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The review of the 22nd season of UEFA Champions League football combines the annual technical report, which has been published for the last 15 seasons, with the commercial, marketing, financial and broadcasting aspects – the essential ingredients in the success of European football’s premier club competition. The technical report is also being produced as a limited-edition stand-alone publication for a small target group of front-line coaches.

As usual, the technical report sets out to provide a permanent record of the 325 matches played during the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League season and to present factual and statistical information in a reader-friendly format. Data on specific matches and the 32 teams who competed in the competition are widely available – notably on UEFA’s own website. The focus in this report is therefore to deliver an overview based on the presentation and interpretation of factual evidence, blended with the input from the team of UEFA technical observers that attended the matches played during the knockout stage of the competition. These culminated with the final in Lisbon, contested for the second successive season by two teams from the same national association.

This mix of facts and observations seeks to provoke as well as to inform. The objective is to provide inspiration for analysis, reflections and debate within; it is hoped, will give technicians food for thought. By highlighting tendencies and trends at the peak of professional club football, the report also offers coaches who are active in the development levels of the game information that may be helpful in terms of working on the qualities which will be needed by the players and coaches who will play leading roles in shaping the UEFA Champions League of the future.
The lure of Lisbon

Madrid’s great rivals laid down a marker in the group stage, dropping just two points each on their way to ensuring the competition’s first single-city final.

One of the multifarious challenges facing members of the coaching profession is that expectations can blur the public’s perception of success and failure. In the UEFA Champions League, success can be a place on the starting grid, survival into the new calendar year, or raising a national flag for the first time in the quarter-finals. For a select few clubs, expectations are pinned to images of the captain triumphantly lifting “Old Big Ears” – and some of the pre-season favourites ended the campaign with a bitter taste of disappointment despite a more than creditable season.

FC Bayern München, for instance, had been señalised as candidates to become the first club to make a successful defence of the title, only to suffer a comprehensive semi-final defeat comparable to the one the Bavarian side had inflicted on FC Barcelona a season earlier. It was one of the many dramatic twists and turns which form the quintessence of the world’s prime club competition.
The drama started to unfold during the autumn. The results pages might have suggested a degree of normality. Half of the 96 group games, for instance, had ended in victory for the home team. On the other hand, there was an eye-catching fact that, in 25 of those fixtures, the visiting team had failed to score. But theories about teams ‘travelling badly’ could be swiftly dismantled by another salient feature of the group stage. No fewer than 31 fixtures were won by the away team. Of the three possible results, draws slumped to a low of 18, with Groups D and F failing to produce a stalemate. The statistics aligned with the previous season (in which 51 of the 96 group games had not been won by the home side) to suggest a more adventurous approach by travelling teams. The competition offered spectators only six 0-0 draws (a meagre 4.8% of the total) with the knockout rounds contributing only one – the goalless first leg of the semi-final between Club Atlético de Madrid and Chelsea FC.

Further question marks were attached to the time-honoured theory that ten points are enough to earn a place in the knockout stage of the competition. SL Benfica, who went on to reach double figures, only for the head-to-head ruling to consign them to third place behind Olympiacos FC – the Greek club exceeding expectations by reaching the knockout rounds. SSC Napoli suffered an even crueler reverse, ending Group F in third place despite accumulating 12 points by winning four of their six matches. Stark contrasts were provided by Galatasaray AŞ and FC Zenit, both of whom secured second place with less impressive records. The Turkish club won their final home fixture in conditions which had forced a 24-hour postponement to qualify with seven points and a deficit of six in the goal difference column. The 1-0 victory in Istanbul signified an early exit for Juventus after the Italian champions had lost ground by conceding three draws in their previous five games.

On the same day, Zenit clinched second place in Group G despite a resounding 4-1 defeat in Vienna against FK Austria Wien. It earned kudos for the Austrian debutants, who recorded their first win in the competition. It also allowed the Russian team, thanks to FC Porto’s defeat for the Austrian débutants, who recorded their first win in the competition. It also allowed the Russian team, thanks to Fiorentina’s defeat against Atlético in Madrid, to progress with cabin-size baggage of six points and a solitary win. The two Portuguese clubs joined Juventus, FC Steaua București, Olympique de Marseille, AFC Ajax and Celtic FC on a seven-strong list of former champions of Europe who fell at the group stage hurdle.
Further apparent contradictions could be found in the eight group tables, where differences between first and last were generally substantial but where few issues had been definitively resolved before the final matchday. The eight fourth-placed teams registered deficits of between nine and 13 points in relation to the group winners — substantial margins in an 18-point campaign. At the same time, differences between first and second ranged from zero (in Groups D and F) to ten points in Group G, where Atlético significantly, equalled their city rivals by conceding only two points in their six games.

Elsewhere, isolated performances rather than sustained excellence caught the eye. In Group E, for example, FC Basel 1893 raised eyebrows by defeating Chelsea at home and at Stamford Bridge — but failed to beat anybody else. Similarly, FC Shakhtar Donetsk, a major force in previous seasons, could only register a brace of wins against Real Sociedad de Fútbol, with the Basque club a shade unlucky to reap only a single point on their return to the competition after a ten-year absence. Galatasaray earned four of their seven points against Juventus. Zenit took four of their six points from the 2004 champions, Porto, and in Group H, AC Milan took second place even though the only opponent they defeated was Celtic.

In terms of grand finales, Group F had no peer. With Marseille losing their six matches, the top two spots were contested by heavyweights Borussia Dortmund, Arsenal FC and Napoli and all three managed to knock down their opponents once. A dramatic late winner at the Stade Vélodrome ultimately handed top spot to the 2013 silver-medallists, while Rafael Benítez’s side felt short of glory in a 2-0 home win against Arsenal. That result meant that Milan would be the only Italian representative in the next phase.

When the dust had settled, it became clear that the knockout stage would get under way with four clubs from England and Germany, three from Spain, and one apiece from France, Greece, Italy, Russia and Turkey. Few would have predicted that, once the ball started rolling in February, many of the ties would be all but resolved after the first 90 minutes. Of that all eight group winners would progress to the quarter-finals at the expense of the runners-up.
Knockout blows

The opening round of 16 fixtures yielded six away victories, five of which were won by two goals or more – with the advantages compounded by the away goals rule. Real Madrid CF, 6-1 victors against FC Schalke 04 in Gelsenkirchen; Paris Saint-Germain, 4-0 winners in Leverkusen; and Dortmund, favoured by a 4-2 scoreline in St Petersburg, became odds-on favourites to go through – and did, even though Zenit claimed a consolation victory in Dortmund. Only two matches punctuated the away win sequence. Galatasaray, coming from behind to draw 1-1 with Chelsea in Istanbul, were outgunned at Stamford Bridge, losing the return 2-0. And Olympiacos, 2-0 winners against Manchester United FC in the home leg, failed to truncate their negative record of 11 losses in as many visits to England when they were beaten 3-0 at Old Trafford.

David Moyes’ team then faced the defending champions and, despite working to extenuation, lost 3-1 in Munich after a 1-1 draw in Manchester. Their local rivals Manchester City FC had suffered the misfortune to be drawn against Barcelona, and their excellent campaign was ended with defeats in Manchester and at Camp Nou. Gerardo Martino’s side, however, were then required to take part in the only one-country tie to emerge from the quarter-final draw. A stunning long-range shot by Diego earned Atlético a 1-1 draw in the Catalan capital, with Barça then unable to bounce back after conceding an early goal in the return. Real Madrid also prevailed by the narrowest of margins in a rerun of the previous season’s semi-final against Dortmund. A convincing display earned Carlo Ancelotti’s side a seemingly comfortable 3-0 advantage but, in Germany, two early goals for Jürgen Klopp’s team produced nail-biting. Limiting the damage to that 2-0 scoreline saw the Spanish team through – by the skin of their teeth. Paris seemed to have carved out a winning margin when an added-time goal earned Laurent Blanc’s team a 3-1 win over Chelsea in the French capital. Despite conceding once in the first half, the French side looked reasonably comfortable – until a diagonal ball into the box allowed Demba Ba to scoop in a second in the 87th minute and secure an away-goal victory for the Londoners.

Their reward was a trip to Madrid, where a respectful display against Atlético led to the only goalless draw of the knockout stage. Again, Chelsea went 1-0 ahead during the first half of the return. But Diego Simeone’s team produced enough mental and physical strength to turn the game round, with Adrián López equalising just before the break. A Diego Costa penalty and a quick reaction by Arda Turan when his scoring attempt rebounded off the crossbar allowed Atlético to seal a return to the final of Europe’s premier competition for the first time in 40 years.

The other semi-final also produced a tale of the unexpected – at least in the second leg. Real Madrid earned a 1-0 home victory in the first, but, bearing in mind the club’s meagre dividends from previous visits to Germany, the result did not generate undue optimism. The surprise in Munich was that centre-back Sergio Ramos was allowed to head home from two set plays within the opening 20 minutes, and that Bayern were subsequently unable to find a reply. An impudent direct free-kick by Ronaldo put 0-4 on the scoreboard in the final minute, perpetuated the tradition that no team has successfully defended the UEFA Champions League title, and made history by ensuring that, for the first time, the European title would be decided at a final between two clubs from the same city.

A minute’s silence was held before both semi-finals to mark the passing of Tito Vilanova and Vujadin Boškov.
Sergio Ramos’s equalising goal seconds from the end of normal time turned the outcome and perceptions of an intriguing final on their heads.

“The equaliser was the winning goal.” The comment by Sir Alex Ferguson focused a spotlight on one critical moment. Three minutes into added time and with only one remaining, Luka Modrić delivered a corner from the right. The one head that the Club Atlético de Madrid players wanted the ball to avoid was that of Sergio Ramos, the man who had killed off the defending champions by heading home twice from set plays during the second leg of the semi-final in Munich. But there he was, given enough elbow room in the centre of the box to rise above the ball and, calculating the angles as shrewdly as a billiards player, swivel his neck to send his header past the stretched-to-the-limit right arm of Thibaut Courtois and into the net at the far post. In the short term, it signified 1-1 and extra time. In the greater scheme of things, it heralded, as Sir Alex pointed out, ultimate victory for Real Madrid CF.

To start a review of the 2014 UEFA Champions League final in the 93rd minute could legitimately be classed as an aberration. But the equaliser not only changed the game. It changed perceptions of the game. Had the Ramos header struck the post, the post-match plaudits would undoubtedly have been redirected towards the compact organisation, defensive acumen and incommensurable team spirit of Diego Simeone’s side. Just over half an hour later, the praise was being redirected towards the self-belief, the tactical sophistication and the sheer punching power of Carlo Ancelotti’s Madrid. As Roy Hodgson remarked on the following morning: “We can make a lot of positive points about Real Madrid, but we shouldn’t be too harsh on Atlético.” Nevertheless, a considered review of the final is inevitably coloured by the hindsight factor.
The hindsight factor reaches back to 75 minutes before kickoff, when the 60,976 spectators were still filling the magnificent Estádio do Sport Lisboa e Benfica with colour, decibels, banners and Madrileño accents. At that moment, the team sheets were being handed to Dutch referee Björn Kuipers. Atlético’s included No19, Diego Costa, injured a week previously, but apparently recovered in time to take part in training on the eve of the final. For a coach, the situation presented a dilemma. Should he start on the pitch or should he be reserved as the stiletto up the sleeve on the bench? Simeone, backed by evidence from the player and the medics, opted for the former. But only nine minutes had ticked past when he needed to be replaced by Adrián López. At that stage, nobody knew there would be extra time. It is only the hindsight factor which classes the player and the medics, opting for the former.

And so to the pitch, where the pageantry of the opening ceremony and the rendition of the UEFA Champions League anthem by Portugal’s celebrated fado singer Mariza gave the crowd goosebumps as the tension rose. This translated seamlessly into a tense start to a contest between, as former Madrid star Fernando Hierro put it, “two different ways of seeing football, with Atlético a compact, tactically mature side with a very good defensive set-up.” Initially, it was Real who probed deeper, with Gareth Bale and Cristian Ronaldo working the right and left flanks respectively, while Karim Benzema attempted to capitalise on neat combinations through the middle. But effective combinations were rare in an opening phase when, as Mircea Lucescu commented, “neither team could put more than three or four passes together.”

For Sir Alex, Atlético’s strength was to “hunt the ball down, to stay organised and to be patient. They were ready to wait and wait and wait – and they scored from their first real chance.” The game was into its 35th minute when it came. Gabi trotted over to take a corner on the right, with his delivery cleared only as far as right-back Juanfran, who re-directed it into a box where there was two-way traffic among a platoon of players moving in or out. With Iker Casillas among those moving out, the header by Diego Godin looped over him and, as the goalkeeper put a desperate hand to it, crossed the line and found a tortuous route into the side of the net. A set play had given Atlético the advantage and the solidity of Simeone’s unit challenged Ancelotti and his players to find solutions.

The first half ended with Khedira earning himself a yellow card during the 94 seconds of added time. It was the third of a dozen in a match where the tensions and frustrations of a local derby translated seamlessly into a tense start to club football’s ultimate stage followed boiling bickering and distorted the timing of tackles. But the opening act had served to highlight the contrast in playing styles and in formations. Atlético’s 4-4-2 relied heavily on the two full-backs – Fernando Hierro put it, “two different ways of seeing football, with Atlético a compact, tactically mature side with a very good defensive set-up.” Initially, it was Real who probed deeper, with Gareth Bale and Cristian Ronaldo working the right and left flanks respectively, while Karim Benzema attempted to capitalise on neat combinations through the middle. But effective combinations were rare in an opening phase when, as Mircea Lucescu commented, “neither team could put more than three or four passes together.”

The 59th minute, when Ancelotti ordered a double substitution. “This wasn’t just about fresh legs,” commented Hierro. “Ancelotti added joy to the team’s play. Swapping Khedira for Isco gained a lot for the team, as he tried to combine with everybody. And sending on Marcelo for Coentrão at left-back was a key move. He was ready to push forward, to try the 1x1. In a game when the front men couldn’t find spaces to run into, individual skill was required – and the two changes provided it.” Hodgson added: “From that moment, Real Madrid pushed more and more, while Atlético couldn’t pose any threat in attack. If you let Real have the ball in or around your area for 30 minutes, you can expect bad news.” For all their pressure, however, there was little to trouble Courtois. Bale struck two shots, Ronaldo launched an acrobatic effort, Isco tried his kick from outside the box. All went wide. As Atlético stubbornly held on, Simeone sent on José Sosa to replace Raúl García, who had been brought into play much less frequently than his midfield colleagues Tiago, Gabi and Koke. Then, with seven minutes remaining, left-back Filipe Luis limped off injured, obliging Simeone to make his third change at a stage when, as Hierro commented: “Had I been the coach, I would have sent on an extra midfielder and closed the game down.”

While the referee was consulting his watch prior to closing the game down after four minutes of added time, the “winning equation” entered the seemingly impenetrable Atlético net. “The 1-1 released the pressure and gave Real added impetus,” said Thomas Schaaf. “Atlético couldn’t find the resources to play vertically or build attacks.” As the referee signalled the start of extra time, a new game had also started. And within minutes, the Atlético fans began to see the writing on the wall. Juanfran landed awkwardly – and hobbled as best he could through the extra half-hour, aware that the three changes had been made. Finally detecting a weakness in Atlético’s defences, Ancelotti’s team exploited it mercilessly, with Marcelo and Di María relentlessly assaulting the damaged area. “This is where the intelligence of Modrić paid off,” Lucescu observed. “He helped Real to dominate totally in midfield. He constantly switched the direction of play to pose questions. And Marcelo, with his interceptions and vertical runs, caused serious problems.” Significantly, while Modrić was the chief supplier to Bale and Ronaldo on the wings, Sergio Ramos – who made more passes than any other player in the final – was the main purveyor of passes to Di María and Marcelo as they broke forward from the left side of midfield. Atlético’s instinct for survival had seen them through the first half of extra time, but with so many key players running – and Juanfran hobbling – on empty, the untimely incursion by Real’s left flank players provided the breakthrough. The shot which provided the culmination to Di María’s run was blocked by Courtois, only for the ball to cannon hard enough to …
from his body to bounce high in the air from the ground and allow Bale to nod in at the back post. Within minutes, Marcelo made an almost identical run through the same unprotected territory to score with a low shot. And Ronaldo rubbed salt into wounds by converting a last-minute penalty then exuberantly celebrating the moment when the camera which was gathering images of him for a feature film. It brought down the curtain on a game in which, as Lucescu observed, “the more agile, creative, technical players ultimately beat the highly disciplined defensive organisation of their opponents”. There was statistical evidence to support his view. Ancelotti’s team, apart from its 60% share of the ball, had doubled Atlético’s tally of goal attempts, and had attempted 86.2 passes to Atlético’s 54.8 with a 76 to 59 advantage in the percentage of accuracy. Atlético’s endeavour was reflected by midfielders Koke, Tiago and Gabi, each of whom covered almost 16km in running to exhaustion. They and their team-mates could legitimately feel maltreated by the 4–1 scoreline. As the white shirts of Real headed into the main stand to receive medals from the UEFA President, Michel Platini, and lift the trophy for the tenth time, the hindsight factors of the heavy scoreline, celebrated the climax of the job. In the technical area he seems to the cause. Simeone’s side was a reflection of his own attitude as a player and his credo as a coach. “Effort and spirit are not negotiable,” Ancelotti, by the narrowest of margins in spite of the heavy scoreline, celebrated the climax of his first year with the club’s tenth European crown. “Real Madrid has become a different team with Ancelotti,” said的一项技术，其丰富的资源以达到战术平衡。“这被证明了。”

### Match statistics

**Saturday 24 May 2014, Estádio do Sport Lisboa e Benfica**

**Real Madrid CF 4–1 Club Atlético de Madrid** *(after extra time)*

**Goals**

- 0–1 Godín 56, 1–1 Ramos 10–5, 2–1 Bale 110, 3–1 Marcelo 118, 4–1 Ronaldo 120 (P)

**Line-ups**

**Madrid:** Casillas (G), Carvajal, Ramos, Varane, Coentrão (Marcelo 70), Modric, Khedira (Isco 59), Di María, Bale, Benzema (Morata 79), Ronaldo (C)

**Atlético:** Courtois; Juanfran, Miranda, Godín, Filipe Luis; Gabi 100, Godín 120 (Atlético)

**Cards**

Yellow: Ramos 27, Khedira 45+, Marcelo 59, Ronaldo 120–1, Varane 120–5 (Redaktör); Raúl García 27, Miranda 53, Villa 72, Juanfran 74, Koke 89, Gala 100, Godín 120 (Atlético)

**Referee**

Björn Kuipers (Netherlands)

**Attendance**

60,976

### Match summary

Carlo Ancelotti became champion of Europe for the fifth time, having done so twice as a player and twice as coach of AC Milan before completing his hat-trick with Real Madrid CF. He was within a minute of losing a UEFA Champions League final as AC Milan coach in 2005, but扳倒了他对手的队。随后他说道：“马塞洛改变了比赛。”

## unter the Italian coach Real Madrid have developed a balance and tactical diversity that reaped its greatest reward in the final

The coaches who acted as UEFA’s observers at the Lisbon final unanimously lauded Ancelotti’s understanding of the substitutions and his bravery in deploying six creative, attacking players in front of his back four as he crossed the adverse result. Eyebrows were raised when he sent on Insúa, a middle-to-front player replete with skill and unpredictability, to replace the industrious Sami Khedira and accompany Luka Modrić in the central midfield. Marcelo’s attacking virtues made him another successful substitution. “Marcelo changed the game,” Sir Alex Ferguson remarked. “Ancelotti was able to bring on substitutes who added to the team, whereas Simeone found himself having to make changes to survive.”

Mircea Lucescu added: “Ancelotti reorganised the team and made an impact and he found ways of beating different types of opposition – like breaking up Bayern’s game by sometimes going over the top. He’s good at finding the right answers.” After Ancelotti’s team had clawed its way back from the brink to take the title, Roy Hodgson reflected on the qualities which had allowed him to ultimately prevail: “Throughout the game, he transmitted calmness, confidence, belief in the work that had been done and faith in the ability of his players.”

Carlo Ancelotti

Under the Italian coach Real Madrid have developed a balance and tactical diversity that reaped its greatest reward in the final
Unlocking the door

From launching attacks from deep or hitting teams on the break to the importance (or not) of possession, opinions differed on the most effective route to goal.

"If we ended the season asking ourselves why Real Madrid were the champions, we’d have to think about the balance within their squad, their ability to field a team equipped to deal with any rival. They could always field two of the best central midfielders you could hope to see, because of their skill on the ball and their defensive strength. They were always ready to get back to their own box or, as we saw against Bayern, to double up against Ribéry and Robben. More importantly, against any rival. They could always field two of the best attackers with any rival. They could always field two of the best attackers."

The final provided a clear example of how Carlo Ancelotti was able to change the texture of his team by blending different personalities into the two central midfield positions, titling the balance in the direction of a more creative approach when chasing the result. Although team structures were fluid, no fewer than 23 of the 32 coaches opted to operate with twin screening midfielders at some stage of the competition. Like Ancelotti, Pep Guardiola was able to stamp different hallmarks on to his formation by permuting Toni Kroos, Thiago Alcantara, Bastian Schweinsteiger, Javi Martinez and Philipp Lahm in the pivotal roles. The other two semi-finalists tended to prioritise a more pragmatic approach, with Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta. The trend is, in consequence, for the looks to provide extra cover through the central area.

Attacking from the back

The final demonstrated that the central area of the defensive third has become the prime area for laying the foundations of attacking play. For Real Madrid CF, the suspension of Xabi Alonso left Carlo Ancelotti with, as Roy Hodgson put it, "a big hole to fill". He filled it in two different ways, with Luka Modric the lynchpin, distributing play to every team-mate except Karim Benzema and none to Cristiano Ronaldo or Gareth Bale. In so, his second-half replacement, linked more successfully with the two wide forwards. The salient feature, however, was that centre-back Sergio Ramos stepped into the Alonso role, completing more passes than any other player and effectively feeding Ángel Di Maria and Marcelo on the left flank. This provided a contrast with his role during the semi-final against FC Bayern München when, faced with Marco Mandzukic and Thomas Müller, he prioritised defensive duties. The former was able to receive only eight passes during the 90 minutes.

Flexible structures

The trend towards a 4-2-3-1 structure continued in the 2013/14 season, with 19 of the 32 contestants operating in this formation at some stage, six setting themselves up in 4-3-3, another six in 4-4-2, and Juventus playing their trademark 3-5-2 except in the two group matches against Real Madrid, when Antonio Conte opted to play four at the back. However, the season offered infinite opportunities to play with numbers. AC Milan, with a change of coach during the campaign, permuted 4-4-2 with 4-5-1; David Moyes’ Manchester United FC mixed 4-4-2 with 4-2-3-1; Carlo Ancelotti switched from 4-3-3 to 4-4-2 against Bayern in the semi-final, AFC Ajax’s starting lineup at home to Barcelona was an example of the teams whose structure was, at certain moments, more akin to a 4-1-4-1 than the traditional 4-3-3; Atlético occasionally switched to 4-5-1; FC Schalke 04’s 4-4-2 was so distant from two flat lines of four that UEFA’s observer was tempted to label it a 4-2-2-2 formation, and, in general, quick transitions to and from attacking and defending structures blurred definitions. Yet the top teams suggested that, in order to be able to unlock doors in the UEFA Champions League, you need to be equipped to play in more than one system.
After nine seasons at the top of the ball possession chart, Barcelona were relegated to second place by Bayern. Pep Guardiola having transferred a playing philosophy from Catalonia to Bavaria. Possessing the ball can be equated to possessing the initiative. But the 2013/14 season demonstrated that, to quote Arsène Wenger, “football doesn’t necessarily reward teams that take the initiative”. Defeats for the main standard-bearers of possession football kept alive a debate which has been ebbing and flowing since the contrasting winning styles of Barcelona in 2009 and 2011, and an FC Internazionale Milano side which became the filling in a sandwich by winning the title under José Mourinho feeling comfortable without the ball and having it for only 32% of the 2010 final against Louis van Gaal’s Bayern. The 2014 final was between two teams and two coaches who gave little relevance to possession figures. Madrid’s average for the victorious campaign was hoisted upwards by a 60% share in the Lisbon final, after defeating Bayern at home and away in the semi-final with a 36% share of the ball. Atlético, the silver medallists, dominated possession in only three of their 13 matches – one of them a marginal 51% quota away against FK Austria Wien. Like Madrid against Bayern, they defeated Barcelona in the quarter-final with 34% of the ball at Camp Nou and 36% at home.

Gareth Southgate, one of the team of UEFA technical observers during the season, commented: “There seems to be a small current trend where teams that dominate possession are being beaten by well-organised defensive blocks and quick counterattacks.” Antonio Conte adopts a similar line: “The football mentality is slowly changing in Italy, working on possession play and attacking. Yet we find ourselves playing smaller clubs that do not allow us to play like this.”

The season certainly offered multifarious examples to support the thesis that minimal possession can be translated into maximum results. Austria Wien had a 36% share at home to FC Zenit and won 4-1. Ajax, renowned as a possession team, registered their season low of 41% – and registered their best result – in the 2-1 home win against Barça. FC Basel 1893’s 2-1 away win over Chelsea was achieved with 44% of possession. When Celtic FC, normally a low-possession team, were given 53% of the ball by visitors AC Milan, they were beaten 1-0. Chelsea, in their semi-final against Atlético, had 38% during the 0-0 draw in Madrid and, when they had 52% in the return at Stamford Bridge, were beaten 3-1. Diego Simeone has clear ideas about the importance of ball possession. “I’m not interested. Not at all,” he insists. “What I’m interested in is winning games. Possession is something that has been sold to us as attractive. Possession play is one way of winning, but it’s not the only way. Our aim is to achieve a balance between both facets of the game, and we have players who can mix possession, defensive balance and counterattacking. I much prefer powerful, purposeful attacking.”

A comment made over a decade ago by Rinus Michels could be injected into debates on the value of possession in a winning formula. “Those who focused on the best result rather than the best football,” he stated in UEFA’s technical report on the 2002/03 season, “were less vulnerable than the others. They were strong defensively, took no big risks and reacted rather than taking the initiative.”

### Average possession per game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Average Possession</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porto</td>
<td>59%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zenit</td>
<td>58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ajax</td>
<td>54%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goldstarcy</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
<td>51%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Anderlecht</td>
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<td>Celtic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria Wien</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The clubs in bold qualified for the knockout stage.
Better late than never

One of the talking points to emerge from the 2012/13 season was the fact that 24% of the goals were scored after the 75th minute. When this statistic was presented to the participants at the UEFA Elite Club Coaches Forum at the beginning of the season, Carlo Ancelotti commented: “It’s difficult to prepare the last 15 minutes from a tactical point of view. They are the least foreseeable minutes because of tiredness, loss of concentration and so on. Sometimes changing a player or a tactic can help, but it is the most difficult period of the game to control.”

The reaction from Paulo Fonseca, head coach of FC Porto at the time, was: “These figures represent a challenge for coaches. In the last 15 minutes you tend to run more risks defensively. But the emotional balance of a team can be improved. You need to keep your players focused – and coaching can achieve that.”

The balance to emerge from the 2013/14 season reveals that the coaches may indeed have found antidotes to fatigue and losses of concentration. The last 15 minutes were no longer the most productive of the 90 and the number of goals scored during added time at the end fell by 23%. For the first time since UEFA started compiling technical reports on the UEFA Champions League in the 1998/99 season, the first 15 minutes after the half-time interval proved to be the most fertile period for goalscoring.

One facet, however, remained unaltered. The second half was by far more productive than the opening 45 minutes. No fewer than 59% of the goals were scored after the break and, in line with previous seasons, 40% hit the net after the 60th minute. This figure has stabilised in recent seasons and arguably reflects enhanced fitness levels. UEFA’s first technical report in 1998/99 highlighted that 53% of the goals had been scored after the hour mark. However, while debating the high number of late goals in the 2012/13 season, the coaches had wondered how many of the goals scored after the 75th minute had been decisive. For the purposes of analysis, ‘decisive’ was defined as a goal which altered the home win/draw/away win outcome of the match. Using these criteria, the Group B game between Juventus and Galatasaray therefore produced three ‘decisive’ goals, with the result shifting to 1-1, 2-1 and 2-2 in the closing minutes. In other games, the late goals had little impact. Staying in Group B, for example, three goals in the last ten minutes of Galatasaray v Madrid simply extended the scoreline from 0-4 to 1-6.

When the goals were scored

When the first goals were scored

The equaliser by Sergio Ramos in Lisbon brought the total of ‘decisive’ goals to 33, representing 42% of the 79 goals scored between the 75th minute and the end of added time. The other 46 goals signified no change to the status quo at the time, although it can be argued that the need to chase an adverse result sometimes made teams vulnerable to further goals by the opposition.
Counters count

UEFA’s technical observers frequently highlighted teams’ reluctance to expose themselves to counterattacks until the necessities of chasing a result obliged them to do so. During the 2013/14 season, the number of goals directly attributable to counters dropped to 61 in comparison with 79 in the previous season. Even so, counterattacks accounted for almost a quarter of the goals scored in open play (23% to be precise). The champions provided a prime example of the potential value of the quick break. No fewer than 13 of Real Madrid’s goals – almost a third – came from counters, the most frequent modus operandi being a ball win in midfield (often just inside opposition territory) and a quick launch of the ‘Formula 1’ forwards, Cristiano Ronaldo and Gareth Bale. Seven counterattack goals came from a simple ball win + one pass + solo run combination. 

Jürgen Klopp makes no secret of the importance he places on counterattacking skills – and Borussia Dortmund scored seven times via this method during the season, including one lightning reply to a dangerous free-kick in favour of Olympique de Marseille. In their away game at RSC Anderlecht, Olympiacos FC also scored one of their five counterattack goals after a set play for their opponents. Barcelona laid foundations for five counters with their intense pressure game, which led to ball wins high up the pitch. Chelsea also scored five times (one of them following a dangerous free-kick for FC Steaua București), mostly with three or more players flooding forward as soon as the ball was won.

Counterattacks accounted for almost a quarter of the goals scored in open play.

“Counterattacking is now much better organised and well thought out,” Carlo Ancelotti comments. “It’s not just about launching a long ball forward – counters tend to be more elaborately planned and can create more goals.” The 2014 champions underlined that counterattacking is an important method of unlocking doors.
One of the most notable evolutions in the UEFA Champions League is a general trend towards a passing game. In the 2009/10 season, 24 of the 32 participants averaged fewer than 500 passes per game and five of them had averages below 400. The figures for 2013/14 reveal that only six of the 32 starters posted averages below 500 and none of the teams made fewer than 400 passes per game. This represented an advance in comparison with the 2012/13 campaign, when 13 sides were below the 500 passes per game figure. Carlo Ancelotti’s Real Madrid CF added almost a hundred passes to their average under José Mourinho, while FC Zenit also added 128 to their average for 2012/13. It is indicative that Ajax, despite adding three to their 2012/13 average of 607, dropped from second place in the table to eighth, as other clubs hardened their emphasis on a passing game.

The exception to the trend was Diego Simeone’s Club Atlético de Madrid, who occupied 24th position of the 32 starters in 2013/14. They were one of the three teams in the bottom ten who progressed beyond the group stage. Olympiacos were the only side to reach the last 16 with an average below 500 passes a match. Eventual champions FC Bayern München made over 700 passes in four of their games en route to the title and would have posted a significantly higher average had they not been restricted to 410 and 414 passes in their two semi-final meetings with Bayern. Their peak of 862 in the final is misleading in that it was achieved over 120 minutes instead of 90. The season high of 984 passes was received by a team-mate during a game (passes) and the percentage of passes attempted during a game (passes) and the percentage of passes received by a team-mate (accuracy).

The graphic gives the average number of passes attempted during a game (passes) and the percentage of passes received by a team-mate (accuracy).
**The final score**

Average goals per game were only just off the 2012/13 record and Cristiano Ronaldo hit a new individual high as scoring flourished again.

The goalscoring record of 368 established in the 2012/13 season was not surpassed, but the final tally in 2013/14 fell only marginally short of the benchmark and registered the second-highest average of goals per fixture during the 22 seasons of the UEFA Champions League. Real Madrid CF scored 41 times en route to the title, with Cristiano Ronaldo setting an individual benchmark of 17 goals with his last-minute penalty in Lisbon, bettering the previous record of 14 strikes in a single campaign. He led a pack of 177 different players who scored during the season.

By the time the two Madrid clubs headed for the Portuguese capital, they had jointly accounted for 17% of the season’s goals. Carlo Ancelotti’s team had, in addition, been standard-bearers for an attacking approach to away fixtures, scoring 20 times on the road, compared with 17 at the Estadio Santiago Bernabéu. The four semi-finalists contributed over 100 goals to the overall tally of 362.

Excluding the goals scored on neutral territory in the final, 201 goals (56% of the total) were scored by the home team and 156 by the visitors – parameters pretty much aligned with the 202/165 split in the 2012/13 season.

In terms of individual goalscoring patterns, the season offered further evidence to fuel debate about the role of the target striker. Among the leading scorers, Zlatan Ibrahimović, Diego Costa, Robert Lewandowski and Álvaro Negredo could be put into that category, whereas Madrid’s scoring pattern provokes reflections:

The salient feature of the season was that the number of goals scored in open play dipped by 10% to just below the 70% mark – which inelegantly indicates a resurgence of dead-ball situations as sources of goals. One of the trademarks of the 2012/13 season had been the emergence of the cut-back from areas near the goal line as a significant purveyor of goals, a fact discussed by the UEFA Champions League coaches when they met at the UEFA Elite Club Coaches Forum prior to the 2013/14 campaign. The tendency towards the cut-back was comprehensively reversed, and though it still produces far greater dividends than it did during the first decade of this century, in relation to 2012/13 it registered a downturn of 44% to provide only 6% of the global tally. The debating point is whether this can be attributed to a greater focus on providing positional defensive cover when opponents sought to exploit the areas adjacent to the midway mark between goalpost and corner flag.

Another eye-catching element in the goalscoring breakdown of the season is the marked decline in the number of goals attributable to the traditional through ball – the forward pass delivered either through or over the defence. Analysis of the 2012/13 campaign pointed out that, as recently as the 2008/09 season, this category had produced 32% of open-play goals, yet had plummeted to 18% in 2013/14 registered another massive downward movement (a further drop of 44%), meaning that the supply of goals via this route has been practically halved in a time span of just two seasons and has reached, by far, the lowest figure since the current 125-match format was introduced a decade ago. The source of 82 goals in the 2010/11 campaign, it dived to 33 in 2013/14 and accounted for several decimal points below 10% of the goals scored.

Reflections based on this statistic will evidently be launched from the starting point of compact central defensive blocks based on positionally conservative centre-backs shielded by, in many cases, two screening midfielders. Another element to be injected into the equation, however, could be related to the advances and adjustments made to goalmaking techniques in recent years. The keepers are now extremely sensitised to the need to ‘weep’ behind their defences and perform sprint-speed sorties to pre-empt the success of the traditional through pass into those less protected areas. Instead of the defence-splitting pass through the central area, more goals were derived from neat combination moves, many of them exploiting the channels between central defenders and full-backs. The number of goals attributable to combination play has almost doubled since 2011/12 and, in 2013/14, reached its highest level in the last decade.

FC Barcelona again provided some outstanding examples, notably the intricate combination move that brought their fourth goal at home to Celtic FC or a similar spell of sustained possession culminating in the passing interchange which allowed Daniel Alves to cut in from the right and seal the 2–0 away victory against Manchester City CF. Chelsea FC scored goals during the group games against FC Basel 1893 and FC Steaua Bucureşti thanks to combinations in wide areas (notably on the left flank), but were unable to exploit this route during the knockout rounds. At the other end of the combination-move spectrum, Jürgen Klopp’s Borussia Dortmund reaped dividends by flooding forward in numbers as soon as the ball was won, offering enough passing options for goalscoring combinations on the counterattack. During the knockout rounds, combination moves were the most fertile sources of goals, whereas crosses from the wide areas had been the prime mover of scoreboards during the group stage.

**Goal type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Guidelines</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Group stage</th>
<th>Knockout stage</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total set-play goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>Wall pass or three-man (or more) combination play</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross</td>
<td>Cross from the wing</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cut-back</td>
<td>Pass back from the byline</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diagonal</td>
<td>Diagonal pass into the penalty box</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Run with the ball</td>
<td>Dribble and close-range shot or dribble and pass</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-range shot</td>
<td>Direct shot or shot and rebound</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward pass</td>
<td>Through pass or pass over the defence</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Defensive error</td>
<td>Bad back-pass or mistake by the goalkeeper</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>277</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>362</td>
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</table>

Karin Benzaoua contributed five goals from the central attacking position, while Ronaldo started his record-breaking campaign in a wider role. Other players at the head of the scoring chart such as Sergio Agüero, Lionel Messi, Arturo Vidal, Thomas Müller, Gareth Bale and Marco Reus operated in wider or support-striker roles. Apart from the players already mentioned, no individual scored more than five times.

Inevitably, certain goals require a degree of personal interpretation in terms of pinpointing their source, but the goal type chart (left) outlines the technical and tactical actions which led to the 362 goals.

The goalscoring analysis outlined above provided the following evidence:

- The number of goals scored in open play dipped by 10% to just below the 70% mark – which inelegantly indicates a resurgence of dead-ball situations as sources of goals.
- The number of goals attributable to the traditional through ball – the forward pass delivered either through or over the defence – has declined by 44% since 2012/13, reaching 6% of the global tally.
- The number of goals attributable to combination play has almost doubled since 2011/12 and, in 2013/14, reached its highest level in the last decade.
- FC Barcelona again provided some outstanding examples, notably the intricate combination move that brought their fourth goal at home to Celtic FC or a similar spell of sustained possession culminating in the passing interchange which allowed Daniel Alves to cut in from the right and seal the 2–0 away victory against Manchester City CF. Chelsea FC scored goals during the group games against FC Basel 1893 and FC Steaua Bucureşti thanks to combinations in wide areas (notably on the left flank), but were unable to exploit this route during the knockout rounds. At the other end of the combination-move spectrum, Jürgen Klopp’s Borussia Dortmund reaped dividends by flooding forward in numbers as soon as the ball was won, offering enough passing options for goalscoring combinations on the counterattack. During the knockout rounds, combination moves were the most fertile sources of goals, whereas crosses from the wide areas had been the prime mover of scoreboards during the group stage.

**Open play**

[Image of player scoring a goal in open play, with statistics on open-play goals and set-play goals shown]

**Goals season by season**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Games</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/93</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>1994/95</td>
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<td>1999/00</td>
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<td>2013/14</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,422</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,608</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.47</strong></td>
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</table>
Set plays

The 2013/14 season revealed that there is still life in the dead ball. The steady downward trend (registered in recent seasons) was halted and the three dead-ball situations which led to goals in the Lisbon final brought the total for the campaign to 94. In the 2005/06 season, the number of set play goals peaked at fractionally below one-third before falling away to marginally over 20% in 2012/13. However, in 2013/14, the figure climbed back to 26% – the level registered in the 2008/09 and 2009/10 seasons.

However, there is a codicil to add. The ‘recovery’ of the dead ball was due, in great part, to a 50% increase in the number of successfully taken penalties, from 20 to 30. This represents the highest figure recorded since the UEFA Champions League adopted its current format in 2003. The total had only once reached 20 (21 to be exact, in 2004/05) until 24 were scored in 2010/11, to spark off correlations with the introduction of the additional assistant referees. During 2013/14, another striking figure is that 17 penalties were not converted. This can legitimately be associated with greater in-depth analysis of opponents, with goalkeepers coaches encouraging their pupils to study penalty takers’ preferences. Adding successes and failures, 47 spot kicks were awarded at an average of one every 2.6 matches. However, 14 of the 32 contestants were not awarded a penalty.

During 2013/14, 17 penalties were not converted. This can legitimately be associated with greater in-depth analysis of opponents

Success rates in the UEFA Champions League raise questions about the wisdom of investing in training ground rehearsals of certain types of set play. In 2013/14, only seven goals were struck into the net from direct free-kicks – representing fractionally below 2% of the total. In other words, only one in 50 of the season’s goals was supplied by free-kick specialist. Andrea Poli’s expertise was successfully stifled by opponents of Juventus, and no other specialist scored more than once, including Lionel Messi, Robin van Persie, Gareth Bale and Cristiano Ronaldo. Ronaldo’s success against Bayern in Munich was among the season’s best set-play goals, along with spectacular strikes by Jens Hegeler and Lorenzo Insigne.

On the other hand, the number of goals resulting from indirect free-kicks increased from 11 to 18 – and their potential value was underlined by Club Atlético de Madrid’s winning goal in Porto, scored from a well-rehearsed move which allowed Arda Turan a free shot at goal from an unprotected area of the Porto box. Indirect free-kicks, for many years, yielded a maximum of 15% of the total – during the Lisbon final brought the total for the season to 37 – a 14% increase on the previous campaign. The efficiency of corner kicks as an attacking weapon is discussed elsewhere in this report.

Crosses from the wings have remained numerically consistent on the season-by-season scoring chart and account for just over one in every six goals scored in the UEFA Champions League. Juventus scored all of their open-play goals following crosses. FC Bayern Munich, one of the most prolific suppliers of crosses in the competition, owed both their equalisers in the quarter-final against Manchester United FC to balls in from the wings. Related to the theme of crossing (many of the productive crosses were, in fact, delivered low) was the number of headed goals (including those scored from indirect free-kicks). The total of 54 was higher than in the previous season (46) but, once again, fell well short of the striking figure of 29% which had provoked media coverage during UEFA EURO 2012. Over the larger sample of the 125 games played in a UEFA Champions League season, the figure was 12.5% in 2012/13 and 15% in 2013/14.

Another noticeable variation was a 29% decrease in the productivity of long-range shooting. Long-distance strikes yielded 54 goals in the 2009/10 campaign (15% of the overall total). After a resurgence in 2012/13, the figure has dropped into line with the long-term average and still accounts for around 13% of open-play goals. During the knockout rounds, long-range shooting shared second place with crosses as the most prolific – and, frequently, the most spectacular – source of goals, with strikes by Zlatan Ibrahimović in Leverkusen and Patrice Evra in Munich among the best goals of the season.
The best goals

Open play

The challenge was to choose ten goals from the 268 scored in open play during the 125 matches of the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League season. No fewer than seven of these could be assigned to the long-range shooting category. Diego’s right-footed strike at Camp Nou provided a crucial away goal for Club Atlético de Madrid in the quarter-final against FC Barcelona, while the breathtaking shots from Patrice Evra in Munich, Yaya Touré in Plzen, Zlatan Ibrahimović in Brussels and Hulk in Dortmund were also scored for visiting teams. Hulk’s stunning strike even earned applause from the home supporters.

Of the two scored on home territory, Douglas Costa produced a wonderful shot high into the net of Real Sociedad de Fútbol from a position wide on the left of the penalty area, while Klaas-Jan Huntelaar belatedly gave the FC Schalke 04 fans something to cheer about by meeting a lofted cross from the left with a simply magnificent long-range volley into the roof of the Real Madrid CF net. The fact that his side was 6-0 down at home at the time took nothing from the brilliance of the Dutch striker’s finish.

Of the three goals that were not struck from outside the box, Diego Costa’s opener during the home match against AC Milan was selected on account of its technical excellence. The Atlético striker met a lofted cross from the right with a left-footed volley executed in a difficult posture. Neymar’s goal against Celtic FC at the Camp Nou was a technically gifted finish but was also selected because of the brilliance of the combination move which set him free in the centre of the Scottish club’s box.

Huntelaar lets fly for Zenit

Ibra’s stunning strike even earned applause from the home supporters

Zlatan Ibrahimović  Anderlecht v Paris

Patrice Evra  Bayern v Manchester United

Klaas-Jan Huntelaar  Schalke v Madrid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scorer</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Klaas-Jan Huntelaar</td>
<td>Schalke v Madrid</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>90+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Patrice Evra</td>
<td>Bayern v Manchester United</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Zlatan Ibrahimović</td>
<td>Anderlecht v Paris</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Vladimir Weiss</td>
<td>Olympiacos v Paris</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Diego Costa</td>
<td>Atlético v Milan</td>
<td>1-0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Yaya Toure</td>
<td>Porto v Manchester City</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Neymar</td>
<td>Barcelona v Celtic</td>
<td>6-0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Douglas Costa</td>
<td>Shakhtar v Real Sociedad</td>
<td>3-0</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Hulk</td>
<td>Dortmund v Zenit</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Diego</td>
<td>Barcelona v Atlético</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The challenge was to choose ten goals from the 268 scored in open play during the 125 matches of the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League season. No fewer than seven of these could be assigned to the long-range shooting category. Diego’s right-footed strike at Camp Nou provided a crucial away goal for Club Atlético de Madrid in the quarter-final against FC Barcelona, while the breathtaking shots from Patrice Evra in Munich, Yaya Touré in Plzen, Zlatan Ibrahimović in Brussels and Hulk in Dortmund were also scored for visiting teams. Hulk’s stunning strike even earned applause from the home supporters.

Of the two scored on home territory, Douglas Costa produced a wonderful shot high into the net of Real Sociedad de Fútbol from a position wide on the left of the penalty area, while Klaas-Jan Huntelaar belatedly gave the FC Schalke 04 fans something to cheer about by meeting a lofted cross from the left with a simply magnificent long-range volley into the roof of the Real Madrid CF net. The fact that his side was 6-0 down at home at the time took nothing from the brilliance of the Dutch striker’s finish.

Of the three goals that were not struck from outside the box, Diego Costa’s opener during the home match against AC Milan was selected on account of its technical excellence. The Atlético striker met a lofted cross from the right with a left-footed volley executed in a difficult posture. Neymar’s goal against Celtic FC at the Camp Nou was a technically gifted finish but was also selected because of the brilliance of the combination move which set him free in the centre of the Scottish club’s box.

Huntelaar lets fly for Zenit

Ibra’s stunning strike even earned applause from the home supporters

Zlatan Ibrahimović  Anderlecht v Paris

Patrice Evra  Bayern v Manchester United

Klaas-Jan Huntelaar  Schalke v Madrid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scorer</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Klaas-Jan Huntelaar</td>
<td>Schalke v Madrid</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>90+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Patrice Evra</td>
<td>Bayern v Manchester United</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Zlatan Ibrahimović</td>
<td>Anderlecht v Paris</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Vladimir Weiss</td>
<td>Olympiacos v Paris</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Diego Costa</td>
<td>Atlético v Milan</td>
<td>1-0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Yaya Toure</td>
<td>Porto v Manchester City</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Neymar</td>
<td>Barcelona v Celtic</td>
<td>6-0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Douglas Costa</td>
<td>Shakhtar v Real Sociedad</td>
<td>3-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Diego</td>
<td>Barcelona v Atlético</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Five goals were selected from the 94 which resulted from dead-ball situations during the 2013/14 season. Two of the five were corner kicks, both headed into the net. The header which gave Manchester United FC a momentary advantage over FC Bayern München at Old Trafford was of exceptional technical quality – Nemanja Vidić’s glance which beat Manuel Neuer being directed into the net from a difficult posture almost facing away from the goal. The other corner, it could be argued, won the title for Real Madrid CF. The delivery from the right by Luka Modrić was superbly directed by Sergio Ramos into the corner of the Club Atlético de Madrid net to force the final into extra time.

The other three were free-kicks struck directly into the net in various manners. Jens Hegeler’s last-minute strike into the top corner of the Real Sociedad de Fútbol net earned his team the three points. Cristiano Ronaldo rounded off his side’s victory in Munich by placing his free-kick firmly under the leaping members of the defensive wall. And Lorenzo Insigne doubled SSC Napoli’s advantage against Borussia Dortmund with a fierce and superbly executed right-footed shot from outside the area which cannoned high into the net off the near post.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scorer</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nemanja Vidić</td>
<td>Manchester v Bayern</td>
<td>1-0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Insigne</td>
<td>Napoli v Dortmund</td>
<td>2-0</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergio Ramos</td>
<td>Madrid v Atlético</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>90+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristiano Ronaldo</td>
<td>Bayern v Madrid</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jens Hegeler</td>
<td>Leverkusen v Real Sociedad</td>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>90+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Benfica came from behind to earn seven of their ten points.

The importance of scoring first

Real Madrid CF’s from-the-brink comeback in the Lisbon final was one of the rare exceptions in a season when the team scoring the first goal became, for yet another year, the odds-on favourite to emerge as the victor. No fewer than 74% of the games which produced goals were won by the team scoring first. This statistic sets a UEFA Champions League record, beating the 72% success rate for sides scoring first in the 2004/05 and 2010/11 seasons. In the 2008/09 campaign only 56.8% of matches were won by the team that broke the deadlock but, since then, the percentage has steadily increased.

The total of 23 draws in 2013/14 represents a downturn in relation to 27 in 2012/13 and 31 in 2011/12. It is a return to the figure recorded in 2010/11. Groups D and F did not produce a draw, while just five of the 29 knockout fixtures ended in stalemate. The season produced six goalless draws – the only one in the knockout rounds being the semi-final first leg between Club Atlético de Madrid and Chelsea FC. It means that, on 17 occasions, the team conceding an opening goal fought back to draw, but just 14 of the 119 games which contained goals finished in victory for the side going 1-0 down.

Three teams (SL Benfica, Manchester City FC and Atlético Madrid) came back more than once, though the latter suffered the reverse process in the Lisbon final. The debating point is why the success rate is so low when it comes to fighting back. In the return leg of their quarter-final, for example, FC Barcelona went 1-0 down to Atlético after only five minutes and failed to find a reply in the remaining 85. On just seven occasions 1-0 went up on the scoreboard in the last quarter-hour, when there was little time to mount a comeback. In almost one-third of the games which featured goals, the first hit the net in the opening 15 minutes and, in 56% of the total, the deadlock was broken during the opening half-hour. The question is therefore why, with so much time to react, so few sides manage to.

In search of explanations, Sir Alex Ferguson points to the steady trend towards possession play and an increasingly accurate passing game. “Teams now have the ability to keep the ball for long periods, which makes it more difficult for teams who are chasing goals,” he said. Manuel Pellegrini regards the statistic as “something very logical. When you start a game, you’re playing against your opponent. When you are losing a game, you are playing against the opposition, the clock and the scoreboard.”

Arsène Wenger adds: “If you are losing, you are obliged to take the initiative and therefore have an even greater chance of losing.” Is it logical that the first goal should have such great importance?

74% of games that produced a goal were won by the team scoring first – a UEFA Champions League record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WINS</th>
<th>DRAWS</th>
<th>DEFEATS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Result of the team scoring first

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comeback kings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andorliicht</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benfica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plzeň</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
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<td>Napoli</td>
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<td>Porto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria Wien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Madrid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Teams in bold recovered from going a goal down to win
The average UEFA Champions League match generated more attempts than any other team, and 64% of their finishing was accurately placed between the posts. Barca were marginally better, with two out of three attempts obliging the goalkeeper to react. Overall, 91% of this season’s goal attempts were on target. Among the 32 contestants, Porto were alone in delivering more off-target than accurate finishes (57 to 51). In terms of the average number of goal attempts generated per match, four of the clubs in the bottom ten nonetheless reached the knockout stage of the competition, and Arsenal FC occupy bottom place in the table for the second successive season. On the other hand, three of the top ten failed to pass the cut in spite of healthy quantities of goal attempts, with Real Sociedad de Fútbol scoring only once from their 80 strikes at goal.

### Real Madrid converted one in five of their chances.

Silver-medallists Atlético Madrid’s conversion rate was 1 in 6.69; FC Barcelona’s was 1 in 6.86; Chelsea FC’s 1 in 7.58, and FC Bayern München’s was 1 in 7.58; and FC Porto’s was 1 in 9.54 – but they did not average the UEFA Champions League match. However, the averages conceal radical differences in the efficiency of finishing. FC Porto’s success rate was one goal for every eight shots at goal.

### Attempts on goal

The average UEFA Champions League match offered spectators 25.92 goal attempts and, on average, they saw one goal per 8.64 attempts to score.

### Crossing

For the second successive season, a Portuguese club topped the chart in terms of the average number of crosses per game. In both cases, the club was eliminated at the group stage. The most salient feature, however, is that whereas SL Benfica topped the 2012/13 table with 20.83 crosses per match, no fewer than seven teams exceeded that figure during the 2013/14 season. Success rates, calculated on the basis of the cross reaching a team-mate, were headed by Manchester City FC’s 39%, which gave them a narrow advantage over the two Portuguese contestants, but there was a general upward trend in success. In 2012/13, ten of the 32 participants registered averages below 20%, with CFR 1907 Cluj finding team-mates with only two of every 25 crosses. As the table reveals, only two clubs – SSC Napoli and FC Basel 1895 – fell below the one-in-five ratio during the 2013/14 season.

### In some cases, the figures could arguably suggest adjustments to playing styles.

José Mourinho’s Chelsea FC delivered substantially fewer crosses per game (13.08) in comparison with the previous season (18.67) while FC Barcelona, under Gerardo Martino, practically doubled their delivery of crosses (from 11 per match to 21). FC Bayern München, with Pep Guardiola taking the baton from Jupp Heynckes, also registered a substantial increase (from 16.77 to 28.83).
ANALYSIS

Talking points

The trend for foreign strikers, long-range shooting and an increase in goals from corners are up for debate

Pedro Rodríguez or the Bayern wingers as strikers? Is it realistic to class any of the Barça front men as ‘strikers’? A scrutiny of squad lists reveals a high number of middle-to-front players who could just as easily be labelled midfielders as forwards – and very few attackers who operate as genuine target men.

The undisputable fact is that, in the attacking departments of the top clubs, native players generally had marginal roles and minimal presence. Among the German clubs, Bayer 04 Leverkusen were alone in fielding a home-grown striker (Stefan Kiessling) whereas, at other clubs, German players tended to be fielded in supporting middle-to-front roles.

Among the English clubs, Danny Welbeck is the only genuine candidate for a ‘striker’ label. This tendency has come to the fore at a time when the trend towards a 4-2-3-1 team structure is becoming a regular feature at UEFA’s age-limit tournaments, meaning that the lone striker has become a common sight. The debate point raised in last season’s report therefore has continued relevance in terms of the UEFA Champions League star performers of the future. Is European football developing a sufficient number of strikers to guarantee a supply of ‘predators’? Or is the modern-day coach being pushed towards a striker-less formation simply because there is a shortage of strikers?

The language of goals

There is strong evidence to suggest that world and European titles in national team football exercise an influence on the world’s prime club competition. On the back of a unique hat-trick for La Roja, Spanish players were the most numerous contingent, with 86 in the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League. They ended a period of domination by the French, triggered by their titles in 1998 and 2000, who this season supplied only 45. Brazilians, who peaked at 96 in the 2007/08 season, accounted for 54, with Argentina supplying exactly half that number.

The question is not so much about numbers, however, as the roles they play. “If you look at the top strikers, most of them are South American. In Europe we’re not producing many real strikers.” The words were spoken by Arsène Wenger at the UEFA Elite Club Coaches Forum at the beginning of the season. He could be contradicted by Club Atlético de Madrid who, in the final, fielded Adrián López, David Villa and, briefly, Brazilian-born Diego Costa who now travels with a Spanish passport. But it could be pointed out that Adrián (554 minutes) and Villa (454) played less than half of Atlético’s campaign. At the other end of the pitch in Lisbon, Álvaro Morata made a brief appearance for Real Madrid CF to bring his total for the season to 173 minutes. Team sheets speak volumes. Attacking duties at the top eight clubs relied heavily on imported talent.

Digging deeper into the last 16 reveals more of the same: Edin Džeko, Sergio Agüero, Álvaro Negredo and Jesús Navas at Manchester City FC, Hulk, José Rondón and Danny at FC Zenit, Adán Szalai and Klaas-Jan Huntelaar at FC Schalke 04, Michael Olaïtan and Nelson Váidez at Olympiacos FC, Olivier Grouot at Arsenal FC, where Theo Walcott played only 93 minutes…

There are also shades of meaning. Although they are undoubtedly attacking players, is it legitimate to describe Wayne Rooney, Karim Benzema (FRA), Cristiano Ronaldo (POR), Gareth Bale (WAL), Álvaro Morata (ESP)

Atlético Madrid

Diego Costa (ESP), David Villa (ESP), Adrián López (ESP)

Bayern

Mario Mandzukic (CRO), Arjen Robben (NED), Franck Ribéry (FRA), Xherdan Shaqiri (SUI)

Chelsea

Fernando Torres (ESP), Samuel Eto’o (CMR), Demba Ba (SEN)

Dortmund

Robert Lewandowski (POL), Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang (GAB)

Paris

Zlatan Ibrahimovic (SWE), Ezequiel Lavezzi (ARG), Edinson Cavani (URU)

Manchester United

Robin van Persie (NED), Javier Hernández (MEX), Danny Welbeck (ENG), Wayne Rooney (ENG)

Barcelona

Lionel Messi (ARG), Neymar (BRA), Alexis Sánchez (CHI), Pedro Rodríguez (ESP)

Striker nationalities at quarter-final clubs

The trend for foreign strikers, long-range shooting and an increase in goals from corners are up for debate

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Distance covered

For the second successive season, Jürgen Klopp’s Borussia Dortmund covered more ground than any other UEFA Champions League participant, peaking at a team total of 1,26,34km in the 3-0 victory over Olympique de Marseille in the German club’s first home fixture of the season. This was also the match in which Dortmund hit their highest number of long passes and, by far, the lowest number of shots on target. During the quarter-final against Real Madrid CF, for example, the team played three times as many short passes.

The four German clubs featured among the top dozen in terms of distance covered, with FC Bayern München slipping past Dortmund for much of the season, only to bring their average down by covering just 112.66km during the home leg of their semi-final against Madrid – the Bavarian club’s lowest tally of the campaign. It is noticeable that the other six quarter-finalists are in the bottom half of the table.

Another salient feature is that no fewer than 13 of the 17 teams which covered the greatest distances per match were eliminated during the group stage, and that the difference between first and last in the table is significant: the average distance covered by Dortmund players over the season was 16% greater than the figure for AC Milan.

Individual statistics are not easily calibrated, as the data generally available refer to cumulative distances over the entire season – which evidently favours players from the two teams that contested the final. More reliable comparisons can only be made on the basis of distances per minute played. The table is based on sampling rather than an exhaustive analysis of the 600-plus players who competed in the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League. The key players from Bayern and Dortmund form the nucleus of the top ‘runners’ in the competition, with the two Bayern wingers invading a list otherwise dominated by mid-field to front players or, in the case of Xabi Alonso, Xavi Hernández and Andrea Pirlo, organizers operating in the pivotal area in front of the back four. For the sake of comparison, the top of the table highlights the figures registered by forwards who made a significant impact on the competition. The diversity of attacking styles is illustrated by Thomas Müller and Robert Lewandowski covering, respectively, 52% and 56% more ground than Lionel Messi.

The table excludes matches when teams played 30 minutes or more with ten players – a factor which evidently distorted the team total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player Club</th>
<th>Average*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henrikh Mkhitaryan</td>
<td>136.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Müller</td>
<td>136.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koke</td>
<td>136.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Großkreutz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xabi Alonso</td>
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<tr>
<td>Franck Ribéry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xavi Hernández</td>
<td>132.34</td>
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<td>Andrea Pirlo</td>
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<td>Ramires</td>
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<td>Paul Pogba</td>
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<td>David Alaba</td>
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<td>Raúl García</td>
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<td>Toni Kroos</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Luka Modrić</td>
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<td>Diego Costa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zlatan Ibrahimović</td>
<td>95.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionel Messi</td>
<td>89.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Metres covered per minute played

STATISTICS

Distance in metres per match

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Club</th>
<th>Distance in metres</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dortmund</td>
<td>121,918</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aya</td>
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<td>Ermes</td>
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<td>Austria Wien</td>
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<td>Pisa</td>
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<td>Milan</td>
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<td>Steaua</td>
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<td>Schalke</td>
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The table excludes matches when teams played 30 minutes or more with ten players – a factor which evidently distorted the team total.
Approaching the goal

How efficiently does a team translate approach work into scoring chances? Statistically, the number of deliveries or solo runs into the opposition’s penalty area could be presented as evidence – and here, FC Bayern München more than doubled the average for the 2013/14 season of 14.1 incursions into the box per game. However, the average over the campaign provides only minimal orientation bearing in mind that most of the participants showed disconcerting inconsistencies during the course of the season – none more so than FC Viktoria Plzeň, who played their way into the penalty area 38 times during the 2-1 home win against PFC CSKA Moskva but failed to progress that far into enemy territory at all when taking on Bayern in Munich. Pep Guardiola’s side registered the highest maximum (50 in that match against Plzeň) and the highest minimum (18 at home to Manchester City FC). The other beaten semi-finalist, Chelsea FC, twice failed to record double figures during the group stage and reached the Club Atlético de Madrid area only four times during the fixture in Madrid. Atlético registered their minimum at Camp Nou during the first leg of the quarter-final, while city rivals Real entered the Borussia Dortmund box only five times in their away leg and penetrated the Bayern penalty area only 15 times during the two legs of the semi-final. Olympique de Marseille recorded a single entry in Dortmund, while FK Austria Wien could claim maximum efficiency by drawing 1-1 in Porto, where they also entered the penalty area only once.

Deliveries or solo runs into the opponents’ box

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Arturo Vidal scored five times for an offensive-minded Juventus
Discipline

Free-kicks

During the 2013/14 season, the average UEFA Champions League fixture was punctuated by a few decimal points below 28 free kicks (27.58 to be precise). The overall total increased slightly season on season from 3,413 infractions to 3,448 – in other words, by just 1%. The technical report on the 2010/11 season remarked that, for the first time, none of the 32 teams had exceeded 20 fouls per game and that the average number of fouls had dropped below 30. This trend was continued, with up to 32 teams comfortably below the 95 mark. It was noticeable that 10 of the 16 teams in the top half of the “fouls committed” table were eliminated during the group stage. Once again, the trend towards defending from the front meant that forwards, midfielders and goalkeepers were among the most penalised, including, to cite random examples among the leaders, Edin Hazard, Mario Balotelli, Neymar, Ezequiel Lavezzi, Robert Lewandowski, Olivier Giroud, Giorgios Samaras and Frank Ribéry, alongside midfielders such as Axel Witsel, Marco Veratti, Fernando, Gabi, Ramires and Raúl García.

Yellow and red cards

Even though the number of infractions was marginally higher, caution by referees registered a downturn of just over 4%, despite a Lisbon final which yielded a dozen yellow cards. The season’s total fell from 548 in 2012/13 to 525 at an average of 4.2 per match. One in every 6.57 fouls was considered a bookable offence. In terms of individual clubs, four had exceeded an average of three cautions per game during the 2012/13 season. During the 2013/14 season the team that reached this mark was RSC Anderlecht, who accounted for four of the season’s 27 dismissals. Twelve clubs recorded averages lower than two yellow cards per game, compared with 10 in the previous season. There was an even split between groups stage fixtures and teams who reached the knockout round. One player, Real Madrid CF’s screening midfielder Kaka, who was ruled out of the final as a result of receiving his third caution of the season during the return leg of the semi-final in Munich. The number of dismissals registered a significant uptake of 35% – the highest total since the 2009/10 season. Direct red cards accounted for more early showers than yellow/red dismissals, with 93 red cards being raised on 13 and 11 occasions respectively. The six matches involving FK Austria Wien yielded a harvest of only 11 offside decisions.

In individual terms, Italian players who used to occupy pole position season after season in the offside lists, have now left the stage. And gone are the days when, for example, the technical report could remark that Arsenal FC striker Emmanuel Adebayor had been flagged 26 times in a single season. In 2013/14, the assistant referees’ best friend was another Arsenal striker, Olivier Giroud, yet he was flagged only 14 times during his 635 minutes on the field of play. Olympiacos forward Kostas Mitroglou was caught offside 11 times in 450 minutes – the same number, but not the same frequency, as Cristiano Ronaldo, whose 11 offsides were spread over 993 minutes. Anderlecht striker Aleksandar Mitrović was flagged nine times during his side’s six group games. The debating points raised by the sharp downturn in offside decisions focus on whether this is due to players’ increased awareness – and discipline – in positional terms, coupled with questions about whether the flagging offside statistics can be related to deeper defending. An interlocking factor is the practice by assistant referees of not raising the flag if the player is deemed to conform with today’s ‘not interfering with play’ criteria. Eighteen of the 32 teams caught their opponents offside more frequently than they were flagged themselves, with Olympique de Marseille and FC København providing the most striking examples, while Club Atlético de Madrid’s transitions into deep defending were reflected by their opponents straying into offside positions only once every two games.

Although FC Porto created openings for 109 goal attempts during their six group games, the Portuguese club’s players were flagged offside only on three occasions. The graphic (right) gives average figures, club by club, for being caught offside and for catching opponents offside. The technical report could remark that Arsenal FC striker in a single season. In 2013/14, the assistant referees’ best friend was another Arsenal striker, Olivier Giroud, yet he was flagged only 14 times during his 635 minutes on the field of play. Olympiacos forward Kostas Mitroglou was caught offside 11 times in 450 minutes – the same number, but not the same frequency, as Cristiano Ronaldo, whose 11 offsides were spread over 993 minutes. Anderlecht striker Aleksandar Mitrović was flagged nine times during his side’s six group games. The debating points raised by the sharp downturn in offside decisions focus on whether this is due to players’ increased awareness – and discipline – in positional terms, coupled with questions about whether the flagging offside statistics can be related to deeper defending. An interlocking factor is the practice by assistant referees of not raising the flag if the player is deemed to conform with today’s ‘not interfering with play’ criteria. Eighteen of the 32 teams caught their opponents offside more frequently than they were flagged themselves, with Olympique de Marseille and FC København providing the most striking examples, while Club Atlético de Madrid’s transitions into deep defending were reflected by their opponents straying into offside positions only once every two games. Although FC Porto created openings for 109 goal attempts during their six group games, the Portuguese club’s players were flagged offside only on three occasions. The graphic (right) gives average figures, club by club, for being caught offside and for catching opponents offside. The technical report could remark that Arsenal FC striker...
TECHNICAL TEAM SELECTION

All-star squad

Selecting a squad of 18 players who had made an impact on the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League was among the challenges facing a team of coaches led by Sir Alex Ferguson when they met in Lisbon on the morning after the final. In recent seasons, there had been up to 23 players in the squad. But this season, the decision was to imitate the UEFA Champions League coaches and to impose a limit of 18 names on the team sheet.

The selection features 11 players from the two finalists, with Club Atlético de Madrid, in the final for the first time, supplying one player in each line. A notable departure from recent traditions is that Lionel Messi was not selected. Seven players from the previous season’s squad were named once again: Manuel Neuer, Philipp Lahm, Sergio Ramos, Andrés Iniesta (the only FC Barcelona player on the list for the 2013/14 season), Arjen Robben, Zlatan Ibrahimović and Cristiano Ronaldo. The defensive line comprises three central defenders and two full-backs, although Lahm permuted his place in the back four with a holding role in midfield. Four of the six midfielders operated in central roles, with Ángel Di María and Iniesta playing wide on the left. The five attackers include two central strikers and three who started in wide positions.

Goalkeepers

Thibaut Courtois
Manuel Neuer
Sergio Ramos

Defenders

Daniel Carvajal
Diego Godín

Midfielders

Ángel Di María
Gabri
Andrés Iniesta
Toni Kroos
Marco Reus
Arjen Robben

Attackers

Diego Costa
Zlatan Ibrahimović
Sergio Ramos

0
Goals conceded by Madrid in the semi-final against Bayern, who had previously scored in 15 successive UEFA Champions League games

47
Attempts on target by Cristiano Ronaldo, 17 more than second-placed Arjen Robben
## Results

### SEASON OVERVIEW

**GROUP STAGE**

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### PLAY-OFFS – LEAGUE PATH

#### PLAY-OFFS – LEAGUE PATH

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### PLAY-OFFS – CHAMPIONS PATH

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The last 16

At the UEFA Elite Club Coaches Forum in Nyon prior to the start of the 2013/14 season, Arsène Wenger commented, “Waving your group is important, as you get to play the second leg at home. Whether or not that is a real advantage is unknown. But you feel you have done the job well if you finish at the top of the group.” Sir Alex Ferguson added: “Some years ago, a change in counterattacking methods in terms of the use of quick combinations and collective build-ups based on neat, assured combination play was the key to their success.”

Further discussion of their views was promoted by events when the top 16 teams kicked off the knockout stage of the competition in February. The first legs produced six away wins which all but settled the ties, with the group runners-up – the home teams – scoring six goals and conceding 20. Only two English clubs required the home advantage factor in order to progress, with Chelsea FC winning at Stamford Bridge after drawing in Istanbul, while Manchester United FC rebounded from a 2–0 defeat in Athens to edge past Olympiacos FC by scoring three unanswered goals at Old Trafford.

Once the ‘pure’ draws came into play as from the quarter-final stage, ties gained in intensity and home advantage carried greater specific gravity. Indeed, there were no away victories in the quarter-finals. On the other hand, the outcomes of the semi-finals were decided by the second-leg wins for the two Madrid clubs in Munich and in London. In terms of playing styles, the most illustrious standard-bearers for possession-based football – FC Bayern München and FC Barcelona – were both eliminated by opponents who attached lesser importance to their share of the ball.

KEY FEATURES

- 4–2–3–1 with rapid transitions to 4–5–1 defending
- Strong, experienced defenders: Mertesacker, Vermaelen, Koscielny
- Build-ups based on neat, assured combination play
- Modification of possession-based football – FC Bayern München and FC Barcelona
- Compact defending; rapid defence-to-attack transitions
- High levels of technique, Rosický excel in dribbling, passing
- Excellent team spirit and work ethic
- Dangerous set plays delivered by Özil, Cazorla, Rosický

TEAM SHAPE

COACH

Arsène Wenger
Born: 21/10/1949,
Stuttgart (FRG)
Nationality: French
Manager of
Arsenal since 2004
UEFA Champions League: 15%
Head coach from
20/09/1996

TEAM PROFILES

ARSENAL FC

England
# CLUB ATLÉTICO DE MADRID

**Spain**

**STATISTICS**

**PLAYERS USED** 24

**GOALS SCORED** 26

**GOAL ATTEMPTS** 176 (104 on target) = 13.5 % per game

**TIME SCORED**

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**TIME OUTS**

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**SUBSTITUTIONS** 35/59

**AVERAGES**

**POSSESSION** 45.9 %

**PASSES ATTEMPTED** 1155

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED** 1 521 208 meters

**PASSING ACCURACY** 89.4%

**PERIODS**

- **Long**
  - 71 (14% of total)

- **Medium**
  - 244 (49.2%)

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**TEAM SHAPE**

**COACH**

Diego Simone

**KEY FEATURES**

- **4-4-2 with two screening midfielders**
- **High-energy football based on fast, vertical combination moves**
- **Exceptional commitment, spirit, work ethic, high level of technique**
- **Quick transitions in both directions, occasional intense high pressure**
- **Compact, incontestable midfield play, Mario, Gabi, Thiago, Koke, Arda, Guti**
- **Aggressive, ambitious upfield runs by full-backs, especially Juanfran on-target**
- **Very quick transitions in both directions, occasional intense high pressure**
- **Compact, incontestable midfield play, Mario, Gabi, Thiago, Koke, Arda, Guti**
- **Aggressive, ambitious upfield runs by full-backs, especially Juanfran on-target**

**TEAM PROFILES**

**COACH**

Gerardo Martino

**KEY FEATURES**

- **4-3-3 with single screening midfielder (usually Busquets)**
- **Stoner less formation; Messi a decisive midfield playmaker**
- **Excellent short-passing game, high-tempo build-up circulation**
- **Players (Iniesta, Neymar, Messi) a slow starters**
- **uncios set plays with centre-backs providing aerial power**
- **Good use of width with both full-backs attacking constantly**
- **Patient build-up by skillful players who want the ball, Xavi the leader**
- **Set plays not ‘launched’; emphasis on short corners, quick free-kicks**
- **Influential experienced spine; Piqué, Busquets, Xavi, Messi**
- **Excellent passing, well-placed crosses from wide areas**

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# FC BARCELONA

**Spain**

**STATISTICS**

**PLAYERS USED** 24

**GOALS SCORED** 21

**GOAL ATTEMPTS** 114 (94 on target) = 12.6 % per game

**TIME SCORED**

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**TIME OUTS**

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**SUBSTITUTIONS** 25/59

**AVERAGES**

**POSSESSION** 63.7%

**PASSES ATTEMPTED** 1 017

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED** 10 927 313 meters

**PASSING ACCURACY** 86.9%

**PERIODS**

- **Long**
  - 58 (8% of total)

- **Medium**
  - 502 (71.6%)

- **Short**
  - 253 (37.1%)

**TEAM SHAPE**

**COACH**

Javier Aguirre

**TEAM PROFILES**

---

54

2013/14 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT

55
**FC BAYERN MÜNCHEN**

**Germany**

**STATISTICS**

**PLAYERS USED**

22

**GOALS SCORED**

24

**GOAL ATTEMPTS**

210 (134 on target) = 19 (2.14) per game

**TIME SCORED**

90+

**SUBSTITUTIONS**

3 (2:33) (non-goal scorers/
substitutes)

**AVERAGES**

**POSSESSION (%)**

65%

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**

2181

**PASSING ACCURACY (%)**

83%

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

111,736 meters

**TEAM SHAPE**

1-15 16-30 31-45 Half-time 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

**TEAM FORMATION**

1-15 16-30 31-45 45+ 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

**TEAM COVERAGE**

Max. 73% v Arsenal (a)

**TIME SCORED**

90+

**POSSSESSION (%)**

53%

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**

2390

**PASSING ACCURACY (%)**

984

**TEAM DISTANCE COVERED**

111,421 meters

**TEAM SHAPE**

1-15 16-30 31-45 Half-time 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

**TEAM FORMATION**

1-15 16-30 31-45 45+ 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

**TEAM COVERAGE**

Max. 88% v Plzen (h)

**TEAM PROFILES**

**COACH**

Josef Guardiola

**Country**

Germany

**Born**

18 March 1971

**Nationality**

Spanish

**Manager**

UEFA Champions League 6

**Head coach from**

24/03/2013

**KEY FEATURES**

- 4-2-3-1 with compact 4-5-1 defending
- Strong goalscorers
- Dangerous set plays
- Exploiting aerial power of defenders
- Experimental system

**COACH**

José Mourinho

**Country**

Portugal

**Born**

26/01/1963

**Nationality**

Portuguese

**Manager**

UEFA Champions League 12

**Head coach from**

03/08/2013

**KEY FEATURES**

- 4-2-3-1 with compact 4-5-1 defending
- Disciplined team play based on strong work ethic, collective spirit
- Dangerous set plays
- Exploiting aerial power of defenders
- Composure on the ball, experience, mental strength, winning mentality
Borussia Dortmund

**Statistics**

**Players Used**

23

**Goals Scored**

18

**Goal Attempts**

141 (87 on target) = 141 (8.7) per game

**Time Scored**

1-15: 0
16-30: 0
31-45: 0
45+: 0

**Substitutions**

28/30 (2 double substitutions)

**Averages**

Min: 13
Max: 70

**Possession**

0%

**Passes Attempted**

562

**Passing Accuracy**

71%

**Goals Conceded**

9

**Goals Conceded per Game**

9

**Passes Per Game**

37 (13 of total)

**Passes Per Match**

327 (38%)

**Team Shape**

2

**Coaching**

Jürgen Klopp

Born: 16/09/1967, Stuttgart (GER)

Nationality: German

Matches in UEFA Champions League: 24

Head coach from: 01/07/2008

**Key Features**

- **German** based on speed, aggressive running, off-the-ball movement.
- Good links between lines, high defence with keeper covering behind.
- Rapid defence-to-attack transitions; dangerous counters on numbers.
- Good use of width with wingers cutting in to attack goal.
- Intense pressure on ball carrier in midfield and attacking third.
- Dangerous free kicks by Reus, with direct supply to front.
- High level of individual technique, 1-2-1 skills, athletic qualities.
- Strong team spirit, work ethic, mental resilience.

**Galatasaray AŞ**

Turkey

**Statistics**

**Players Used**

23

**Goals Scored**

9

**Goal Attempts**

78 (41 on target) = 9 (8.5) per game

**Time Scored**

1-15: 0
16-30: 0
31-45: 0
45+: 0

**Substitutions**

25/24

**Averages**

Min: 14
Max: 60

**Possession**

52%

**Passes Attempted**

656

**Passing Accuracy**

74%

**Goals Conceded**

9

**Goals Conceded per Game**

9

**Passes Per Game**

86 (15 of total)

**Team Shape**

3

**Coaching**

Roberto Mancini

Born: 27/11/1966, Bari (ITA)

Nationality: Italian

Matches in UEFA Champions League: 6

Head coach from: 10/09/2015

**Key Features**

- **High** levels of individual technique.
- Dangerous set plays based in adverse situations.
- Frequent use of direct supply from keeper to strikers.
- Adventurous full-backs, especially on right.
- Excellent team spirit, resilience in adverse situations.

**Profiles**

- **Goalkeepers**
  - Dortmund: Roman Weidenfeller
  - Galatasaray: Fernando Muslera

- **Defenders**
  - Dortmund: Julian Schieber
  - Galatasaray: Guillermo Burdisso

- **Midfielders**
  - Dortmund: Marco Reus
  - Galatasaray: Selçuk İnan

- **Forwards**
  - Dortmund: Robert Lewandowski
  - Galatasaray: Didier Drogba
### Germany

**Key Features**
- Classic 4-3-3 with swift transitions to 4-5-1 defending
- High pressing in possession to disturb opponents’ build-up
- Compact, narrow back four ready to hold tight defensive line
- Quick counterattacks mostly led by Sam, Castro

#### Bayer 04 Leverkusen

#### Manchester City FC

#### Statistics

**Players Used**

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**Goalkeepers**
- Bernd Leno
- Ariadna Palop
- Niklas Lomb

**Defenders**
- Philipp Wollscheid
- Maximilian Wagener
- Stefan Kiessling
- Gaël Clichy

**Midfielders**
- Stefan Reinartz
- Timo Horn
- mamm

**Forwards**
- Stefan Kiessling
- Dedryck Boyata

**Coaches**
- Manuel Pellegrini
- Santiago (CHI)

**Statistics**

- **Players Used**: 22
- **Goals Scored**: 10

### England

#### Manchester City FC

#### Statistics

**Players Used**

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**Goalkeepers**
- Joe Hart
- Emyr Huws
- Pablo Zabaleta

**Defenders**
- Vincent Kompany
- Aleksandar Kolarov
- Joleon Lescott

**Midfielders**
- James Milner
- Stevan Jovetić
- Pablo Zabaleta

**Forwards**
- Edin Džeko
- Álvaro Negredo
- Samir Nasri

**Coaches**
- Manuel Pellegrini
- Santiago (CHI)

**Statistics**

- **Players Used**: 21
- **Goals Scored**: 19

### Key Features

- **4-4-1-4 formation, more clearly**
- **4-3-3 away from home**
- **Rapid transition from deep, compact defensive block**
- **Disciplined hard-working defending; intense pressing from halfway line**
- **Effective double-cover defending; pre-empting penetration in wide areas**
- **Mixed attacking: short passing from back, direct supply to front**
- **Effective full-backs pushing forward and delivering crosses**
- **Powerful, attacking team; Company, Terero, Diédouh the strong spine**
- **Dangerous inverting or outswinging set plays aimed at big men in box**
- **Silva the creative midfield playmaker behind Agüero and Diédouh**
- **Quick, powerful counterers; good game-opening diagonal passes**

**Coaches**
- Manuel Pellegrini
- Santiago (CHI)

**Statistics**

- **Players Used**: 546
- **Goals Scored**: 546

**Averages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Passes Attempted</th>
<th>Passing Accuracy</th>
<th>Team Shape</th>
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<td>BAY</td>
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<td>72% v Man Utd</td>
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<td>MAN</td>
<td>1,113 v CSKA</td>
<td>73% v CSKA</td>
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**Team Profiles**

- **Team Shape**: 4-4-1-4
- **Team Proximity**: Close proximity
- **Team Interactions**: High level of interaction

**Team Analysis**

- **Key Features**: Swift transitions, compact defending, disciplined pressing
- **Team Dynamics**: Strong midfield, effective attacking transitions

---

**Goals Attempted**

- **64% v Man Utd**: 45% v Man Utd
- **80% v CSKA**: 45% v CSKA

---

**Passing Accuracy**

- **74% v CSKA**: 45% v CSKA
- **73% v Man Utd**: 45% v Man Utd

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2013/14 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT

KEY FEATURES

- **MANCHESTER UNITED FC**
  - **Attackers**
  - Rapid, direct attacks with pace and power.
  - Strong, effective play from wide channels.
  - Sharp finishing from crosses and set pieces.
  - Compact, disciplined deep defence with gegenpressing.
  - Strong, resolute midfield play with energy and composure.

- **Defenders**
  - Compact, disciplined in possession.
  - Effective pressing and denial of space.
  - Rapid, direct counterattacks with pace and power.

- **Midfielders**
  - Compact, disciplined in possession.
  - Effective pressing and denial of space.
  - Rapid, direct counterattacks with pace and power.

- **AC MILAN**
  - **Attackers**
  - Rapid, direct attacks with pace and power.
  - Strong, effective play from wide channels.
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COACHES

- **MANCHESTER UNITED FC**
  - David Moyes
  - **AC MILAN**
  - Massimiliano Allegri

TEAM PROFILES

AC MILAN

- **Players Used**
  - 29
- **Goals Scored**
  - 9

MANCHESTER UNITED FC

- **Players Used**
  - 23
- **Goals Scored**
  - 17

PROFILES

- **Manchester United FC**
  - Born: 25/06/1986
  - Nationality: British

- **AC Milan**
  - Born: 13/01/1987
  - Nationality: Italian

MATCHES

- **Manchester United FC**
  - Champions League: 9
  - European Cup: 4
  - Europa League: 1

- **AC Milan**
  - Champions League: 12
  - Europa League: 2

STATISTICS

- **Manchester United FC**
  - PASSES PER GAME:
    - Min. 110,395 v Bayern (a)
    - Max. 114,310 v Shakhtar (h)
  - TEAM DISTANCE COVERED:
    - 112,323 metres
  - POSSESSION:
    - 48%
  - PASSING ACCURACY:
    - Max. 709 v Olympiacos (a)
  - GOALS SCORED:
    - 15
  - PLAYERS USED:
    - 32

- **AC Milan**
  - PASSES PER GAME:
    - Min. 62% v Ajax (h)
    - Max. 654 v Atlético (a)
  - TEAM DISTANCE COVERED:
    - 103,121 metres
  - POSSESSION:
    - 45%
  - PASSING ACCURACY:
    - Max. 56% v Leverkusen (h)
  - GOALS SCORED:
    - 7
  - PLAYERS USED:
    - 29

TEAM SHAPE

- **Manchester United FC**
  - 4-2-3-1

- **AC Milan**
  - 4-4-2

TEAM PROFILES

- **Manchester United FC**
  - Born: 01/04/1976
  - Nationality: Dutch

- **AC Milan**
  - Born: 11/08/1967
  - Nationality: British

HISTORY

- **Manchester United FC**
  - Champions League: 9
  - European Cup: 4

- **AC Milan**
  - Champions League: 12
  - Europa League: 2

BIOGRAPHY

- **Manchester United FC**
  - Born: 01/04/1976
  - Nationality: Dutch

- **AC Milan**
  - Born: 11/08/1967
  - Nationality: British
OLYMPIACOS FC

Greece

PLAYERS USED

23

GOALS SCORED

12

TIME SCORED

1-15 16-30 31-45 Half-time 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

Minutes

Goals

1-15 16-30 31-45 Half-time 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

Minutes

Substitutions

24/24

TEAM SHAPE

AVERAGES

PASSING ACCURACY 70%

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 100.457 metres

PASSES PER GAME

Long

7h 17h (of total)

Short

2h 3h (38%)

TOTAL STATISTICS

GOALS SCORED

PLAYERS USED

KEY FEATURES

- 3-3-1-1 transforming into 4-3-3 attacking formation
- Compact, deep defensive block; pressing mainly in the 1st third
- Occasional high pressure; emphasis on fast attack; defensive transitions
- Patient build-up play back to front passing movements
- Looked for chances to make quick, well-executed counterattacks
- Effective use of wide areas; accurate crosses and cut-backs
- Willing to shoot from long range
- Dominating the playmaker; good technique under pressure; accurate, incisive passes
- Manolis the leader in back four; good positioning, decisive interventions
- NDiaye the hardworking midfield enforcer; Manolis the more attacking partner

COACH

Míchel

Born: 23/05/1963, Madrid (ESP)
Nationality: Spanish
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 1
Head coach from: 01/02/2013

PARIS SAINT-GERMAIN

France

PLAYERS USED

21

GOALS SCORED

25

TIME SCORED

1-15 16-30 31-45 Half-time 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

Minutes

Substitutions

28/30

TEAM SHAPE

AVERAGES

PASSING ACCURACY 84%

TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 106.053 metres

PASSES PER GAME

Long

7h 14h (of total)

Medium

2h 6h (16%)

TOTAL STATISTICS

GOALS SCORED

PLAYERS USED

KEY FEATURES

- 4-3-3 with single striking midfielder
- Compact unit; good links, movement between lines
- Emphasis on building from centre-back, playing through midfield
- Composed combination play based on individual technique
- Full-backs supporting attacks; Luizvini, Cavani cutting in from wide
- Ibrahimovic the creative, unpredictable focal point of attacking play
- Midfield trio (Motta the pivot) combining width, shutting down spaces
- High defensive line led by Ibrahimovic, keeper covering space behind him
- Intense pressure on ball carrier
- High defensive line led by Thiago Silva; keeper covering space behind him
- Full-backs supporting attacks; Luizvini, Cavani cutting in from wide
- Ibrahimovic the creative, unpredictable focal point of attacking play
- Midfield trio (Motta the pivot) combining width, shutting down spaces
- High defensive line led by Ibrahimovic, keeper covering space behind him
- Intense pressure on ball carrier

COACH

Laurent Blanc

Born: 17/11/1965, Alès (FRA)
Nationality: French
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 24
Head coach from: 25/06/2013
## REAL MADRID CF

**Spain**

### TEAM SHAPE

**FORWARDS**
- Cristiano Ronaldo
- Gonzalo Higuaín
- James Rodríguez
- Álvaro Morata

**MIDFIELDERS**
- Toni Kroos
- Luka Modrić
- Mateo Kovacic

**DEFENDERS**
- Nacho
- Daniel Carvajal
- Pepe
- Raphael Varane

### KEY FEATURES
- **4-4-2 or 4-3-3 with twin screen midfielders**
- **Flowing attacking moves**
- **Attacking midfield running around opponents**, Benzema the predator
- **Physical power and Ronaldo's dead-ball winning in opponents' half**

### COACH

**Carlo Ancelotti**

**Born:** 10/06/1959  
**Reggiana (ITA)**  
**Nationality:** Italian

**Matches to UEFA Champions League:** 150

**Head coach from:** 01/07/2013

### STATISTICS

#### PLAYERS USED

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### TEAM PROFILES

**TEAM SHAPE**

- **4-4-2 or 4-3-3 with twin screen midfielders**
- **Flowing attacking moves**
- **Attacking midfield running around opponents**, Benzema the predator

**KEY FEATURES**

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**COACH**

**Jens Keller**

**Born:** 24/11/1970, Stuttgart (GER)  
**Nationality:** German

**Matches to UEFA Champions League:** 10

**Head coach from:** 10/12/2012

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FC ZENIT
Russia

TEAM SHAPE

COACH
Luciano Spalletti
Born: 07/05/1959,
Cetano (PI)
Nationality: Italian
Matches in
UEFA Champions League: 4-4
Head coach from:
11/12/2009 to 10/07/2014

TEAM PROFILES

Group stage fallers

The fact that SSC Napoli were eliminated with 12 points while FC Zenit qualified with six underlines the difficulties when it comes to searching for common denominators among the 16 teams who made an exit from the competition in December. In recent seasons, the clear trend towards a possession-based passing game has been interrelated with the pre-Christmas exits of teams whose statistics suggested a more direct attacking style based on a slimmer share of the ball and lower numbers of passes.

In the 2012/13 season, 14 teams averaged less than 50% of possession and none of them were among the group stage fallers. During the 2013/14 campaign, the number of teams averaging a smaller share of the ball than their opponents rose to 18 – a majority of the 12 starters. Nine of them were eliminated after the group stage, which meant that more than half of the teams which successfully negotiated the group and played in the knockout rounds also averaged less than 50% of the ball. There is still a case for arguing that greater possession lays foundations for greater success in the competition, but the evidence in 2013/14 became much more tenuous. In Group G, debutants FK Austria Wien (averaging 40% of possession) ended level on five points with FC Porto (59% of the ball).

In terms of passing, a similarly contradictory story could be told. In recent seasons, the figure of 500 passes per match has been used as a benchmark to distinguish ball-playing style or philosophy.

In the 2012/13 season, 14 teams that averaged less than 50% of possession and as many as nine of them were among the group stage fallers. During the 2013/14 campaign, the number of teams averaging a smaller share of the ball than their opponents rose to 18 – a majority of the 12 starters. Nine of them were eliminated after the group stage, which meant that more than half of the teams which successfully negotiated the group and played in the knockout rounds also averaged less than 50% of the ball. There is still a case for arguing that greater possession lays foundations for greater success in the competition, but the evidence in 2013/14 became much more tenuous. In Group G, debutants FK Austria Wien (averaging 40% of possession) ended level on five points with FC Porto (59% of the ball).

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**AFC AJAX**
Netherlands

**RSC ANDERLECHT**
Belgium

---

### AFC AJAX

**Players Used:** 22

**Goals Scored:** 5

**Goals Against:**

- **1st:** 78 (80 on Target) + 15 (13 on Target) per game

**Substitutions:** 18/18

**Averages**

- **Possession:** 54% (Max. 61% vs Barcelona)
- **Passes Attempted:** 628 (Max. 764 vs Barcelona)
- **Passing Accuracy:** 78% (Max. 82% vs Barcelona)
- **Team Distance Covered:** 119,333 metres (Max. 122,845 vs Celtic)
- **Team Shape:**
  - Short 120 (25%)
  - Medium 282 (59%)
  - Long 73 (15% of total)

**Goals in Squad List:**
- **Goalkeepers:**
  - Kenneth Vermeer: 90
  - Jasper Cillessen: 90
- **Defenders:**
  - Ricardo van Rhijn: 90
  - Nicklas Moisander: 73
- **Midfielders:**
  - Daley Blind: 90
  - Davy Klaassen: 83
- **Forwards:**
  - Siem de Jong: 59
  - Lerin Duarte: 90

**Passes Per Game:**
- **Long:** 83 (13% of total)
- **Medium:** 417 (66%)
- **Short:** 128 (20%)

**Statistics:**

- **Goals Scored:**
  - Frank de Boer: 5

**Team Profile:**

**Goalkeeper:**
- Kenneth Vermeer: 90

**Defender:**
- Ricardo van Rhijn: 90

**Midfielder:**
- Daley Blind: 90

**Forward:**
- Siem de Jong: 59

---

### RSC ANDERLECHT

**Players Used:** 21

**Goals Scored:** 4

**Goals Against:**

- **1st:** 62 (63 on Target) + 10.5 (10 on Target) per game

**Substitutions:** 15/18

**Averages**

- **Possession:** 43% (Max. 55% vs Olympiacos)
- **Passes Attempted:** 475 (Max. 533 vs Olympiacos)
- **Passing Accuracy:** 70% (Max. 80% vs Olympiacos)
- **Team Distance Covered:** 111,547 metres (Max. 113,465 vs Benfica)
- **Team Shape:**
  - Short 120 (25%)
  - Medium 282 (59%)
  - Long 73 (15% of total)

**Goals in Squad List:**
- **Goalkeepers:**
  - Silvio Proto: 90
- **Defenders:**
  - Fabrice N'Sakala: 90
  - Olivier Deschacht: 90
- **Midfielders:**
  - Davy Roef: 90
  - Bram Nuytinck: 90
- **Forwards:**
  - Anthony Vanden Borre: 90

**Passes Per Game:**
- **Long:** 73 (15% of total)
- **Medium:** 282 (59%)
- **Short:** 120 (25%)

**Statistics:**

- **Goals Scored:**
  - Frank de Boer: 4

**Team Profile:**

**Goalkeeper:**
- Silvio Proto: 90

**Defender:**
- Fabrice N'Sakala: 90

**Midfielder:**
- Davy Roef: 90

**Forward:**
- Anthony Vanden Borre: 90

---

**2013/14 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT**

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FK AUSTRIA WIEN

Austria

PLAYERS USED

GOAL ATTREPTS: 19 GOALS SCORED: 5

TIME SCORED

1-15 16-30 31-45 45+ 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

SUBSTITUTIONS: 1/8/18 (includes late double substitution)

0 0 0 0

AVERAGES

POSSESSION: 51% PASSES ATTEMPTED: 470 TEAM DISTANCE COVERED: 118.8 km

PASSING ACCURACY: 65% PASSING ATTEMPTED: 760 TEAM DISTANCE COVERED: 131.07 km

TEAM SHAPE

COACH

Nenad Bjelica

Born: 20/05/1973, Doboj (BiH)
Nationality: Croatian
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 5
Head coach from: 17/03/2013

FC BASEL 1893

Switzerland

TEAM PROFILES

PLAYERS USED

GOAL ATTREPTS: 19 GOALS SCORED: 5

TIME SCORED

1-15 16-30 31-45 45+ 46-60 61-75 76-90 90+

SUBSTITUTIONS: 18/18 (includes late double substitution)

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AVERAGES

POSSESSION: 53% PASSES ATTEMPTED: 585 TEAM DISTANCE COVERED: 111.46 km

PASSING ACCURACY: 74% PASSING ATTEMPTED: 816 TEAM DISTANCE COVERED: 132.17 km

TEAM SHAPE

COACH

Murat Yakin

Born: 15/05/1969, Basel (Su) Nationality: Swiss
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 6
Head coach from: 15/10/2012

Forward

MK Odd 1 1 1 1

David Degen 0 0 0 0

Philipp Sutry 0 0 0 0

Defenders

Goalkeepers

Jan Sommer 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

Mariano Valadon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Midfielders

Goalkeepers

Bojan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Marko Stankovic 1 90 90 90 90 90 90

Forwards

Nikola Đorđević 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

Ivan Perišić 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

FC BASEL 1893 Swisswitzerland

TEAM PROFILES

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Forward

MK Odd 1 1 1 1

David Degen 0 0 0 0

Philipp Sutry 0 0 0 0

Defenders

Goalkeepers

Jan Sommer 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

Mariano Valadon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Midfielders

Goalkeepers

Bojan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Marko Stankovic 1 90 90 90 90 90 90

Forwards

Nikola Đorđević 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

Ivan Perišić 90 90 90 90 90 90 90

FK AUSTRIA WIEN Austria
SL BENFICA
Portugal

TEAM SHAPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEAM SHAPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short 131 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium 330 (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long 68 (13% of total)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Possession: 48%
- Passe attempted: 529
- Passing accuracy: 74%
- Team distance covered: Min. 135,954 meters
- Max. 195,915 meters
- Possession: Min. 41% v Olympiacos (a)
- Max. 73% v Ajax (h)
- Possession: Min. 52% v PSG (a)
- Max. 68% v Manchester City (a)

STATISTICS

**PLAYERS USED**

- Goal attempts: 9
- Goals scored: 3

**GOALS SCORED**

- 1-0, 1-1, 2-0, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 3-0, 3-1, 4-1

**TIME SCORED**

- 1-15, 16-30, 31-45, Half-time, 46-60, 61-75, 76-90, 90+

**TEAM SHAPE**

- Position:
  - 1 Fraser Forster
  - 24 Lukas Zebrowski

**Defenders**

- 23 Mikael Lustig
- 5 Virgil van Dijk
- 4 Efe Ambrose
- 90 90 90 90

**Midfielders**

- 41 Darnell Fisher
- 16 Joe Ledley
- 11 Derk Boerrigter
- 17 Amido Baldé
- 18 Tom Rogic

**Forwards**

- 49 James Forrest
- 20 Teemu Pukki

**Matches**

- Blue = home; Grey = away

- Numbers in the squad list refer to minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**Team profiles**

- Jorge Jesus
  - Born: 26/07/1954, Amadora (POR)
  - Nationality: Portuguese
  - Matches in UEFA Champions League: 20
  - Head coach from: 16/06/2009

**COACH**

- Neil Lennon
  - Born: 25/06/1971, Lurgan (NIR)
  - Nationality: Northern Irish
  - Matches in UEFA Champions League: 14
  - Head coach from: 25/01/2010

CELTIC FC
Scotland

**TEAM SHAPE**

- Short 107 (25%)
- Medium 248 (58%)
- Long 5 (12%)

**TEAM SHAPE**

- Position:
  - 1 Fraser Forster
  - 24 Lukas Zebrowski

**Defenders**

- 23 Mikael Lustig
- 5 Virgil van Dijk
- 4 Efe Ambrose
- 90 90 90 90

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**AVERAGES**

- Passes per game: Min. 108,858 v Olympiacos (h)
- Max. 118,862 v Anderlecht (h)
- Team distance covered: Min. 35% v PSG (a)
- Max. 55% v Olympiacos (a)
- Possession: Min. 105,599 v Barcelona (a)
- Max. 111,515 v Ajax (a)
- Passing accuracy: Min. 70% v Milan (h)
- Max. 75% v Milan (h)
- Passes attempted: Min. 105,599 v Barcelona (a)
- Max. 111,515 v Ajax (a)
- Goals scored: 60
- Assists: 25

**Team profiles**

- Jorge Jesus
  - Born: 26/07/1954, Amadora (POR)
  - Nationality: Portuguese
  - Matches in UEFA Champions League: 20
  - Head coach from: 16/06/2009

**COACH**

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2013/14 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE TECHNICAL REPORT

PFC CSKA MOSKVA
Russia

Averages

PASSES ATTEMPTED 112
PASSING ACCURACY 74%
TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 1,543,395 metres
TEAM SHAPE

POSESSION 42%
TEAM SHAPES USED

PLAYERS USED 20
GOALS SCORED 8

TEAM SHAPE

GOAL ATTEMPTS 18 (6 on target) = 1.1 (0.7) per game
TIME SCORED

G A BAY PLZ MC MC BAY PLZ

GA

G A BAY PLZ MC MC BAY PLZ

TEAM PROFILES

Defenders

1 Sergei Cheychugov
5 Viktor Varin
16 Aleksei Berezutski
16 Kirill Nababkin
24 Vasili Berezutski
45 Georgi Schennikov
14 Kirill Nababkin

Midfielders

1 Sergei Chepchugov
31 Vitinho
23 Georgi Milanov
22 Andrea Pirlo

Attackers

8 Seydou Doumbia
10 Alan Dzagoev
11 Paolo De Ceglie
14 Fernando Llorente

Goalkeepers

30 Marco Storari
4 Martín Cáceres
20 Simone Padoin

TEAM PROFILES

JUVENTUS
Italy

Averages

PASSES ATTEMPTED 219
PASSING ACCURACY 77%
TEAM DISTANCE COVERED 1,136,672 metres*
TEAM SHAPE

POSESSION 52%
TEAM SHAPES USED

PLAYERS USED 21
GOALS SCORED 9

TEAM SHAPE

GOAL ATTEMPTS 29 (7 on target) = 1.7 (0.7) per game
TIME SCORED

G A KOB GAL RM RM KOB GAL

GA

G A KOB GAL RM RM KOB GAL

TEAM PROFILES

Defenders

4Sergei Ignashevich
3 Angelo Ogbonna
13 Federico Peluso
19 Leonardo Bonucci

Midfielders

8 Claudio Marchisio
21 Andrea Pirlo
33 Mauricio Isla

Attackers

10 Carlos Tévez
9 Mirko Vučinić
14 Fernando Llorente

Goalkeepers

30 Gianluigi Buffon
13 Federico Peluso
49 Angelo Ogbonna

TEAM PROFILES

Antonio Conte
Born: 31/07/1964
Lecce (ITA)
Nationality: Italian
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 10
Head coach from 22/03/2011

Leoneid Slutski
Born: 04/03/1973
Volgograd (RUS)
Nationality: Russian
Matches in UEFA Champions League: 21
Head coach from 26/10/2009

COACH

Sections in the squad list refer to minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists; so = sent off; s = substitution; s = suspended; I = injured/ill; so = sent off; Match: Start (on) / Substituted (off)
**FC København**

Denmark

**Players Used**

- **GOALS SCORED**: 6

**Goalkeeper**
- 21 Johan Wiland (90' 0 90 90 90 90 90)

**Defender**
- 31 Jakob Jersing (0 0 0 0 0 0 0)

**Midfielder**
- 18 Nicolai Jørgensen (90' 90 90 90 90)

**Forward**
- 29 Mathias Valbuena (90' 90 90 90 90 90 90)

**Statistics**

**Goals Attempted**: 46 (27 on target) = 8 (4.5) per game

**Possession**: 44%

**Passes Attempted**: 531

**Goal Attempts**: 46

**Goal Attempts**: 46 (27 on target) = 8 (4.5) per game

**Time Scored**: 1

**Substitutions**: 18/18

**Average**

- **Distance Covered**: 138,191 metres
- **Average**: 3.30 (88%)

**Team Profile**

**Coach**: Ståle Solbakken

Born: 27/05/1966

**Nationality**

Norwegian

**Matches in UEFA Champions League**: 20

**Head Coach from**: 21/08/2015

---

**Olympique de Marseille**

France

**Players Used**

- **GOALS SCORED**: 5

**Goalkeeper**
- 16 Brice Samba (90 90 90 90 90 90)

**Defender**
- 30 Steve Mandanda (90 90 90 90 90)

**Midfielder**
- 29 Laurent Agorom (90 90 90 90 90)

**Forward**
- 20 Rod Fanni (90 90 90 90 90)

**Statistics**

**Goals Attempted**: 513

**Goal Attempts**: 513

**Possession**: 47%

**Passing Accuracy**: 72%

**Time Scored**: 1

**Substitutions**: 18/18

**Average**

- **Distance Covered**: 100,551 metres
- **Average**: 7h (15% of total)

**Team Profile**

**Coach**: Elie Baup

Born: 17/05/1955

**Nationality**

French

**Matches in UEFA Champions League**: 10

**Head Coach from**: 04/07/2012 to 07/12/2013

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**Team Profiles**
SSC NAPOLI

Italy

FC VIKTORIA PLZEŇ

Czech Republic

TEAM PROFILES
FC SHAKHTAR DONETSK
Ukraine

FC STEAUA BUCUREŞTI
Romania

**Statistics**

**Players Used**

**Goals Scored**

**Time Scored**

**Substitutions**

**Averages**

**Passes Per Game**

**Team Shape**

**Coach**

**Team Profiles**