE MELO 1 1 1 45+ 1 1 1
20 Ronny RODELIN 4 1
27 Terentev JELIN 45* 16

Instructions: G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill
1 goal was an own goal by CSKA’s Vasil Berezutskii in Moscow
England

Manchester City FC

**STATISTICS**

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<tr>
<th>Possession</th>
<th>57%</th>
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<td>Max.</td>
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<td>Min.</td>
<td>45% in Munich</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>112,397 Metres</th>
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<td>116,389 v Villarreal (h)</td>
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<td>Min.</td>
<td>109,527 in Munich</td>
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<td>794 in Villarreal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Min.</td>
<td>574 in Munich</td>
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<th>Passing Accuracy</th>
<th>83%</th>
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<td>88% in Villarreal</td>
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<td>Min.</td>
<td>80% v Napoli (h), in Munich</td>
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<td>46-60 mins</td>
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**APPEARANCES**

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<th>Head Coach</th>
<th>Roberto MANCINI</th>
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1 goal was an own goal by Villarreal’s Carlos Marchena in Manchester.
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<td>490 (62%)</td>
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<td>90+</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-15 mins</td>
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<td>16-30 mins</td>
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APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS

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DEFENDERS

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1 goal was an own goal at Old Trafford by Cristian Sârghi (Oţelul Galaţi)

HEAD COACH

SIR ALEX FERGUSON

Date of birth: 31/12/1941 in Glasgow
Nationality: Scottish
Head coach since: 07/11/1986
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 182
Players issued: 24
Substitutions: 16 / 18
OLYMPIACOS FC
Greece

STATISTICS

POSSESSION  48%
Max.  55% v Marseille (h)
Min.  44% v Dortmund (h), Marseille (a)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED  112,295 METRES
Max.  115,208 at Arsenal
Min.  108,390 v Marseille (h)

PASSES ATTEMPTED  425
Max.  519 in Dortmund
Min.  324 in Marseille

PASSING ACCURACY  66%
Max.  75% v Marseille (h), Arsenal (a)
Min.  61% v Dortmund (h)

PASSES PER GAME
Long  87 (20% of total)
Medium  249 (59%)
Short   89 (21%)

GOALS SCORED 8
1-15 mins 1
16-30 mins 2
31-45 mins 2
76-90 mins 3
90 + 2
Including 2 double substitutions

GOALKEEPERS
17 Franco COSTANZO 90 90 90
42 Balázs MEGYERI 90 90 90 90

DEFENDERS
2 Giannis MANIATIS 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
3 François MODESTO 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
4 Olof MELLBERG 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
6 Tassos PAPAZOGLOU 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
20 José HOLEBAS 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
21 Arnaud PAPAZOGLOUS 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
23 Ivan MARCANO 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
35 Vassilis TOROSSIDIS 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
92 Giannis POTOURIDIS 90 90 90 90 90 90 2

MIDFIELDERS
7 Ariel IBAGAZA 23 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
8 Ljubomir FEJSA 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
17 Giannis FEJATZIDIS 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
19 David FUSTER 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
31 Pablo ORBAIZ 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
33 Francisco YESTE 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
77 Jean MAKOUN 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
93 Djamel ABDOUN 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 2

FORWARDS
9 Marco PANTELIC 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
10 Rafik DJEBBOUR 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 2
14 Kevin MIRALLAS 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 2

HEAD COACH
ERNESTO VALVERDE
Date of birth 09/02/1964 in Viaendar de la Vera (Cáceres)
Nationality Spanish
Head coach since 07/08/2010
Matches in UEFA Champions League 6
Players used 22
Substitutions 18/18
STATISTICS

POSSESSION 39%
Max. 52% v BATE (h)
Min. 28% in Barcelona

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 110,001 METRES
Max. 117,996 v Milan (h)
Min. 103,750 v BATE (a)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 527
Max. 428 in Milan
Min. 207 v Barcelona (h)

PASSING ACCURACY 67%
Max. 70% in Milan
Min. 63% v BATE (a)

PASSES PER GAME
Long 73 (22% of total)
Medium 189 (58%)
Short 64 (20%)

GOALS SCORED 4
0-14 mins 1
15-30 mins 1
31-45 mins 1
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 1
76-90 mins 1
90+ 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 18 / 18
16-30 mins 2
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 6
76-90 mins 8
90+ 1

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS
24 Marek ČECH 90 90 90 1 90 90
25 Michal DANEK
30 Martin TICHÁČEK
33 Roman PAULÍK 1 1 1 90

DEFENDERS
8 David LIMBERSKÝ 78 90 90 90 90 90
14 Radim REZNÍK 66 90
15 Frantisek SELVINSKY 66+ 90
16 David BÝSTROH 90 90 90 90 90 90
17 Frantisek RUTTORAL 90 90 90 90 90 90
28 Marián CÍSOVSKÝ 90 90 90 22* 5 90

MIDFIELDERS
6 Vaclav PILAR 88 75 75 90 89 84
7 Petr TRAPP 12
9 Martin ŠÍMUT
10 Pavel HORVATÍN 90 90 90 90 90 90
11 Milan PLAJZELA 66 90 86 90 83 90
16 Vladimír DARIDA 6 6 62+
20 Petr JÍRAČEK 90 90 90 90 90 28*
26 Daniel KOLÁR 90 89 90 68 90 67

FORWARDS
5 Michal DURIS 21 23 32 22 11 23 1
17 Jakub HORA 2 6
21 Marek BAKOS 90 67 58 26* 79 90 2

G = Goal; S = Suspended; * = Started; ± = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

HEAD COACH
PAVEL VRBA
Date of birth 06/12/1963 in Prerov
Nationality Czech
Head coach since 01/07/2008
Matches in UEFA Champions League 6
Players issue 39
Substitutions 18 / 18
**STATISTICS**

| Possession | 54% |
| Max.       | 63% v APOEL (h) |
| Min.       | 39% in Donetsk |
| Team Distance Covered | 107,643 METRES |
| Max.       | 113,166 v APOEL (a) |
| Min.       | 102,887 v APOEL (b) |
| Passes Attempted | 519 |
| Max.       | 646 v Shakhtar (h) |
| Min.       | 360 in Donetsk |
| Passing Accuracy | 71% |
| Max.       | 77% v Shakhtar (h) |
| Min.       | 63% in Donetsk |
| Passes per Game |
| Long       | 89 (17% of total) |
| Medium     | 323 (62%) |
| Short      | 107 (21%) |
| Goals Scored |
| 1-15 mins  | 7 |
| 16-30 mins | 2 |
| 46-60 mins | 1 |
| 61-75 mins | 1 |
| 76-90 mins | 7 |
| Substitutions Made | 18 / 18 |
| 31-45 mins | 1 |
| Half-time  | 2 |
| 46-60 mins | 2 |
| 61-75 mins | 1 |
| 76-90 mins | 6 |
| Including 1 double substitution |

**APPEARANCES**

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1 goal was an own goal in Donetsk by Razvan Rat

**GOALKEEPERS**

1 HELTON Da Silva
31 Rafael BRACALI

**DEFENDERS**

4 MAICON Pereira
5 ALVARO PEREIRA
13 Jorge FUCILE
16 ROLANDO Pires
21 Christian SAPUNARU
21 Eliaquim MANGALA
30 Nicolas OJAMENDI

**MIDFIELDERS**

6 Fredy GUARÍN
7 Fernando BELLUSCHI
8 João MOUTINHO
10 CRISTIÁN RODRÍGUEZ
19 JAMES RODRIGUEZ
23 Josef de SOUZA Dias
25 FERNANDO Reges
35 Steven DEFOUR

**HEAD COACH**

VÍTOR PEREIRA

Date of birth 26/07/1968 in Espinho
Nationality Portuguese
Head coach since 21/06/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 0
Players used 20
Substitutions 18 / 18
Mircea Lucescu

Date of birth 29/07/1945 in Bucharest
Nationality Romanian
Head coach since 16/05/2004
Matches in UEFA Champions League 75
Players issued 20
Substitutions 17 / 18

Posession 54%
Max. 62% v APOEL (h)
Min. 30% in Porto

Team Distance Covered 111,283 Metres*
Max. 113,043 v APOEL (h)
Min. 104,746 v Zenit (h)
* excluding Matchday 1 when Shakhtar played 40 minutes with 10 and 10 with 9

Passes Attempted 484
Max. 589 v APOEL (a)
Min. 396 in Porto

Passing Accuracy 72%
Max. 80% v APOEL (a)
Min. 63% in Porto

GOALKEEPERS
16 Artem TETENKO
25 Oleksandr RYBKA
30 Andriy PYATOV

DEFENDERS
5 Olexandr KUCHER
13 Vyacheslav SHEVCHUK
26 Razvan RAT
30 Andriy CHYZHOV
44 Yaroslav RAKITSKIY

MIDFIELDERS
3 Tomás HÜBSCHMAN
7 FERNANDINHO
8 ADSON
10 WILLIAM
14 Yevhen KOBIN
20 DOUGLAS Costa
22 Henrik MKHITARYAN
29 ALEX TEIXEIRA

FORWARDS
9 LUIZ ADRIANO
11 EDUARDO
17 Yevhen SELIZNOY
99 Marcelo MORENO

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/Ill

No Player Por APO Zen Zen Por APO
16 90 90 90 90 90 90
25 90 90 90 90 90 90
30 90 90 90 90 90 90
5 90 90 17 90 90 90
13 90 90 90 90 90 90
26 90 90 90 90 90 90
27 80 5 90 1 1 1
33 90 90 90 90 90 90
36 90 90 90 90 90 90
44 90 90 90 90 90 90
3 9 90 90 90 90 90
9 90 90 90 90 90 90
84 87
64 87
81 90 90 90 90
87
25 75 22 3 78
26 65 15 68 21
90 90 90 90 90 90
90 90 77 90 73 3
42 9 90 59 12
14 13
1
6

Heads of FC Shakhtar Donetsk

Ukraine

FC SHAKHTAR DONETSK

POSSESSION
Max. 62% v APOEL (h)
Min. 30% in Porto

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED
111,283 METRES*
Max. 113,043 v APOEL (h)
Min. 104,746 v Zenit (h)
* excluding Matchday 1 when Shakhtar played 40 minutes with 10 and 10 with 9

PASSES ATTEMPTED
484
Max. 589 v APOEL (a)
Min. 396 in Porto

PASSING ACCURACY
72%
Max. 80% v APOEL (a)
Min. 63% in Porto

PASSES PER GAME
Long 89 (18% of total)
Medium 307 (63%)
Short 88 (19%)

GOALS SCORED
6
1-15 mins 2
45+ 1
61-75 mins 2
76-90 mins 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE
17 / 18
31-45 mins 1
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 8
76-90 mins 7

GOALKEEPERS
16 Artem TETENKO
25 Oleksandr RYBKA
30 Andriy PYATOV

DEFENDERS
5 Olexandr KUCHER
13 Vyacheslav SHEVCHUK
26 Razvan RAT
30 Andriy CHYZHOV
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G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/Ill

No Player Por APO Zen Zen Por APO
16 90 90 90 90 90 90
25 90 90 90 90 90 90
30 90 90 90 90 90 90
5 90 90 17 90 90 90
13 90 90 90 90 90 90
26 90 90 90 90 90 90
27 80 5 90 1 1 1
33 90 90 90 90 90 90
36 90 90 90 90 90 90
44 90 90 90 90 90 90
3 9 90 90 90 90 90
9 90 90 90 90 90 90
84 87
64 87
81 90 90 90 90
87
25 75 22 3 78
26 65 15 68 21
90 90 90 90 90 90
90 90 77 90 73 3
42 9 90 59 12
14 13
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6

Heads of FC Shakhtar Donetsk

Ukraine
STATISTICS

**POSSESSION**
- Max.: 57% in Moscow
- Min.: 38% in Lille

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**
- Max.: 111,300 v Inter (h)
- Min.: 106,827 v Inter (a)

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**
- Max.: 548 in Moscow
- Min.: 338 v CSKA (h)

**PASSING ACCURACY**
- Max.: 78% v CSKA (h)
- Min.: 56% v CSKA (h)

**PASSES PER GAME**
- Long: 71 (15% of total)
- Medium: 280 (60%)
- Short: 116 (25%)

**GOALS SCORED**
- 16-30 mins: 1
- 61-75 mins: 1
- 76-90 mins: 1

**SUBSTITUTIONS MADE**
- 31-45 mins: 1
- Half-Time: 1
- 61-75 mins: 8
- 76-90 mins: 4
- 90+ : Including 1 double substitution

APPEARANCES

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**HEAD COACH**

ŞENOL GÜNES
- Date of birth: 01/06/1952 in Trabzon
- Nationality: Turkish
- Head coach since: 01/07/2009
- Matches in UEFA Champions League: 1
- Players used: 18
- Substitutions: 17/18
VALENCIA CF
Spain

STATISTICS

POSSSESSION 61%
Max. 66% at Chelsea
Min. 56% v Genk (a)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 113,611 METRES
Max. 115,609 v Chelsea (h)
Min. 111,598 v Genk (a)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 626
Max. 740 at Chelsea
Min. 550 v Genk (a)

PASSING ACCURACY 79%
Max. 83% at Chelsea
Min. 73% v Leverkusen (h)

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 113,611 METRES
Max. 115,609 v Chelsea (h)
Min. 111,598 v Genk (a)

PASSES PER GAME
Long 87 (14% of total)
Medium 40 (64%)
Short 138 (22%)

GOALS SCORED 12
1-15 mins 3
16-30 mins 1
31-45 mins 1
61-75 mins 6
76-90 mins 2

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 18/18
16-30 mins 1
Half-time 1
46-60 mins 6
61-75 mins 9
76-90 mins 3
Including 1 double substitution

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS
1 DIEGO ALVES 90 90 90 90 90 90
13 Vicente GUAITA 90 90 90 90 90 90

DEFENDERS
4 Adil RAMI 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
12 Antonio BARRAGAN 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
17 JORDI ALBA 90 65 16
18 VICTOR RUIZ 90 90 90 90 90 45* 90
22 Jeremy MATHIEU 90 90 90 90 90 90
23 MIGUEL Brito Garcia 90 90 90 90 90 90

MIDFIELDERS
5 MEHMET TOPAL 90 1 90 90
6 David ALBELDA 90 82 90
8 Sofiane FEGHOULI 69 17 25 90 57 65
10 Ever BANEGA 90 73 90 26* 1 1
16 Sergio CANALES 11 90 25 1 1 1
19 PAULO HERNANDEZ 23 73 65 90 90 23 1
21 Daniel PAREJO 74 90 45* 5 1
24 Tino COSTA 1 66+ 90 77 1

FORWARDS
7 JONAS Gonçalves 17 90 74 90 90 90 3
9 Roberto SOLDADO 90 90 90 90 65 90 90
11 Aritz ADURIZ 2 90 6 25 35 1
14 Pablo PIATTI 74 31 31 33
G = Goals, S = Suspended, * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

HEAD COACH

UNAI EMERY
Date of birth 03/11/1971 in Fuenterrabia / Hondarribia
Nationality Spanish
Head coach since 22/05/2008
Matches in UEFA Champions League 14
Players used 19
Substitutions 18/18
VILLARREAL CF
Spain

STATISTICS

POSSSESSION 44%
Max. 52% v Napoli (a)
Min. 36% in Munich

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 109,428 METRES
Max. 114,472 in Manchester
Min. 102,284 v Napoli (a)

PASSES ATTEMPTED 473
Max. 498 v FC Bayern (h)
Min. 426 v Manchester City (h)

PASSING ACCURACY 75%
Max. 78% v Manchester City (h)
Min. 72% v Napoli (a)

PASSES PER GAME
Long 60 (13% of total)
Medium 291 (62%)
Short 122 (26%)

GOALS SCORED 2
1-15 mins 1
46-60 mins 1

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE 18 / 18
31-45 mins 1
Half-time 1
46-60 mins 1
61-75 mins 5
76-90 mins 10
Including 1 double substitution

APPEARANCES

GOALKEEPERS
1 CÉSAR Sánchez
13 DIEGO LÓPEZ
113 DIEGO LÓPEZ

DEFENDERS
2 GONZALO Rodríguez
3 Joan ORIOL
4 Mateo MUSACCHIO
6 ANGEL López
12 Cristian ZAPATA
14 MARIO Gaspar
15 José CATALÁ

MIDFIELDERS
5 Carlos MARCHENA
8 Jonathan DE GUZMAN
10 Rubén Gracia ‘CANI’
11 HERNAN PEREZ
17 Javier CAMUNAS
18 WAKASSO Mubarak
19 Marcos SENNA
20 BORJA Valero
21 BRUNO Soriano
26 MARCOS GULLON

FORWARDS
7 NILMAR Honorato da Silva
9 MARCO RUBÉN
22 Giuseppe ROSSI
41 José Luis Moreno ‘JOSELU’

HEAD COACH
JUAN CARLOS Garrido
Date of birth 29/03/1969 in Valencia
Nationality Spanish
Head coach from 01/02/2010 to 21/12/2011
Matches in UEFA Champions League 6
Players used 23
Substitutions 18 / 18

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill
**HEAD COACH**

**KRUNOSLAV JURČIĆ**

Date of birth: 26/11/1969 in Ljubuski (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Nationality: Croatian

Head coach since: 27/05/2011

Matches in UEFA Champions League: 6

Players used: 19

Substitutions: 18 / 18

**STATISTICS**

POSESSION: 41%

Max. 46% in Lyon

Min. 36% in Madrid

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED: 113,053 METRES

Max. 117,235 v Madrid (h)

Min. 107,904 in Lyon

* excluding Matchday 6 when playing 62 minutes with 10

PASSES ATTEMPTED: 649

Max. 533 in Amsterdam

Min. 384 v Lyon (h)

PASSING ACCURACY: 70%

Max. 77% in Madrid

Min. 65% v Ajax (h)

PASSES PER GAME

Long: 71 (16% of total)

Medium: 268 (60%)

Short: 110 (26%)

GOALS SCORED: 3

31-45 mins: 1

76-90 mins: 2

SUBSTITUTIONS MADE: 18 / 18

Half-time: 5

46-60 mins: 2

61-75 mins: 7

76-90 mins: 4

Including 1 double substitution

**APPEARANCES**

**GOALKEEPERS**

12 Filip LONČARIĆ

30 Ivan KELAVA

**DEFENDERS**

3 Luis IBÁÑEZ

4 Josip ŠIMUNIĆ

13 Antonio Nogueira TONEL

14 Simo VRSALJKO

24 Domagoj VIDA

25 Leandro CUFRÉ

**MIDFIELDERS**

5 Adrián CALELLO

6 Arijan ADEMI

7 Jerko LEKO

8 Mateo KOVAČIĆ

11 Ivan TOMEČAK

16 Milan BADELIĆ

18 Mario STUM

20 Mehmed ALISPAHIĆ

23 Nikola POKRIVAČ

**FORWARDS**

10 SAMMIR Cruz Campos

21 Fatos BEQIRAJ

55 Ante RUKAVINA

G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill

GNAK DINAMO ZAGREB

Croatia
The 2011/12 season consolidated some long-standing tendencies. The opening quarter-hour, after a brief upward surge in 2009/10 which alerted teams to the need to be fully mentally and physically tuned in right from kick-off, returned to its familiar status as the least prolific period of the game. However, goalscoring was otherwise fairly evenly distributed over the 90 minutes. Discounting the solitary goal scored during extra time (by champions Chelsea FC), 54.4% of the goals were scored after the interval. As usual, minutes 76-90 proved to be the most fertile – but only marginally so. The difference between the final quarter-hour and the middle period of each half boiled down to something under 0.6%.

Individual match situations apart, the statistics demonstrate that any lapses of concentration or physical condition while match officials are consulting their watches are, in the UEFA Champions League, likely to be severely punished by opponents who remained focused from the first whistle to the last.

However, one salient feature of the goalscoring patterns which emerged during the season was that almost 10% of the goals were scored during the periods of additional time at the end of each half. It can be argued that goals in this period changed the shape of the competition. Here again, the champions provided an illustration of their relentless pursuit of a result by scoring all three of the goals which eliminated FC Barcelona during a total of 8 minutes and 15 seconds of additional time during the semi-final tie – the winner at Stamford Bridge at the end of the first half; a crucial away goal at Camp Nou in the same period; and the killer blow delivered by Fernando Torres during the 2 minutes 59 seconds of added time at the end of the game.
The importance of scoring first

RESULTS FOR TEAMS SCORING FIRST

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<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draws</td>
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<td>Defeats</td>
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The 2010/11 season equalled the record set in 2004/05, when 72% of the games played were won by the team scoring first. The 2011/12 campaign registered a noticeable but not spectacular downward trend, even though the graphic clearly illustrates that 63.2% of the 125 games were won by the team scoring first. The seemingly significant decline of almost 9% needs to be qualified by the fact that nine matches failed to produce goals. The adjusted statistic therefore reads that in 68% of the games where goals were scored, the victor was the side which went 1-0 ahead.

Only one of the goalless draws occurred during the knockout rounds – and AC Milan v FC Barcelona could be considered “accidental” bearing in mind the nature of the game at San Siro. FC Zenit St Petersburg and Trabzonspor AŞ registered two 0-0 scorelines in group games, with both matches between AFC Ajax and Olympique Lyonnais also remaining goalless. Of the 15 matches won by the team which went 1-0 down (13% of the games where goals were scored) only two were in the knockout rounds – FC Zenit coming back to beat SL Benfica 3-2 in St Petersburg and SSC Napoli bouncing back to beat Chelsea at home, both in the round of 16. Overall, the number of drawn games rose significantly from 23 to 31 (a 35% increase), which meant that almost a quarter of the games played ended with honours even. Unusually, 5 of the 16 teams who successfully negotiated the group stage did so by winning only two of their six matches.
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<tr>
<th>Team</th>
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**Average per match**

- **Shots at goal**: The number of shooting opportunities created.
- **Shots wide**: The efficiency in terms of converting them into results.

**Real Madrid CF** were alone in registering over 200 attempts at goal, of which 46% were on target. Pep Guardiola's team averaged around 17 goal attempts per match, whereas APOEL FC reached the quarter-finals despite carving out only 4.6 goalscoring opportunities per match. Lionel Messi averaged six. Barça's Argentinian attacker had 36 shots on target, plus 31 wide of the mark – which means that, although he once again topped the scoring charts, the accuracy of his finishing was not equal to the 67% success rate he had established in 2010/11. In terms of accurate finishing, a number of teams surpassed Barça's average of 46% on-target attempts per game, including Real Madrid (55%), FC Bayern München (54%) and, most strikingly, Arsenal FC at 70% on target. On the other hand, the London club had an uncharacteristically low average of seven goal attempts per match. Only 29% of Trabzonspor's finishing was on target. Individually, Cristiano Ronaldo was Messi's nearest rival in attempts at goal (30 on target/25 wide), while the two opposing strikers in the Munich final ended the season with contrasting records – FC Bayern's Mario Gomez with a tally of 29/15 and Chelsea FC's Didier Drogba with 10/13. Interestingly, six of the top ten teams in terms of on-target attempts per match were eliminated at the group stage.
The low conversion ratio of corners into goals is mentioned in the goalscoring analysis on pages 10–13 of this report – and this trend was continued and accentuated at UEFA EURO 2012. The UEFA Champions League success rate was 1 in 37 as recently as the 2007/08 season, declining to 1 in 54 in 2009/10 – a figure which was more in line with the 1 in 64 ratio registered at EURO 2008. The chart for the 2011/12 season confirms the peculiar trend in the UEFA Champions League that the teams whose approach play produces the highest number of corners tend to be eliminated in the group stage. The top four were out before Christmas. It is noticeable that quarter-finalists APOEL FC and AC Milan feature in the bottom three, with the latter averaging significantly fewer corners than the other two Italian representatives. Champions Chelsea FC are also positioned among the bottom ten, with an average of only four corners per game. Yet the Londoners’ one and only corner in two hours of football in the Munich final was successfully converted and laid the foundations for ultimate victory. The question, bearing in mind the levels of espionage prevalent in the UEFA Champions League, is whether it is worth investing much time on the training ground in rehearsing manoeuvres which may only work once before opponents get wise to the mechanisms involved.
## UEFA Champions League Technical Report 2011/12

### STATISTICS

#### Passing phases

**CHELSEA FC**

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**FC BARCELONA**

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<td>Andrés Iniesta</td>
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<td>Alexis Sánchez</td>
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The contrast between successive winners of the UEFA Champions League is a topic mentioned elsewhere in this report. Alternating victories with FC Barcelona’s passing game, FC Internazionale Milano and Chelsea FC have taken a different route to success, based on direct attacking and counterattacking without overmuch emphasis on possession of the ball. This fact can be underpinned with solid statistical evidence which this comparison between the 2011 and 2012 champions’ passing patterns over the entire season reveals.

The figures are influenced by the appearances made by each individual and therefore need to be correlated to the information on pages 26 and 31 of this report. But, on the FC Barcelona chart, three-figure totals appear ten times, while on the Chelsea FC chart there are only six totals in excess of 50.

The figures are also of interest in terms of passing patterns and risk management. For example, they reveal that 60% of one Chelsea defender’s passes were to Petr Čech or to fellow defenders, whereas Barça right-back Dani Alves made 166 passes to Lionel Messi.
A glance at the rear-view mirror over the last eight seasons confirms that FC Barcelona's position at the top of the ball possession chart has become one of the UEFA Champions League norms, to the extent that, as discussed elsewhere in this report, coaches increasingly search for antidotes and encourage their players to feel comfortable without the ball against possession-oriented opposition. The result was a dichotomy between playing styles, and increased questioning of the value of possession and the need for it to be a positive foundation for attacking play rather than an objective in itself. One statistic to throw onto the debating table is that 7 of the 14 teams which averaged over 50% of ball possession during the 2011/12 season were eliminated at the group stage, including four of the top six. None of Italy’s representatives achieved an even share of the ball. Discussion on the relationship between possession and results was carried right the way through to the Munich final, where Chelsea FC (who had had only 28% of the ball during both legs of their semi-final against Barcelona), faced a much more possession-oriented FC Bayern München. The German hosts had 60% of the ball during the first half and the overall percentages at the end of extra time were 56 to 44 in favour of Jupp Heynckes’ team. The fact that the 2011/12 final ended with 1-1 on the scoreboard will allow debate on ball possession to continue unabated.
The introduction of experimentation with two additional pairs of refereeing eyes on the goal lines has coincided with a significant decrease in the number of fouls in UEFA Champions League matches. Are the two factors interrelated? The report on the 2010/11 season remarked that, whereas the 2005/06 campaign had yielded 35 fouls per match, a new benchmark had been set in that, for the first time, none of the 32 participating teams had exceeded 20 fouls per game and the average number of free-kicks per match had fallen below 30, also for the first time. In 2011/12, none of the teams averaged above 18 fouls per fixture and the average number of free-kicks had fallen even further to 28.1 per game. The season’s statistics offer food for thought – and discussion – about equations between fair play and results. Six of the nine teams which averaged over 15 fouls per game were eliminated at the group stage. Many of the top teams seem to be aware of the dangers inherent to giving away free-kicks in the defensive third, with FC Barcelona (the stature of their team offering further incentives to minimise set-play opportunities for their opponents) leading the way with an average of only 9.42 fouls per fixture. With regard to the finalists, matches involving FC Bayern München produced, on average, just over 30 fouls; those involving Chelsea FC, just under 26. In the individual charts, the tendency (also linked to the presence of additional assistant referees?) for fouls to be committed by attackers rather than defenders was accentuated during the season, with Zlatan Ibrahimović, Franck Ribéry, Marco Streller, Toni Kroos, Didier Drogba and Mario Gomez featuring among the top ten. Just under one-third of the free-kicks awarded against the silver medallists were for fouls committed in advanced areas by that trio of players. Franck Ribéry was also the season’s most-fouled player (he won 45 free-kicks), followed by Lionel Messi with 26.

### Fouls Committed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
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The 2011/12 season set a new all-time record in terms of yellow cards. The total of 549 cautions at an average of 4.39 per match represented an increase of 21% on the previous season and reversed a downward trend. The 2009/10 campaign yielded 472 yellow cards and the 2010/11 season 453. The three teams who averaged three or more yellow cards per game were eliminated in the group stage – but so were eight of the nine clubs which recorded fewer than two cautions per fixture, the exception being semi-finalists FC Barcelona. The two finalists were “middle-of-the-table” teams. In individual terms, three players were cautioned five times during the season: Holger Badstuber (FC Bayern München), Raul Meireles (Chelsea FC) and Maxi Pereira (SL Benfica). Dismissals dropped slightly (22 compared with 24 in 2010/11 and 27 in 2009/10) and were significantly lower than the tournament record of 39 set in the 2004/05 season. Only seven were direct red cards – the lowest figure since the 125-game format was adopted. Seventeen clubs had between one and three players red-carded during the campaign. Curiously, seven of the dismissals (almost one-third of the season’s total) occurred on the opening matchday in September, when match officials were fresh from their pre-season briefing. The debating point is, as mentioned in other chapters of this report, whether the sharp increase in the number of yellow cards can be related to the presence of additional assistant referees on the goal line.

Penalties

During the 2010/11 season, the number of penalties rose by 61% compared with the previous year, and the 2011/12 campaign registered a further 24% increase. Once again, this could be related to the presence, during the last two seasons, of the additional assistant referees. Spot kicks proved to be crucial factors in the final outcome of the competition, with Bayern eliminating Real Madrid CF during a shoot-out at the semi-final stage and then losing the title to Chelsea in another shoot-out. Fortune also smiled on the London club during open play, with Lionel Messi striking a penalty against the crossbar during the return leg of the semi-final at Camp Nou and Petr Čech then saving a penalty from Arjen Robben during the first period of extra time in the Munich final.

Yellow cards

Villarreal CF 20
FC Porto 19
GNK Dinamo Zagreb 18
FC Shakhtar Donetsk 17
APOEL FC 27
SL Benfica 27
SSC Napoli 21
AC Milan 26
Trabzonspor AŞ 15
LOSC Lille Métropole 15
FC Viktoria Plzeň 15
FC Oţelul Galaţi 15
Bayer 04 Leverkusen 20
Chelsea FC 31
Olympique de Marseille 23
FC Basel 1893 18
FC Zenit St Petersburg 18
FC Bayern München 29
Arsenal FC 17
Real Madrid CF 24
FC Internazionale Milano 16
PFC CSKA Moskva 16
Olympique Lyonnais 15
Olympiacos FC 11
Valencia CF 11
Manchester City FC 10
KRC Genk 9
FC Barcelona 17
FC BATE Borisov 8
Manchester United FC 8
Borussia Dortmund 7
AFC Ajax 6

AVERAGE PER MATCH
4.39
3.91
3.82
3.78
3.70
3.61
3.55
3.53
3.50
3.47

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The 125-match campaign registered a slight decrease in the number of offside decisions: the flag was raised 678 times at an average of 5.42 offside per match, compared with 696 at 5.57 in the previous season. AC Milan, who had headed the chart in 2010/11, were this time surpassed by Turkish debutants Trabzonspor AŞ, whose total of 31 offsides included ten flaggings for Burak Yılmaz in the 270 minutes he played. For the second successive season, Zlatan Ibrahimović topped the individual chart by being flagged 21 times – almost half of AC Milan’s total. He was also second in the 2009/10 chart while at FC Barcelona. Gonzalo Higuaín (15) and Karim Benzema (12) provided over half of Real Madrid CF’s total, while FC Zenit St Petersburg’s Aleksandr Kerzhakov strayed offside 11 times during the 360 minutes that he spent on the field of play. PFC CSKA Moskva were the most adept at luring opponents into their offside trap. Villarreal CF were caught offside only eight times but their opponents were flagged on 36 occasions, while, similarly, FC Porto players fell foul of the offside trap only three times in their entire campaign but caught their opponents on 32 occasions. Despite holding a high line and offering space, the effectiveness of FC Barcelona’s high pressing can be measured by the fact that their opponents were flagged offside on an average of only 2.92 occasions per game. Unusually, opponents of the two Manchester clubs were caught offside on an average of once per match. However, one UEFA Champions League tradition was extended during the 2011/12 season: the three Italian clubs were among the top ten in terms of straying most frequently into offside positions.
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