

European Under-19 Championship Final Round 2012 – Estonia

# INTRODUCTION

# CONTENT

- Introduction 2
- The route to the final 3
  - The final 4
  - Technical topics 6
    - Talking points 10
    - Winning coach 12
- The UEFA technical team 13
  - Team analysis: Croatia 14
  - Team analysis: England 15
  - Team analysis: Estonia 16
  - Team analysis: France 17
  - Team analysis: Greece 18
  - Team analysis: Portugal 19
    - Team analysis: Serbia 20
      - Team analysis: Spain 21
        - Results 22

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The 11th European Under-19 Championship finals were the first to be staged in Estonia and the final tournament was extremely well organised (the coaches were unanimous in their praise for the host association). The playing surfaces, severely tested by torrential rain prior to and during key matches, proved to be excellent - notably when the two semifinals were played as a double-header under heavy rain at the Lilleküla stadium. It was one of the four venues used for the 15 matches played from 3-15 July 2012: the Kadriorg and Lilleküla stadiums in Tallinn and two grounds in Rakvere and Haapsalu, some 90 minutes' drive from the capital. The eight teams were accommodated at a single hotel in Tallinn, which helped to promote cultural interchanges between the squads. Whereas seven of the competitors played at least one group match in Tallinn, the Serbian team was alone in having to travel outside the capital for all three of their fixtures. Attendances were high. peaking with the 7,864 fans who made their way to the Lilleküla stadium to watch the final on a day when thunder, lightning and persistent heavy rain might have provided motives to stay away. They were rewarded with a spectacular game. The accumulative total for the event was 46,022 spectators at an average of 3,068 per match. Nine of the 15 games were televised to a pan-European audience by Eurosport.

Only three countries (Greece, Serbia and the defending champions, Spain) had been at the 2011 finals in Romania. The 2012 final tournament in Estonia served as a qualifying event for the forthcoming FIFA Under-20 World Cup, with Croatia, England, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain earning places at the final tournament to be played in Turkey from 21 June to 13 July 2013.

# THE ROUTE TO THE FINAL



The Spaniards started the tournament as the only country to have successfully defended the Under-19 title and, during the first half of their opening game against Greece, Julen Lopetegui's side produced trademark patient, possession-based combination play with Gerard Deulofeu, in particular, creating danger with his skill on either flank. His run on the right provided Spain's first goal but, after the second, they struggled with the higher pressing by the Greek team and needed resilience to hang on for a 2-1 win.

A similar pattern applied to their second – spectacular – game against Portugal. Spain took the lead three times but allowed Portugal to hit back three times and then clinched top place with a laborious 2-0 win against Estonia. Arno Pijpers' host team was well organised in defence but individual lapses of concentration gave Portugal two of their three goals in the opening match. Against Greece, Estonia started well. But Greece took the lead through Giorgos Katidis and, improving in the second half, scored two magnificent goals. Karl-Eerik Luigend scored Estonia's only goal of the tournament but Greece had the last word with a fourth goal. In their final match, Estonia had a minimal share of possession and, although they defended stoutly, only threatened the Spanish goal with isolated counterattacks.

With Spain into the semi-finals and the hosts eliminated, the Portugal v Greece match in Rakvere took on must-win dimensions for the latter, whereas Edgar Borges' team needed only a point. After a cautious start, the game burst into life in the 16th minute when Giannis Gianniotas cut in from the right and rounded off a fine individual effort with a left-footed finish. Within 60 seconds, André Gomes collected the ball outside the box, beat three defenders and levelled with a powerful shot. When Daniel Martins was shown a red card for violent conduct, Greece sensed their opportunity and, a few minutes later, captain Katidis scored the first of his two goals. Even when the Greeks were also reduced to ten in the second half, they continued to dominate, even though substitute Betinho set up a nail-biting finish by making it 3-2 with a late goal.

Group B also had a sting in the tail. Pierre Mankowski's French side took the lead with an impressive 3-0 win over Serbia, all the goals hitting the net in the first half. Croatia's possession play frustrated them in the second game but speedy right-back Dimitri Foulquier secured three points when a cross-shot from the right looped over the Croatian keeper and into the far corner of the net. The Croatians had also put England under great pressure in their opening match, but had to settle for a 1-1 draw. England then started strongly against Serbia and posted a 2-1 win to create a scenario on the final matchday in which England or Croatia could qualify along with France. Croatia convincingly defeated Serbia but missed out when England beat a much-changed French team 2-1 to take top spot.

This set up two dramatic semi-finals. The first was marked by the dismissal of Greek keeper Stefanos Kapino during added time at the end of the first half, when his team were leading 1-0. But the first action by reserve keeper Sokratis Dioudis was to save the ensuing penalty. England took the upper hand after equalising in the 56th minute but failed to beat Dioudis and were beaten by a counterattack in the 18th minute of extra-time. The other semi-final was as spectacular as it was dramatic, with French strength and aerial power terrorising the Spanish defence. Spain scored three times – the last during extra time – but two corners and a cross allowed France to make it 3-3 and then go 1-0 and 2-1 up in the penalty shoot-out. But Spanish keeper Kepa Arrizabalaga made two consecutive saves to give his team a 4-2 win and a chance to end the tournament as Spain had started it – with a game against the talented Greeks.

Defender Karol Mets exemplifies Estonia's commitment to the cause as he holds off Greece's livewire winger Giannis Gianniotas

# THE FINAL Singing in the rain



With Greek left-back Kostas Stafylidis grounded, Spain's top scorer, Jesé Rodríguez, finds space to use the ball during the Tallinn final

On a damp, inhospitable night in Tallinn, nearly 8,000 people turned up at the Lilleküla Stadium to see if Spain's Under-19 team could retain the European Under-19 Championship title they had won the previous season. Of the previous year's squad, six were again on duty and three were in the starting lineup – Gerard Deulofeu, Paco Alcácer, and captain José Campaña, talented young players from FC Barcelona, Valencia CF and Sevilla FC respectively. Their opponents, Greece, had last contested a final at this level five years ago, when they lost 1-0 to Spain. But this new generation had some gifted players who were capable of producing a surprise, notably, left back Kostas Stafylidis, winger Giannis Gianniotas and captain Giorgos Katidis who would provide the middle-tofront threat. On a slick surface, which was waterlogged two hours before kick-off, the game started at a frantic pace – the ball moving like an ice-hockey puck gliding across the surface. Spain's coach, Julen Lopetegui, remained faithful to the culture which has seen his country achieve unparalleled success on the international stage. Favouring a 4-3-3 formation, La Rojita set about mimicking the style of their "big brothers" in the full national team. As captain José Campaña said afterwards: "Our style makes the difference, we like to have the ball and to enjoy playing football." Not only did the Spanish youngsters play a high-tempo possession game, but they immediately pressed the ball when it was lost, as if someone had snatched their favourite toy. The Greeks, on the other hand, operated a fluid 4–2–3–1 system, with guick wingers and a creative "free spirit", Giorgos Katidis, in front of a double midfield screen. Coach Kostas Tsanas had clearly called for a fast pace and an emphasis on using the flanks.



In an evenly balanced first half, both sides had their chances to break the deadlock, but it was the efforts of the No10s which came closest to a breakthrough. Despite Spain having the greater percentage of possession, it was a header back across goal from the Greek captain, following a free-kick on the left, that nearly produced the opener. And, just before half-time, Real Madrid starlet Jesé Rodríguez unleashed a powerful right-foot shot from outside the penalty box which was turned round the post expertly by Greek goalkeeper Sokratis Dioudis.

It had rained in the first 45 minutes - in the second period, it poured. The conditions, however, had no effect on the quality of the play or the enthusiasm of the crowd. Both sides displayed admirable speed in transitions both from defence into attack and vice versa. While Spain's No17, Gerard Deulofeu, operating on the right wing after the break, was a constant menace with his incisive dribbling movements, the Greeks, meanwhile, threatened with inswinging corners and free kicks from Kostas Stafylidis and Giannis Gianniotas respectively. The best efforts, however, came from the Spanish: José Campaña hit the crossbar with a long-range effort, and with 30 minutes to go, Jesé Rodriguez and Alejandro Grimaldo forced a double save from the Greek goalkeeper. Although Spain were dominating the territory, the Greeks counterattacked with admirable skill and purpose, and pressed relentlessly in their own half of the field. The biggest warning came with 11 minutes remaining. Gerard Deulofeu went to the byline and forced a save from the Greek keeper, Sokratis Dioudis, with a dangerous cutback. One minute later, and the decisive moment of the match arrived. With great tenacity, Spanish full-back "Joni" Castro

Otto stole the ball from the Greeks just inside their own half. Within the blink of an eye, the ball was transferred to right-wing partner Gerard Deulofeu. The latter ran to the heart of the Greek defence and slid a perfectly weighted, subtle through pass to his fellow winger, Jesé Rodriguez. As frantic commotion ensued in the Greek defence, Spain's No10, with the calmness of someone strolling in the eye of a storm, stroked the ball across the Greek goalkeeper and inside the far post. The Spanish midfield trio of Oliver Torres, Jesús "Suso" Fernández and José Campaña were not involved in the build-up to the goal, but their impressive work up to that point had created the conditions for the decisive moment to occur. The Greeks tried to rally, and a shot from Giannis Gianniotas went wide of the mark, as did a header from substitute Charalambos Lykogiannis. With three minutes of additional time played, and the Greeks in possession of the ball, the final whistle sounded and Spain were UEFA Under-19 champions for the second season in a row, their sixth title in 11 years.

As Kostas Tsanas' players dropped onto the wet surface, spent forces on a wild night, the Spanish youngsters were singing in the rain. The Spanish Football Federation's president, Angel María Villar Llona, and technical director, Ginés Meléndez, looked on from the stands with understandable pride. Of course, at that moment, collecting of the trophy was uppermost in the minds of the Spanish delegation, but inevitably some would be thinking of greater things in the future. As captain José Campaña shared with us the morning after: "The players in our full national team, world and European champions, are great footballers and great people." Spain's Under-19 class of 2012 left Tallinn with a title, but more importantly with wonderful role models to emulate.

> Andy Roxburgh UEFA Technical Director

Spain's influential winger Gerard Deulofeu demonstrates his dribbling skills by wrongfooting Dimitris Kourbelis during the final

# **TECHNICAL TOPICS**

The final tournament in Estonia offered a diversity of playing styles, and one of the salient features from a technical standpoint was the re-emergence of the 4–4–2 team structure.

In 2011, seven of the eight finalists had, at some stage, preferred a 4–2–3–1 formation, and – also at some stage of the tournament, six teams had adopted a 4–3–3 structure. Only one team (silver medallists Czech Republic) had operated in a classic 4–4–2 formation. At the 2012 final tournament, half of the teams played 4–4–2 or variations on that theme during most of their games.

As it happened, there was a clear contrast between the two groups. The four teams who adopted the 4–4–2 formation were in Group B. Two of them, England and Serbia, alternated 4–4–2 with 4–3–3 or, in the case of Serbia, 4–1–3–2 and 4–2–3–1 on a match by match basis. England changed from 4–3–3 to 4–4–2 during their 1–1 draw with Croatia and again during the semi-final against Greece, when the opposition was reduced to ten.

In Group A, Spain and Portugal opted for a 4–3–3 formation, while Estonia adopted a similar set-up but, with defensive density the priority, converted it into a 4-5-1. The Greek team was equipped to operate in 4-3-3 or, usually, 4-2-3-1 formation.

The even split between the two playing formations laid foundations for debate on the merits of each. Discussion was further fuelled when, on the second matchday, the 4-3-3 group produced 11 goals and the 4-4-2 group just four. The overall outcome of the group stage was that the 4-3-3 teams led 24-15 in terms of goals scored. In other words, Group A yielded 60% more goals. UEFA's observers acknowledged that the statistic may have been purely coincidental - as was the fact that the two semi-finals produced victories for the 4–3–3 teams against 4-4-2 opponents. This can be reduced to anecdotal status by the fact that one was decided by a penalty shoot-out and the other was distorted by a dismissal at the end of the first half.

But the trivia provided food for thought and a pretext to raise a number of questions. Does the 4–3–3 formation offer greater tactical flexibility and create more attacking options? Is a 4–3–3 system more appropriate to youth development levels in that it offers greater individual exposure to the challenges of building moves and is better suited to educating players in an attacking style of football? Is 4–4–2 better in the sense that it educates striking partnerships? Does the 4–3–3 formation afford more possibilities to work on possession play and make full use of the depth and width of the pitch? Or is the 4–4–2 with a midfield diamond equally or more suitable?

# THE END PRODUCT

Scoring rates have stabilised in final tournaments at Under-19 level. The 49 goals registered in Estonia represent a marginal increase on the 46 in 2011 and the 45 in 2010. The scoring rate in the group phase increased from 2.5 to 3.25 per match, with the 10 goals in the knockout matches bringing the overall tournament average to 3.27.

Set plays accounted for 11 of the tournament's goals – with the 22% representing a slight decrease on the 24% registered in Romania in 2011. The figure is in line with the declining figures in senior competitions, with 22% of the goals at EURO 2012 coming from set-plays and 21% of the goals scored in the 2011/12 UEFA Champions League.

In Estonia, the set-play goals comprised two penalties, two free-kicks and seven corners. Incidentally, the tournament's solitary own goal (by Estonia against Portugal) was also derived from a corner and, of the overall total of eight, five stemmed from contact on inswinging deliveries and the other three were derived from "second ball" goal attempts at corners. Bearing in mind that the final tournament produced 155 corners, the success rate of one goal per 20 corners (19.5 to be precise) is in contrast with the poorer conversion ratios of 1 in 57 at EURO 2012 and 1 in 46 in the UEFA Champions League. At the 2011 Under-19 finals, the success rate had been 1 in 44.

Of the two free-kicks, one was hit directly into the Estonian goal from the right by Portugal's Daniel Martins, the other was an indirect free-kick bent in from the left and headed in at the near post by France's Richard-Quentin Samnick. Including the own goal, five of the set-play goals (almost 40%) were scored on the opening matchday – a fact which reinforces the impression that spying has now become such a regular feature at this level that the surprise factor is rapidly removed from the set-play

Serbia's Ivan Petrović takes to the air while France's Geoffrey Kondogbia looks as though he's heading for the ground in a midfield battle during the Group B fixture



equation. On the other hand, the value of set plays was highlighted by the semi-final between France and Spain, when significant advantages in physical stature allowed Pierre Mankowski's team to stay alive against opposition which was dominant in open play.

Of the 37 goals scored in open play, 29 (78%) were the result of elaborated approach play, while 8 (22%) were derived from direct defence-to-attack transitions, including the Spanish counterattack which decided the final in Tallinn. Comparisons with the 2011 final tournament, where the split was 63–37, offer evidence to support theories that counterattacks are becoming less productive. In the 2011/12 UEFA Champions League, goals from counters (which peaked at 40%) fell to 27% of the goals and, at EURO 2012, the figure was 23%.

Combination attacks were the most successful route to goal. A total of 21 goals resulted from collective passing moves, along with five of the counterattack goals, when ball-winning was followed by a rapid combination – as illustrated by the Spanish goal which won the final: possession being regained by the right-back in Greek territory, followed by a combination between Gerard Deulofeu and the goalscorer Jesé Rodríguez. Six of the open-play goals were attributable to solo efforts.

The final tournament produced 323 goal attempts at an average of 21.5 per match.

Team	Goal attempts	Average	On target	Average
Croatia	25	8.33	16	5.33
England	49	12.25	25	6.25
Estonia	8	2.67	5	1.67
France	52	13.00	19	4.75
Greece	55	11.00	27	5.40
Portugal	34	11.33	18	6.00
Serbia	26	8.67	6	2.00
Spain	74	14.80	34	6.80

# **HEADS AND FEET**

The tournament kicked off two days after the end of UEFA EURO 2012, where a new record of 22 headed goals made excuse the pun - headlines on the sports pages. This provided a stark contrast with the 2011 Under-19 and Under-17 final tournaments, where one of the talking points was the fact that none of the goals were headers. The trend towards keeping the ball on the deck was so obvious (England coach Noel Blake commented that, in some training sessions, lifting the ball above head height was considered a foul) that there was concern that young players were no longer being educated in the aerial arts.

These fears may have been allayed by the figure of seven headed goals in Estonia. Four of those goals were scored by Greece, with Croatia, England and France sharing the other three. It is legitimate to add that France's aerial power did contribute to other goals – notably in the semi-final against Spain, when headers from corners created chaos and, ultimately, two goals. However, the general trend was for crosses to be on a low trajectory, generating debate about whether attackers are being adequately trained to head high crosses – and whether goalkeepers are being educated to deal with them.

# PRESSING FOR VICTORY

Spain and France, along with - occasionally - Greece and Portugal, held a high line and based their game on upfield pressing aimed at regaining possession in advanced areas. Almost two-thirds of the goals scored had their origins in ball-winning in the opponents' half. The figure includes the situations where advanced pressing created the free-kicks, penalties or corners which led to goals being scored. Portugal were especially effective in this department, with all eight of the team's goals stemming from high regains of the ball. Ditto Croatia, whose spells of advanced forechecking led to their four goals. The French team was not far behind, with six of the team's eight goals derived from high pressing.

Estonia's Nikita Martonov has a hands-on confrontation with Portuguese defender Tiago llori during the Group A match in Tallinn

# **TECHNICAL TOPICS**



French goalkeeper Alphonse Aréola is beaten and right-back Dimitri Foulquier is anguished as Gerard Deulofeu scores Spain's first goal in the semi-final

The two finalists, Spain and Greece, were the teams best equipped to create scoring opportunities, from both advanced pressing and ball-winning in their own half. Both teams scored five times after advanced ballwinning, and six when the ball was won in their own half and was then played through the opposition.

The general tendency at the final tournament was to combine fierce pressure on the ball carrier with a rapid transition into a solid defensive block. The emphasis, however, was on building from the back, with Estonia the only team to prefer direct deliveries to the lone striker. The hosts' goal in the competition was derived from a long pass by the goalkeeper and possession regained high up the pitch on a "second ball" basis.

Sustained high pressing was obviously a tall order for players who, in the majority, were in pre-season mode. But investing energy in high pressing generated dividends in Estonia.

# **OPEN WIDE**

Defensive blocks were universally built on a flat zonal back four, with one or two



Greek defender Mavroudis Bougaidis gets to a corner before England's No2, Eric Dier, and goalkeeper Sam Johnstone to head his team into a 1-0 lead in the semi-final

screening midfielders operating in the area immediately in front of them. There was great variety. Serbia, for instance, fielded Srdan Mijailović as a single screen in the opening match against France and then switched to a two-man screen for the remaining two fixtures. Portugal, on the other hand, consistently deployed Agostinho Cá as a single holding midfielder, while England, France and Spain alternated between the two systems. In the final, Spain operated with a single screen (José Campaña) while the Greeks opted, as usual, to field Panagiotis Ballas and Spyros Fourlanos in the twin version. In general, defensive blocks consisted of at least six players but, in some cases, containment work involved as many as nine outfield players.

This obliged attack-minded teams to look for penetration routes along the flanks – and this took different forms. The two most successful teams operated with two wingers, with Greece relying on the pace and solo skills of Charis Mavrias and Giannis Gianniotas, while Spain fielded various partners for the talented soloist Gerard Deulofeu.

There was a marked trend away from the tradition that the two full-backs should not attack at the same time. Three teams opted for double wing play with players pushing forward on both flanks. Seven of the eight teams had full-backs who were ready, willing and able to make deep attacking runs right to the opposition byline. Some teams laid the foundations for this by playing narrow in midfield to open up channels on the flanks, with the sides operating a 4–3–3 formation or a 4–4–2 with a midfield diamond especially effective at doing this.

France, on the other hand, adopted the ploy of overloading one flank and then switching play to the advancing full-back on the vacant wing – Dimitri Foulquier on the right or, usually, Lucas Digne on the left – both of whom had exceptional pace and attacking vocations.



The "job description" of the full-backs emerged as one of the salient features of the tournament. With defensive blocks making central penetration difficult, the "box-to-box" full-back in the Daniel Alves or Jordi Alba mould took on greater relevance within the team structure. The Spanish provided an outstanding example, with "Joni" Castro Otto on the right and Alejandro Grimaldo on the left producing telling upfield runs to exploit the spaces created when the two wingers took defenders out of the way. The Greek left-back Kostas Stafylidis also had an outstanding tournament and one of the notable features of the final was that his powerful attacking runs were stifled by the presence of the mercurial Deulofeu. "He was such a handful that it was difficult to think about attacking," he admitted after the game. As a by-product of their attacking vocation, full-backs were well-positioned to offer immediate support to high ball-winning activities as soon as possession was lost, with the two centrebacks and at least one screening player staying deep to provide cover.

## WHEN THE GOALS WERE SCORED

The statistics tend to support theories that starts were generally cautious, with the opening quarter-hour proving to be marginally the least prolific in terms of goals, whereas in 2011 it had been the most fruitful period. Otherwise, goals were fairly evenly shared: 23 during the first half, 23 after the break and 3 during extra time. The four goals during added time at the end of the 90 minutes were scored by Greece, Portugal (two) and France, with two of them going into the Spanish net.

One of the salient features of the tournament in Estonia underlined the importance of scoring the first goal. No team came back from 1-0 down to win – something which occurred three times in the final tournaments in both 2011 and 2010. In Estonia, the team conceding the first goal came back to draw on three occasions – one of them the semi-final between Spain and France, when Julen Lopetegui's side eventually obtained a penalty shoot-out victory after going 1-0 down in the match which ended as a 3-3 draw.

## **ORCHESTRAS AND SOLOISTS**

As Jarmo Matikainen remarked: "The players seemed to be very well equipped for a possession game and I was impressed by the overall quality of the passing game. Teams found different ways to get forward and the approach was generally based on being prepared to take the initiative and implement an attacking philosophy. We saw some interesting game plans and some creative approach play. I felt that individual skills of players like Deulofeu or Gianniotas were important elements but I was more impressed by the collective work in the final third, by the variety of passing techniques and by some final deliveries which were technically superb. Spain set the benchmarks in terms of possession football and the players were masters of creating spaces and exploiting them. It was noticeable that more teams want to play like Spain - and that made for a tournament of exceptional technical quality."

Minutes	Goals 2012	%	Goals 2011	%	Goals 2010	%
1–15	5	10	8	17	5	11
16–30	9	18	7	15	8	18
31–45	9	18	4	9	6	13
46–60	7	16	7	15	9	20
61–75	6	12	7	15	7	16
76–90	6	12	6	13	8	18
90+	4	8	4	9	2	4
Extra time 91–105	0	0	1	2	0	0
Extra time 106–120	3	6	2	4	0	0

Decimal points account for the missing 1% in 2011

Spanish midfielder Suso and Greek captain Giorgos Katidis exhibit their tattoos as they compete for the ball during the Group A opener in Haapsalu

# **TALKING POINTS**



French attacker Jean-Christophe Bahebeck tries to negotiate a sliding tackle by Spanish left-back Alejandro Grimaldo during the dramatic semi-final

# **BEAUTY BEFORE AGE?**

There is a steady trend at Under-19 level towards the selection of players on ability rather than their birth certificates. At the 2008 final tournament, 75% of the players were born in the first six months of 1989. By 2010, the percentage had dropped to 66% and, in Estonia in 2012, fewer than half (47%) of the players were born in the first six months of 1993. The Spanish and Serbian squads contained only six players apiece from the top end of the age bracket, whereas the French squad – the only one of the eight finalists to feature exclusively players born in 1993 – included 14. No fewer than 10 of those 14 were born in the first three months of 1993.

The difference between the French and most of the other competitors became patent during the semi-final against Spain, when the superiority in terms of physical stature and power converted every deadball situation near the Spanish penalty area into a cue for serious nail-biting on the Spanish bench – and in the defence. As one member of the coaching staff joked afterwards: "We would have preferred them to have penalties rather than corners!" The contrast between the two squads was marked. Julen Lopetegui's squad included seven players born in 1994 and two in 1995 – one of the latter being left-back Alejandro Grimaldo who, at 16, was voted into the tournament's Technical Team Select.

In total, the tournament featured 29 players born in 1994 or 1995 – and 23 of them started at least one game in Estonia. The number of younger players has been increasing steadily from the figure of just 11 who appeared in squads in 2008. As UEFA's technical observer Marc Van Geersom commented: "This is a positive evolution. It demonstrates quite clearly that more countries are adopting a policy of focusing on skill rather than strength, power and stature."

Squad structures in Estonia

Born	CRO	ENG	EST	FRA	GRE	POR	SRB	ESP	
1993	16	13	17	18	17	15	12	11	
1994	3	5	1	0	2	3	6	7	
1005								2	

Croatian and Greek squads featured 19 players; the Spanish squad 20

As a by-product of the trend towards selecting players from lower age groups, the "experience factor" has been injected into the equation. The Spanish squad, for example, included six of the players who had lifted the trophy in Romania a year earlier. The Greeks, their opponents in the final, similarly selected nine of the squad which had travelled to Romania. Five nations had been present at the Under-17 final tournament in 2010, but the turnover of players was considerable. Greece selected 11 players from the 2010 tournament in Liechtenstein, Portugal 10, England 9, Spain 8, and France only 4. The coaches highlighted the importance of the Under-19 tournament in the development pathways of the players in terms of improving individual skills and acquiring top-level international experience.

The debating point is how this valuable experience should be shared out. Is it fairer to give each calendar year a chance by selecting only players from that 12-month period? Or should talented players be given opportunities irrespective of their dates of birth? What are the most appropriate selection criteria at this level?

# WHEN SHOULD WE MEET?

The finals in Estonia represented a departure from the traditional dates of a tournament which, in previous years, kicked off in mid-July and finished at the end of the month or in the first days of August. Timings, however, continue to emerge as one of the competition's talking points. Many of the coaches highlighted the challenges they faced in terms of preparation and player release. In some cases, domestic championships did not finish until June, meaning that players reported for national team duty during a period where the priorities were holidays, rest or recovery from injuries. In other cases, the tournament dates coincided with the start of clubs' pre-season activities or even UEFA Europa League qualifying rounds, with the result that some clubs refused to release players, did so with reluctance or even imposed the condition that they should return from Estonia before the end of the tournament. One



coach underlined the difficulties which arose because his squad contained three different types of players: those already in the first-team squad at professional clubs, those who were key players at seconddivision clubs, and those who were playing in domestic youth competitions.

Five of the coaches in Estonia proposed a direct switch between the Under-19 and Under-17 final tournaments, with the U19s moving to late May/early June and the U17s taking over the current Under-19 slot in July. This proposal would entail a change to the elite round schedule which, in 2012, had not been concluded until 31 May – less than five weeks before the final tournament. This created difficulties with regard to preparation programmes and logistics. Would it be more convenient to play the elite round in mid/late March? Would such changes be beneficial to national associations and to clubs?

At the same time, the imminent introduction of a club competition for Under-19s played in parallel to the UEFA Champions League prompted the coaches to ask for greater clarity in terms of the international calendar and protected dates for national team football at youth development levels. What is the best route map in order to make sure that young players can fully exploit their opportunities to gain international experience at both club and national team levels?

# JUNIORS AND SENIORS?

Another victory for Spain, barely a couple of weeks after Vicente Del Bosque's side had won EURO 2012, raised the issue of relationships between youth development and senior teams. Spain's run of success at adult level has been built on a playing philosophy and a team shape developed over the last two decades and successfully transported into the senior team. Relationships are not always so close or welldefined, however. The coaches in Estonia felt that the countries who regularly take part in the finals of youth development competitions have better chances to make an impact in major tournaments at senior level. But not all national associations have a master plan or a mission statement which can stand comparisons with the Spanish federation's successful formula. In Estonia, Spain struck another blow in favour of a clear playing philosophy at all levels.

Is this the best way forward for all national associations? Or should the coaches of youth development teams be given a free rein to adapt their playing style to the qualities and the profiles of the players they have at their disposal?

# **TO CHANGE OR NOT TO CHANGE?**

Equipping players to operate in different systems is an easily defensible concept in terms of youth development. But the other pertinent question is to what extent tactical flexibility is appropriate in a short-duration tournament. Marc Van Geersom, half of UEFA's technical team in Estonia, was able to blow the dust off a question he had asked at the final tournament in France in 2010: "Was it coincidence that the two teams which reached the final were ones which had retained a stable playing structure?"



# WINNING COACH Julen and his jubilant jewels



Julen Lopetegui answers questions during the pre-final press conference, during which he tried not to look too often at the trophy he and his players would lift a day later

Spain is the only country to have successfully defended the Under-19 title - and the challenge facing Julen Lopetegui in Estonia was to repeat the victory obtained under coaching guru Ginés Meléndez in 2011. High expectations added to the daunting nature of his task as he took the squad to Tallinn with another relatively inexperienced coach, Santi Denia, as his assistant. "Experience", however, is a relative term. Julen made 317 Liga appearances between the posts of seven clubs, among them Real Madrid CF and FC Barcelona, and was one of the goalkeepers in Spain's 1994 FIFA World Cup squad. Santi made 136 appearances for Albacete Balompié and 226 for Club Atlético de Madrid. In coaching terms, however, they were relative rookies, having joined the Spanish federation's coaching family in 2010 - in Julen's case after a start to his coaching career at Rayo Vallecano followed by a spell as a TV commentator.

In Estonia, there was help at hand. As the coordinator of Spain's youth development teams, Ginés Meléndez travelled with the squad to Tallinn. However, he was impeccably respectful in terms of maintaining the right distance and allowing Julen to get on with the job. He was ready to offer advice – but only when asked.

Julen, like all the members of the Spanish coaching team, was expected to respect the playing philosophy which, in previous years, had translated youth development titles into unprecedented successes at senior level. He set about the job in determined fashion with, as he put it, "the main focus in training camps is how to open up from all of the back four; speed of ballcirculation, the profile of every playing position; use of the wings; speed of movement; coaching forwards in playing with their backs to goal and linking with midfielders; and the art of quickly regaining the ball after losses of possession."

Despite the ultimate triumph, the tournament in Estonia was no walk in the park. Lessons were learned from the way Greece made Spain struggle in the second half of the first game. More were assimilated after Portugal had thrice been allowed to come back from a goal down. And even more in the final group game against Estonia. "When your opponents operate with 11 behind the ball even after you have scored, it presents a number of difficulties. Our opponents were well organised, physically strong and highly motivated. It's not always easy being the team that is obliged to win."

Spain's status undeniably generates pressure. But Julen refused to let it affect him. He paid attention to the importance of relaxing; he could be seen taking his staff for an after-dinner walk through the streets of Tallinn; he made sure the players had the right cocktails of training and recovery, activity and inactivity. He breathed a sigh of relief when he saw torrential rain before kick-off which, he knew, would suit the Spanish style of play. During the game, he calmly offered advice from the technical area, encouraging his players to maintain faith in their playing style. And, after the final whistle, he was quick to hug and pay tribute to the Greek silver-medallists.

Tallinn will go into his personal memory book as his first experience of being thrown into the air by his talented young players. He had some jewels in his squad and Julen had given them reasons for jubilation.



Life's not bad! The Spanish players sing in the rain to celebrate their successful defence of the Under-19 title

# THE UEFA TECHNICAL TEAM





UEFA's technical director Andy Roxburgh – and the trophy – are flanked by Marc Van Geersom (left) and Jarmo Matikainen at the Lilleküla Stadium in Tallinn

UEFA's technical team at the final tournament in Estonia was formed of two highly experienced observers: Jarmo Matikainen of Finland and Marc Van Geersom of Belgium, who had been half of the technical team at the Under-19 final tournament in France in 2010 and who was in action at the 2011 final tournament as head coach of the Belgian team. Jarmo Matikainen made his debut for the Finnish FA in 1999 as head coach to the women's age-limit teams, also acting as technical director from 2000 to 2009. He played many roles within the FA coaching team and led the women's Under-19s to two European final tournaments and the FIFA Under-20 World Cup in 2006. He left to join the Welsh national association as coordinator of women's football just after acting as UEFA observer at the 2010 Under-19 final tournament in France.

**Marc Van Geersom,** a former top-level professional, started his coaching career at FC Sparta Petegem and began to specialise in the youth sector at RC Gent. In 1988 he started coaching Belgian national teams. After leading the women's team for four years, he specialised in youth football, coaching the Under-16, Under-18 and Under-19 sides. Since 2000 he has taken responsibility for all the national youth

teams and, as coach, he led the Under-19s six times to European Championship final tournaments. He has also implanted new projects and defined the way the Belgian youth teams play today.

TOP SCORERS	
5 Jesé Rodríguez	Spain
3 Dimitris Diamantakos	Greece
Giorgos Katidis	Greece
2 Benik Afobe	England
Paco Alcácer	Spain
Betinho	Portugal
Gerard Deulofeu	Spain
André Gomes	Portugal
Domagoj Pavičić	Croatia
Paul Pogba	France
Mihael Pongračić	Croatia
Samuel Umtiti	France

# TEAM OF THE TOURNAMENT

lo Name		Country	Goalkeepers			Defenders	
oalkeepers		<u> </u>					
1 Alphonse AR	ÉOLA	France					
2 Sokratis DIO		Greece	12121		1.10	Les I	
2 Simon SLUG	4	Croatia	E.		9	-	
efenders			Alphonse	Sokratis	Simon	Mavroudis	
4 Mavroudis B	DUGAIDIS	Greece	ARÉOLA	DIOUDIS	SLUGA	BOUGAIDIS	
8 Nathaniel CH	ALOBAH	England	Defenders				
2 Dimitri FOUL	QUIER	France					
3 Alejandro GR	IMALDO	Spain	100	2.5			
5 Derik OSEDE		Spain	100	104 12	SIC	19107	
3 Kostas STAF	YLIDIS	Greece	3				
5 Samuel UMT	ITI	France	Alejandro	Derik	Kostas	Samuel	
lidfielders			GRIMALDO	OSEDE	STAFYLIDIS	UMTITI	
8 Jesús 'Suso'	FERNÁNDEZ	Spain	Midfielders				
5 André GOME	S	Portugal					
6 José Gómez	CAMPAÑA	Spain		100			
0 Giorgos KATI	DIS	Greece	0.07	100	30	1-01	
0 Domagoj PAN	/IČIĆ	Croatia			e		
5 Saúl ÑÍGUEZ		Spain			A Ch		
6 Paul POGBA		France	José Gómez	Giorgos	Domagoj	Saúl	
6 Oliver TORRE	S	Spain	CAMPAÑA	KATIDIS	PAVICIC	ÑÍGUEZ	
ttackers			Attackers				
7 Benik AFOBE	:	England					
1 Paco ALCÁC		Spain	1919	1 10	20	-	
7 Gerard DEUL		Spain		25	1	4 0 0	
9 Dimitris DIAN		Greece					
1 Giannis GIAN		Greece	Panik	Page	Conord	Distinis	
0 Jesé RODRÍO		Spain	Benik AFOBE	Paco ALCÁCER	Gerard DEULOFEU	Dimitris DIAMANTAKOS	







No.	Player	Born	Pos.	ENG	FRA	SRB	G	Club
1	Oliver ZELENIKA <sup>1</sup>	14/05/1993	GK		1	1		GNK Dinamo Zagreb
2	Toni GORUPEC	04/07/1993	DF	90	90	90		GNK Dinamo Zagreb
3	Ivan ALEKSIĆ	06/03/1993	DF	90	90	90		NK Osijek
4	Filip MRZLJAK	16/04/1993	MF	S	90	90		NK Lokomotiva Zagreb
5	Matej MITROVIĆ	10/11/1993	DF	90	90	53		HNK Cibalia
6	Josip ČALUŠIĆ	11/10/1993	DF	90	90	90		NK Lokomotiva Zagreb
7	Marko PAJAČ	11/05/1993	MF	90	67			NK Varaždin
8	Ivan MOČINIĆ	30/04/1993	MF	90	90	37		HNK Rijeka
9	Marko DUGANDŽIĆ	07/04/1994	FW	74	58	6		NK Osijek
10	Domagoj PAVIČIĆ	09/03/1994	MF	85	79	90	2	GNK Dinamo Zagreb
11	Dejan ČABRAJA	22/08/1993	FW			90		GNK Dinamo Zagreb
12	Simon SLUGA	17/03/1993	GK	90	90	90		HNK Rijeka
13	Toni DATKOVIĆ	06/11/1993	DF	11				HNK Rijeka
14	Mato MILOŠ	30/06/1993	DF		23			HNK Rijeka
15	Danijel MIŠKIĆ	11/10/1993	MF	79	90	90		GNK Dinamo Zagreb
16	Hrvoje MILIČEVIĆ	20/04/1993	MF	5		3		NK Zrinjski Mostar (BIH)
17	Antonio ČOLAK	17/09/1993	FW	90	32	84		1. FC Nürnberg (GER)
18	Mihael PONGRAČIĆ	24/08/1993	FW	16	11	87	2	NK Osijek
21	Marko MALENICA	08/02/1994	GK					GNK Dinamo Zagreb
Pos	- Position: G - Goals: S - Susr	onded: * - Starte	ыd. т – <i>С</i>	ubstitute	· I – Iniu	red/ill		

Pos. = Position; G = Goals; S = Suspended; \* = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill <sup>1</sup> Replaced by Marko Malenica because of injury

# COACH

Dinko JELIČIĆ (19/09/1973)



The game against England was our best performance, even if some players were struggling physically because the club season had only just ended. Against France, we spent too much of the game defending - and that was down to a lot of technical mistakes. Against Serbia, we didn't play at our best but we achieved what we set out to do - to attain a place at the World Cup. The team is very promising and I am convinced that we will perform better at the World Cup with the first-choice squad that we didn't have in Estonia.

# Croatia v France



- 4-4-2 with midfield diamond and twin strikers
- Well-organised compact defence and excellent keeper; effective high pressing
- Good balance in midfield with 4 Mrzljak generally the controlling influence
- Emphasis on possession play and patient build-ups from the back
- Good link-up pairings on flanks with midfielders making diagonal runs

- Crisp passing and combinations in final third, creating clear scoring chances
- Dangerous with well-planned, well-executed set plays







No	Player	Born	Pos.	CRO	SRB	FRA	GRE	G	Club
1	Samuel JOHNSTONE	25/03/1993	GK	90	90	90	120		Manchester United FC
2	Eric DIER	15/01/1994	DF	90		90	56*		Sporting Clube (POR)
3	Jack ROBINSON	01/09/1993	DF	26	90	90	120		Liverpool FC
4	Conor COADY	25/02/1993	MF	64	90	6			Liverpool FC
5	Michael KEANE	11/01/1993	DF	90			120		Manchester United FC
6	Tom THORPE	13/01/1993	DF	90	90	90	120		Manchester United FC
7	Ross BARKLEY	05/12/1993	MF	84	64		120		Everton FC
8	Nathaniel CHALOBAH	12/12/1994	DF	90	90	90	120	1	Chelsea FC
9	Saido BERAHINO	04/08/1993	FW		19	90	76		West Bromwich Albion FC
10	Harry KANE	28/07/1993	FW	77	79	84		1	Tottenham Hotspur FC
11	Nathan REDMOND	06/03/1994	MF	6	90	77	44	1	Birmingham City FC
12	Robert HALL	20/10/1993	FW	13		70	120		West Ham United FC
13	Connor RIPLEY	13/02/1993	GK						Middlesbrough FC
14	George THORNE	04/01/1993	MF	90	90	90	29		West Bromwich Albion FC
15	Hallam HOPE	17/03/1994	FW		11	13			Everton FC
16	Luke GARBUTT	21/05/1993	DF	90	90	20	64+		Everton FC
17	Benik AFOBE	12/02/1993	FW	90	71		120	2	Arsenal FC
18	John LUNDSTRAM	18/02/1994	MF		16	90	91	1	Everton FC
Pos	s. = Position; $G = Goals; S = S$	Suspended; * =	Started; +	- = Subs	stitute; l	= Injure	ed/ill		

Noel Blake (12/01/1962)



# T

I was lost for words when we lost the semi-final against Greece. They decided to play behind the ball and I was disappointed that we didn't find answers. We needed to make better decisions in the final third as we didn't always make the right ones. We got better as the tournament went on and, bearing in mind the players who were already in the Under-21s and the ones who were injured, reaching the semi-finals augurs well for the future.

# England v Greece



- 4-3-3 with single midfield screen or 4-4-2 with midfield diamond
- Strong back four with full-backs ready to support attacks
- Good attack-defence balance in midfield; tactically mature
- Prepared to hold a high line and disturb opponents' build-up with high pressing
- Effective use of width; diagonal passes created channels for runs from midfield

- Four fast, technically-equipped attackers; 17 Afobe the cutting edge
- High levels of fitness; good off-ball movement; aerial power; tactical flexibility







No	. Player	Born	Pos.	POR	GRE	ESP	G	Club
1	Vadim GURNIK	25/04/1993	GK	90	90	90		FC Flora
2	Johannes KUKEBAL	19/07/1993	DF	90	90	90		JK Kalev
3	Kevin INGERMANN	06/07/1993	DF	90	90	90		FC Levadia
4	Karol METS	16/05/1993	DF	90	90	90		FC Flora
5	Artur PIKK	05/03/1993	DF	90	90	90		JK Tammeka Tartu
6	Bert KLEMMER	15/10/1993	MF	90	62	90		FC Viljandi
7	Hannes ANIER	16/01/1993	FW	89	90	90		Odense BK (DEN)
8	Andreas RAUDSEPP	13/12/1993	MF	90	90	90		FC Levadia
9	Artur RÄTTEL	08/02/1993	FW	76	37	90		FC Levadia
10	Brent LEPISTU	26/03/1993	MF	45+	53	89		FC Flora
11	Karl-Eerik LUIGEND	15/01/1993	MF	90	90	89	1	FC Flora
12	Riido REIMAN	19/02/1994	GK					Sörve JK
14	Martin KASE	02/09/1993	DF	1	45*			JK Kalev
15	Märten PAJUNURM	29/04/1993	DF			1		FC Kuressaare
16	Mikk METSA	29/04/1993	DF		28			FC Viljandi
17	Juri GAVRILOV	11/05/1993	FW	14	45+			FC Flora
18	Martin USTAAL	06/02/1993	MF			1		FC Levadia
20	Nikita MARTONOV	04/09/1993	MF	45*				FC Levadia
Pos	s. = Position; G = Goals; S = Susp	ended; * = Starte	ed; + = S	ubstitute	e; I = Injui	red/ill		

Arno PIJPERS (21/04/1959)



Our plan was to be compact, not to give away too many chances, and to manage to create a few ourselves. We were in a group with the two finalists and our lack of experience showed. We played with great team discipline and I congratulated my players on this. I told them how important it was to learn from the experience and that, if some of them go on to play for the senior team, they will have gained mental strength and will not feel as nervous as we did in this tournament. 

# Estonia v Spain



- 4-5-1 with two compact, deep defensive lines close together
- Twin midfield screen (6 Klemmer and 8 Raudsepp); 10 Lepistu the link to attack
- Great discipline, team ethic; maintained shape when under extreme pressure
- Rational organisation with constant distances between lines and individuals
- Emphasis on direct passing to hardworking lone striker 9 Rättel
- Wide men 7 Anier and 11 Luigend key transition players, main threat in counters
- Contain-and-counter philosophy with well-rehearsed, threatening set plays







No	. Player	Born	Pos.	SRB	CRO	ENG	ESP	G	Club		
1	Alphonse AREOLA	27/02/1993	GK	90	90		120		Paris Saint-Germain FC		
2	Dimitri FOULQUIER	23/03/1993	DF	90	90	90	120	1	Stade Rennais FC		
3	Jérôme PHOJO	15/04/1993	DF	15		90			AS Monaco FC		
4	Richard-Quentin SAMNICK	23/01/1993	DF	90	90		120	1	Paris Saint-Germain FC		
5	Samuel UMTITI	14/11/1993	DF	90	90	90	120	2	Olympique Lyonnais		
6	Paul POGBA	15/03/1993	MF	90	90		120	2	Juventus (ITA)		
7	Elhadji BA	05/03/1993	MF		1	90	81		Le Havre AC		
8	Geoffrey KONDOGBIA	15/02/1993	MF	90	90	90	120		RC Lens		
9	Thibaut VION	11/12/1993	FW	90	58		120	1	FC Porto (POR)		
10	Axel NGANDO ELESSA	13/07/1993	FW	26	53+	72	39		Stade Rennais FC		
11	Jean-Christophe BAHEBECK	01/05/1993	FW	83	89	25	38*		Paris Saint-Germain FC		
12	Lucas DIGNE	20/07/1993	DF	75	90		120		LOSC Lille		
13	Vincent DISTEFANO	04/03/1993	DF			90			Montpellier HSC		
14	Alassane PLEA	10/03/1993	FW	64	37*	18	37		Olympique Lyonnais		
15	Alexy BOSETTI	23/04/1993	FW		32	65	82+		OGC Nice		
16	Jonathan MILLIERAS	19/05/1993	GK			90			LB Châteauroux		
17	Jordan VERETOUT	01/03/1993	MF	90	90	90	83	1	FC Nantes		
18	Kevin MAYI	14/01/1993	FW	7		90			AS Saint-Etienne		
Pos	Pos. = Position; G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill										

Pierre MANKOWSKI (05/11/1951)



The boys were very, very disappointed to lose on penalties but the tournament was full of positives and I was proud of the team. We tried to impose our game on our opponents and we worked hard to regain possession as far forward as we could. We dominated most of the games we played and, in our semi-final against Spain, we matched them in a lot of departments and contributed to a superb game. When you get to penalties, it is down to luck.

# France v Spain



- 4-4-2 with attacking vocation; equipped to counter after high ball-winning
- Emphasis on fluent combination play; attacks built from the back
- Twin midfield screen with one holding, one more creative and adventurous
- Exceptionally fast full-backs (notably 2 Foulquier) dangerous in attack
- High levels of technique combined with physique, fluency of movement
- Attacks based on top-speed running, control, solo skills of attackers
- Effective use of well-planned, well-executed set plays







No	. Player	Born	Pos.	ESP	EST	POR	ENG	ESP	G	Club
1	Stefanos KAPINO	18/03/1994	GK	90	90	90	45*	S		Panathinaikos FC
2	Nikos MARINAKIS	12/09/1993	DF	90	45*			90		Panathinaikos FC
3	Kostas STAFYLIDIS	02/12/1993	MF	S	90	90	120	90		PAOK Thessaloniki FC
4	Mavroudis BOUGAIDIS	01/06/1993	DF	90	90	90	120	90	1	AEK Athens FC
5	Kostas TRIANTAFYLLOPOULOS	03/04/1993	DF			90	120			Panathinaikos FC
6	Panagiotis BALLAS	06/09/1993	MF	73	61	63	120	90		Atromitos FC
7	Charis MAVRIAS	21/02/1994	MF	78	90	76	S	90		Panathinaikos FC
8	Spyros FOURLANOS	19/11/1993	MF	82	69	90	71	85	1	Panathinaikos FC
9	Dimitris DIAMANTAKOS	05/03/1993	FW	90	90	90	45*	67	3	Olympiacos FC
10	Giorgos KATIDIS	12/02/1993	MF	90	90	73	104	89	3	Aris Thessaloniki FC
11	Giannis GIANNIOTAS	24/04/1993	DF	90	90	90	120	90	1	Aris Thessaloniki FC
12	Sokratis DIOUDIS	03/02/1993	GK				75+	90		Aris Thessaloniki FC
13	Kostas ROUGKALAS	13/10/1993	MF	90	29	5				Olympiacos FC
14	Charalambos LYKOGIANNIS	22/10/1993	DF	90	45+		120	23	1	Olympiacos FC
15	Dimitris KOURMPELIS	02/11/1993	MF	S	90	85	120	90		Asteras Tripolis FC
16	Vassilios BOUZAS <sup>1</sup>	30/06/1993	MF	17						Panionios GSS
17	Tasos BAKASETAS	28/06/1993	FW	12	21	17	16	5		Asteras Tripolis FC
18	Antreas BOUCHALAKIS	05/04/1993	MF	8		27	49	1		Ergotelis FC
19	Panagiotis TSINTOTAS	04/07/1993	GK							Levadiakos FC
Pos	s. = Position; $G = Goals; S = Su$	uspended; * =	Started; ·	+ = Su	bstitute	; I = Inju	ured/ill			

<sup>1</sup> = replaced after Matchday 2 because of injury; <sup>1</sup> = replaced by Tsintotas prior to final

# COACH

Kostas TSANAS (22/08/1967)



As a novice in such a tournament, I will never forget the chain of emotions after our matches: from the frustration and sadness after our two defeats by Spain to the great intensity of the other encounters and the joy of the victories we achieved. We had a team of very good players with great ability and personality. I will never forget the way they reacted to adversity and their sadness after the final. But even that is a source of strength, as it would be wrong to just keep the happy moments in our memories.



# Greece v Spain



- 4-2-3-1 with 6 Ballas and 8 Fourlanos a well-balanced screening pair
- Experienced, well-organised team with good understanding of roles and system
- High fitness and strength levels; fast attack-to-defence transitions
- Emphasis on fast combinations; 10 Katidis the leader and attacking catalyst
- Good supply to two dangerous wingers 7 Mavrias and 11 Gianniotas (1 v 1 skills)
- Adventurous full-backs supporting attacks, especially 3 Stafylidis
- Strong team ethic, committed defending; dangerous well-executed set plays








No	. Player	Born	Pos.	EST	ESP	GRE	G	Club
1	Rafael VELOSO	03/11/1993	GK	90	90	90		Sporting Clube de Portugal
2	Pedro ALMEIDA	05/04/1993	DF		19	67		União Leiria
3	TIAGO FERREIRA	10/07/1993	DF	90	90	90		FC Porto
4	TIAGO ILORI	26/02/1993	DF	90	90	90		Sporting Clube de Portugal
5	Daniel MARTINS	23/06/1993	DF	90	90	37*	1	SL Benfica
6	AGOSTINHO CÁ	24/07/1993	MF	72	90	90		Sporting Clube de Portugal
7	Armindo BRUMA	24/10/1994	FW	65	90	90	1	Sporting Clube de Portugal
8	JOÃO MÁRIO Costa	19/01/1993	MF	90	90	86	1	Sporting Clube de Portugal
9	Alberto Coelho BETINHO	21/07/1993	FW	78	67	8	2	Sporting Clube de Portugal
10	RICARDO ESGAIO	16/05/1993	FW	90	90	90		Sporting Clube de Portugal
11	IVAN CAVALEIRO	18/10/1993	FW	25	23	82		SL Benfica
12	BRUNO VARELA	04/11/1994	GK					SL Benfica
13	JOÃO CANCELO	27/05/1994	DF	90	71	23		SL Benfica
14	André TEIXEIRA	14/08/1993	DF					FC Porto
15	ANDRÉ GOMES	30/07/1993	MF	90	79	90	2	SL Benfica
16	Ricardo ALVES	25/03/1993	MF	18				FC Porto
17	TÓ-ZÉ Carvalho	14/01/1993	MF		11	4		FC Porto
18	Carlos Dias CAFÚ	26/02/1993	FW	12				SL Benfica
Pos	s = Position; G = Goals; S = Susp	ended; * = Starte	ed; + = Si	ubstitute	; I = Injur	ed/ill		

One goal was an own goal by Estonia's Artur Pikk

# Portugal v Spain



- 4-3-3 with 6 Agostinho Cá as single screening midfielder
- Emphasis on high-tempo passing moves built from the back
- Skilful midfielders able to switch play and deliver to the wide areas
- Good full-back winger combinations; 13 + 10 on right; 5 + 7 on right
- Occasional use of high pressing; good ball-winning techniques

- Creative play, solo skills and effective passing in final third
- Mentally resilient with a "never-say-die" attitude

COACH

Edgar BORGES (21/06/1954)



7

I can only congratulate the players because they represented their country with dignity and pride. We had to play a lot of our game against Greece with ten but against Spain, we offered a great spectacle with good football and a lot of emotion. My players played a great match and were always trying to get back on level terms. We are now looking to improve because, for me, every training session has to be one step further along the youth development road.









No. Player	Born	Pos.	FRA	ENG	CRO	G	Club
1 Filip PAJOVIĆ	30/07/1993	GK	90	90	90		Videoton FC (HUN)
2 Filip STOJKOVIĆ	22/01/1993	DF	90	90	90		FK crvena zvezda
3 Ivan PETROVIĆ	03/07/1993	MF	63	45+	90		NK Radnički
4 Srdan MIJAILOVIĆ	10/11/1993	MF	90	45*	90		FK crvena zvezda
5 Uroš SPAJIĆ	13/02/1993	DF	90	90	55		FK crvena zvezda
6 Lazar ROSIĆ	29/06/1993	DF					NK Radnički
7 Stefan DIMIĆ	01/05/1993	MF	90	90	76		FK Rad Beograd
8 Marko POLETANOVIĆ	20/07/1993	MF	61	88	60		FK Vojvodina
9 Uroš DJURDJEVIĆ	02/03/1994	FW	29	90	90		FK Rad Beograd
10 Marko PAVOLVSKI	07/02/1994	MF		85	14		OFK Beograd
11 Nikola NINKOVIĆ	19/12/1994	MF		90	90	1	FK Partizan
12 Miroslav GRUJIČIĆ	17/06/1994	GK					FK BSK Borča
13 Boris VARGA	14/08/1993	MF	27				FK Hajduk Kula
14 Aleksandar MITROVIĆ	16/09/1994	FW	66	S			FK Partizan
15 Nemanja RADOJA	06/02/1993	DF	90	90	90		FK Vojvodina
16 Saša IVKOVIĆ	13/05/1993	MF	90	2	35		FK Teleoptik Zemun
17 Aleksandar ČAVRIĆ	18/05/1994	FW	75	90	90		OFK Beograd
18 Djordje RADANOVIĆ	06/05/1993	MF	15	5	30		Nacional Madeira FC (POR)
Pos. = Position; $G = Goals; S = Su$	uspended; * = Star	ted; + = 5	Substitute	e; I = Inju	red/ill		

Zoran MARIĆ (21/02/1960)



In the first half of the first game we played with fear and didn't do ourselves justice. We learned how not to play. We improved against England but Croatia were more organised than we were – especially in defence. Our problem was conceding goals and, although we lifted ourselves afterwards, not being able to find a reply. We didn't have our strongest team, as many of our players were born in 1994. That makes a difference. But we have to face up to reality and continue to work on developing good players. 

# Serbia v Croatia



- 4-2-3-1 with 4 Mijailović + 3 Petrović as the usual screening pair
- Deep, compact defensive block, looking for fast counters on the wings
- High levels of technique equipped to retain possession under pressure
- 4 Mijailovic an influential figure able to operate in various roles
- Dangerous wingers (7 + 11) well supported by full-backs, especially on left
- 8 Poletanović the middle-to-front link
- Mix of short passes, direct attacking; ready to shoot from long range







No.Player	Born	Pos.	GRE	POR	EST	FRA	GRE	G	Club
1 Kepa ARRIZABALAGA	03/10/1994	GK	90	90		120	90		Athletic Club
2 Javier MANQUILLO <sup>1</sup>	05/05/1994	DF	90	32*			1		Club Atlético de Madrid
3 Alejandro GRIMALDO	20/09/1995	DF	90	90	90	90	90		FC Barcelona
4 Jonas RAMALHO	10/06/1993	DF		58+	90	120	90		Athletic Club
5 Derik OSEDE	21/02/1993	DF	90	90	86	120	90	1	Real Madrid CF
6 José Gómez CAMPAÑA	31/05/1993	MF	26	90	90	120	90		Sevilla FC
7 JUANMI Jiménez	20/05/1993	FW	90	28	58		6		Málaga CF
8 Jesús 'SUSO' Fernández	19/11/1993	MF	90	90	70	55*	71		Liverpool FC (ENG)
9 Francisco 'PACO' Alcácer	30/08/1993	FW	38		90	65+	90	2	Valencia CF
10 JESÉ Rodríguez	26/02/1993	FW	52	80		120	89	5	Real Madrid CF
11 Juan BERNAT	01/03/1993	MF	6		32		1		Valencia CF
12 Jonatan 'JONI' Castro Otto	03/03/1994	DF	90	90	90	120	90		RC Celta de Vigo
13 Adrián ORTOLÁ	20/08/1993	GK			90				Villarreal CF
14 Pablo INSÚA Blanco	09/09/1993	DF			4				RC Deportivo La Coruña
15 SAÚL Ñíguez <sup>2</sup>	21/11/1994	MF	90	90	20	120			Club Atlético de Madrid
16 Oliver TORRES	10/11/1994	MF	64	90		91	90		Club Atlético de Madrid
17 Gerard DEULOFEU	13/03/1994	FW	84	62	90	120	84	2	FC Barcelona
18 Denis SUÁREZ	06/01/1994	MF		10	90	29	19	1	Manchester City FC (ENG)
19 Salvador Ruiz SALVA	17/05/1995	DF				30			Valencia CF
20 José Antonio Delgado NONC	30/03/1993	MF							Real Betis Balompié
Pos. = Position; $G = Goals; S = S$	Pos. = Position; G = Goals; S = Suspended; * = Started; + = Substitute; I = Injured/ill								

<sup>1</sup> Replaced by Salvador Ruiz due to injury; <sup>2</sup> Replaced by 'Nono' due to injury

# COACH

Julen LOPETEGUI (28/08/1966)



We played some games that in my opinion were very entertaining for the spectators and, in the final, we played a Greek team which collectively had a great heart. Over the tournament, my players showed enormous personality, character and self-belief. They put in a lot of hard work, their mentality was spot-on, and I think they very much deserved their win. In the final, we played on a surface that favoured quick movement of the ball and we took one of the many chances we created to win the title. I felt very proud of the team. 

# Spain v Greece



- 4–3–3 with either single or double midfield screen
- Well-organised team shaped to promote penetration in wide areas
- Masterful first touch, ability to play under high pressure; possession game
- Slick combination moves based on hightempo short and medium-length
- Great positional mobility, changes of pace in middle-to-front play
- 17 Deulofeu a dangerous winger able to make the difference
- Attack-minded full-backs, especially 3 Grimaldo on left; good crosses

# RESULTS

# GROUP A

### 3 July 2012

Greece - Spain 1-2 (0-2)

0-1 Jesé (30) 0-2 Derik Osede (40) 1-2 Dimitris Diamantakos (66) Attendance: 1200 at Haapsalu Stadium, Haapsalu; KO 17.30 local time (16.30 CET) Yellow cards: GRE: Lykogiannis (25), Fourlanos (79), Rougkalas (90) / ESP: Jesé (37), Arrizabalaga (90+2)

Referee: Vadims Direktorenko (Latvia) / Assistants: Zhuk; Kolev / Fourth official: Valeri

### Estonia – Portugal 0-3 (0-2)

0-1 Artur Pikk (5-own goal) 0-2 Betinho (25) 0-3 Daniel Martins (72) Attendance: 6,691 at Lilleküla Stadium, Tallinn; KO 20.45 Yellow cards: None

Referee: Kenn Hansen (Denmark) / De Neve; Tropeano / Makkelie

### 6 July 2012

### Estonia - Greece 1-4 (0-1)

0-1 Giorgos Katidis (43) 0-2 Spyros Fourlanos (55) 0-3 Dimitris Diamantakos (85) 1-3 Karl-Eerik Luigend (90) 1-4 Dimitris Diamantakos (90+2) Attendance: 3,345 at Kadriorg Stadium, Tallinn; KO 17.00 Yellow cards: None

Referee: Danny Makkelie (Netherlands) / Lebedev; Gudmundsson / Bieri

# Portugal – Spain 3-3 (2-2)

0-1 Jesé (8) 1-1 Bruma (11) 1-2 Jesé (28) 2-2 André Gomes (39) 2-3 Jesé (48) 3-3 João Màrio (90+1-pen)

Attendance: 3,780 at Lilleküla Stadium, Tallinn; KO 20.00 Yellow cards: POR: João Cancelo (38), Betinho (50), João Mário (76) / ESP: Jesé (74)

Referee: Paolo Valeri (Italy) / Tropeano; Liestkiewicz / Tohver

## 9 July 2012

Spain – Estonia 2-0 (1-0)

1-0 Denis Suárez (39) 2-0 Paco Alcácer (87) Attendance: 3,877 at Lilleküla Stadium, Tallinn; KO 17.00 Yellow card: EST: Kukebal (68) Referee: Arnold Hunter (Northern Ireland) / Bodean; Lebedev / Direktorenko

### Portugal – Greece 2-3 (1-2)

0-1 Giannis Gianniotas (18) 1-1 André Gomes (19) 1-2 Giorgos Katidis (42) 1-3 Giorgos Katidis (69) 2-3 Betinho (90+5) Attendance: 1,193 at Haapsalu Stadium, Haapsalu; KO 17.00 Yellow cards: POR: Pedro Almeida (21), João Mario (53), André Gomes (89) / GRE: Ballas (6), Diamantakos (15), Katidis (35), Mavrias (45, 76) Red card: POR: Daniel Martins (37) Yellow-red card: GRE: Mavrias (76) Referee: Alain Bieri (Switzerland) / Liestkiewicz; Kolev / Hansen

# 

GROUP STANDING	S						
	Р	W	D	L	F	Α	Pts
Spain	3	2	1	0	7	4	7
Greece	3	2	0	1	8	5	6
Portugal	3	1	1	1	8	6	4
Estonia	3	0	0	3	1	9	0

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## GROUP B

# 3 July 2012

# England – Croatia 1-1 (0-0)

0-1 Domagoj Pavičić (57) 1-1 Nathaniel Chalobah (60) Attendance: 1,270 at Kadriorg Stadium, Tallinn; KO 17.30 Yellow cards: ENG: Thorpe (90+4) / CRO: Datković (83) Referee: Alain Bieri (Switzerland) / Gudmundsson; Bodean / Saar

### Serbia – France 0-3 (0-3)

0-1 Richard-Quentin Samnick (17) 0-2 Paul Pogba (26-pen) 0-3 Thibault Vion (32)

Attendance: 1,827 at Rakvere City Stadium, Rakvere; KO 18.45 Yellow cards: SRB: Spajic (16), Pajovic (26), Stojkovic (42), Poletanović (57) / FRA: Digne (21), Samnick (54), Pogba (67), Phojo (86) Red card: Mitrović (66)

Referee: Arnold Hunter (Northern Ireland) /Liestkiewicz; Lebedev / Tohver

## 6 July 2012

France – Croatia 1-0 (0-0) 1-0 Dimitri Foulquier (79) Attendance: 1,182 at Haapsalu Stadium, Haapsalu; KO 16.30 Yellow cards: FRA: Foulquier (55) / Močinić (38), Mrzljak (75) Referee: Vadims Direktorenko (Latvia) / Kolev; Bodean / Hunter

# Serbia – England 1-2 (0-1)

0-1 Benik Afobe (6) 0-2 Nathan Redmond (63) 1-2 Nikola Ninković (70) Attendance: 1,712 at Rakvere City Stadium, Rakvere; KO 17.30 Yellow cards: SRB: Pavlovski (80) / ENG: Chalobah (39) Referee: Kenn Hansen (Denmark) / De Neve; Zhuk /Saar

## 9 July 2012

### France – England 1-2 (1-2)

0-1 John Lundstram (16) 1-1 Jordan Veretout (31) 1-2 Harry Kane (39) Attendance: 3,234 at Kadriorg Stadium, Tallinn; KO 20.00 Yellow cards: None

Referee: Danny Makkelie (Netherlands) / Gudmundsson; De Neve / Tohver

## Croatia – Serbia 3-0 (1-0)

1-0 Domagoj Pavičić (2) 2-0 Mihael Pongračić (49) 3-0 Mihael Pongračić (57) Attendance: 1,647 at Rakvere Stadium, Rakvere; KO 20.00 Yellow cards: CRO: Pavičić (37), Čalušić (46), Čabraja (89) / SRB: Petrović (12),

Mijailović (31), Radovanović (72)

Referee: Paolo Valeri (Italy) / Tropeano; Zhuk / Saar

GROUP STANDINGS							
	Р	W	D	L	F	Α	Pts
England	3	2	1	0	5	3	7
France	3	2	0	1	5	2	6
Croatia	3	1	1	1	4	2	4
Serbia	3	0	0	3	1	8	0



# SEMI-FINALS

### 12 July 2012

England – Greece 1-2 after extra time (0-1 : 1-1)

0-1 Mavroudis Bougaidis (38) 1-1 Benik Afobe (56) 1-2 Charalambos Lykogiannis (108) **Attendance:** 3,115 at Lilleküla Stadium, Tallinn; KO 16.45

Yellow cards: ENG: Thorpe (17), Garbutt (72), Robinson (105), Thorne (111) GRE: Katidis (65), Stafylidis (101), Bougaidis (105), Gianniotas (111) Red card: GRE: Kapino (45)

Referee: Kenn Hansen (Denmark) / Lebedev; Liestkiewicz / Bieri

#### Spain – France 3-3 after extra time (0-1 : 2-2); 4-2 in penalty shoot-out

0-1 Samuel Umtiti (26) 1-1 Gerard Deulofeu (61) 2-1 Paco Alcácer (78) 2-2 Samuel Umtiti (90+1) 3-2 Gerard Deulofeu (112) 3-3 Paul Pogba (117) Penalty shoot-out (Spain started): 0-0 Campaña (over) 1-0 Pogba 1-1 Suárez 2-1 Pléa 2-2 Jesé 2-2 Umtiti (saved) 3-2 Paco Alcácer 3-2 Kondogbia (saved) 4-2 Deulofeu

Attendance: 4,325 at Lilleküla Stadium, Tallinn; KO 20.00

**Yellow cards:** ESP: Grimaldo (31), Torres (88), Campaña (90+2), Jesé (103) / FRA: Bosetti (40), Vion (50), Pogba (68), Foulquier (85)

Referee: Arnold Hunter (Northern Ireland) / De Neve; Kolev / Makkelie

# FINAL

# 15 July 2012

Spain – Greece 1-0 (0-0)

#### 1-0 Jesé (80)

**Spain:** Kepa Arrizabalaga; Jonatan Castro Otto 'Joni', Jonas Ramalho, Derik Osede, Alejandro Grimaldo; José Gómez Campaña (capt.); Jesús Fernández 'Suso' (Denis Suárez 71), Oliver Torres; Jesé (Juan Bernat 90+1),

Paco Alcácer, Gerard Deulofeu ('Juanmi' Jiménez 84).

**Greece:** Sokratis Dioudis; Nikos Marinakis, Dimitris Kourmpelis, Mavroudis Bougaidis, Kostas Stafylidis; Panagiotis Ballas, Spyros Fourlanos (Tasos Bakasetas 85); Giorgos Katidis (capt.) (Antreas Bouchalakis 90); Charis Mavrias, Dimitris Diamantakos (Charalambos Lykogiannis (67), Giannis Gianniotas.

Attendance: 7,864 at Lilleküla Stadium, Tallinn; KO 21.30 Yellow cards: ESP: Jesé (90), Arrizabalaga (90+2) / GRE: Katidis (78) Referee: Danny Makkelie (Netherlands) / De Neve; Lebedev / Bieri

# REFEREES

Name	Country	Date of birth	FIFA
Alain Bieri	Switzerland	13/03/1979	2011
Vadims Direktorenko	Latvia	31/01/1981	2009
Kenn Hansen	Denmark	29/05/1980	2011
Arnold Hunter	Northern Ireland	15/03/1979	2011
Danny Makkelie	Netherlands	28/01/1983	2011
Paolo Valeri	ltaly	16/05/1978	2011

# ASSISTANT REFEREES

Name	Country	Date of birth	FIFA
Anatolie Bodean	Moldova	02/03/1974	2000
Yves De Neve	Belgium	11/06/1975	2010
Johann Gudmundsson	lceland	08/09/1978	2008
Ivo Kolev	Bulgaria	25/06/1979	2010
Alexey Lebedev	Russia	17/07/1980	2011
Tomasz Liestkiewicz	Poland	06/10/1978	2011
Marco Tropeano	Luxembourg	30/12/1974	2008
Dzmitry Zhuk	Belarus	22/04/1986	2010


### FOURTH OFFICIALS

Name	Country	Date of birth	FIFA
Eiko Saar	Estonia	21/05/1981	2011
Kristo Tohver	Estonia	11/06/1981	2010

### FAIR PLAY RANKINGS

Pos.	Team	Points	Matches played
1	England	8.286	4
2	Estonia	8.262	3
3	France	8.142	4
4	Spain	8.114	5
5	Croatia	7.809	3
6	Portugal	7.619	3
7	Serbia	7.238	3
8	Greece	6.686	5





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