Women's Champions League Performance Insights: Managing wing-back threats
Friday, December 12, 2025
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UEFA Technical Observer Tanya Oxtoby delves deeper into the tactical battle between Paris Saint-Germain and OH Leuven on Matchday 5 of the UEFA Women's Champions League.
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OH Leuven's approach in order to nullify Paris Saint-Germain was multi-pronged and the Belgian guests fought hard to earn a point in the French capital.
Tanya Oxtoby breaks down the tactical battle, first highlighting OH Leuven's high press at the beginning of the game: "In their high press they went player for player, stayed really narrow behind the ball in their defensive shape behind that, waited for the ball to go longer, and their shape forced Paris SG to play longer. I really liked their aggression in the front phase of the pitch; they were brave, going player for player in the first two lines."
"It caused Paris SG problems in terms of being able to penetrate with any combinations and forced them to go a little bit longer than maybe they would have liked to."
Secondly, OH Leuven were well organised in the other defensive phases, particularly in how their back four worked to deal with Paris SG's wing-backs in the 3-5-2. The full-backs stayed compact but adjusted their positions well to jump out and apply pressure when needed.
"The thing that really helped in this phase to deal with the wing-backs was the fluidity of their shape. They weren't too rigid, so they were still able to get pressure on the ball in wide areas by trying to lock out and make play predictable and then jumping once the ball went into the outer corridor. The full-back was able to go from being really narrow to jumping out, arriving on the first touch, and really trying to force Paris SG to go backwards rather than allowing them time and space to exploit in forward areas."
One of the most important ingredients for the back line to be able to work well together is communication. "It's all about communication, and that understanding of the roles and responsibilities. If you've got those two elements, then the timing of when to step out becomes really easy. And of course, the athleticism to do that too, because without that, you're not going to be able to get pressure on the ball in the right areas."
The full-backs' aggressive jumps inevitably created gaps, and Paris SG worked hard to exploit them with deep penetrative runs, either through balls or combination play. Oxtoby explains: "Paris SG tried to really maximise the width and really stretch OH Leuven's back line. Not only did they maintain maximum width, they had their wing-backs go really high to pin the full-backs and then drop low to drag them out of position.
"That high-to-low movement drew the full-backs out, and then midfield runners looked to exploit that inner corridor or half-space. They had a lot of success with that in the first 15 or 20 minutes, disrupting the back four and creating pockets of space to play into and get in behind."
Even when Paris SG played through, OH Leuven often got numbers back and blocked shots or delayed the attacks long enough to recover.
Overall, OH Leuven adapted quickly, using both midfielders and wingers to help cover those dangerous inside runs. Oxtoby notes: "There was definitely collaboration between the wingers and the full-backs. If the winger could get pressure on and stop the full-back being dragged out, that was the preference. But if the full-back was out, the winger dropped into that space. And if there was a deep runner from midfield, they looked to track those runners."
As the match developed, Paris SG leaned more heavily on switches of play to target OH Leuven's full-backs 1v1 or deliver crosses from wide areas. Oxtoby observes: "I think there was a really clear message at half-time around the switches for Paris SG: being more patient in their creation phase, taking extra opportunities to switch and not crowding the space once they entered the finishing phase. Leaving their wing-backs or wide players in 1v1 situations gave them space to attack and if it wasn't on, they recycled to draw OH Leuven to one side before switching quickly to the opposite side."
Finally, in the closing 20 minutes of the match, Paris SG shifted to a 4-3-3, pushing more players into the box and creating greater danger from wide deliveries. Oxtoby explains that "the change of shape meant that they had a lot more numbers in the box and when they were delivering the ball in, Paris SG were winning a lot more first contacts. It also allowed Paris SG to get a better counter-press and get second, third and fourth-phase opportunities."
OH Leuven found it harder to escape, relying heavily on last-ditch defending: "Paris SG definitely loaded the box. I think they had four in what I would call the gold zone or the best-scoring zone when they were delivering crosses. They were winning first and second contacts in there and causing all sorts of problems. But it's that emergency last-ditch defending, winning or picking up the second balls if you can, making sure that you're 1v1 defending and your shot blocking is spot on in the box as well."
Coaching focus – different strategies to deal with opposition wing-backs: Lessons from Paris SG vs OH Leuven
The encounter also offered a clear example of what elite sides face when confronting the modern back-five systems. For Leuven, the challenge was two-fold: coping with Paris SG's athletic, aggressive wing-backs while also finding ways to impose themselves despite spending long periods without the ball.
As UEFA Technical Observer Lydia Bedford explains, dealing with wing-backs is fundamentally a question of moments, areas and decision-making.
"When playing against a back five and working out who is responsible for the wing-backs, it is important to divide the pitch up into areas and the game into moments," Bedford notes. For Leuven, this required constant adaptability depending on where Paris SG's wing-backs positioned themselves and how quickly they switched the play.
Bedford outlines three decisive moments that frame every decision
- Good numbers + good pressure
- Unbalanced numbers + good pressure
- Unbalanced numbers + poor pressure
"In moments where you have good numbers, you would coach the team to commit to the press and go together." That means full-backs stepping out aggressively, even if it exposes space behind them.
But when the numbers are unbalanced, the risk-reward equation changes. "In moments where you have an underload but players read triggers well and are pressing aggressively then it's a risk but worth the reward if you commit to hunt the ball together."
When the team is unbalanced, decision-making skills become key as the situation needs analysing and a decision needs to be made whether to press or stay compact and reorganise.
This was evident against Paris SG, a team capable of punishing any mistimed jump or exposed channel. Bedford stresses that against such wing-back systems: "A real priority when pressing would be keeping play wide. You need to commit numbers to deal with the wide area, but be smart in ensuring that players can't easily turn and switch play to the opposite wing-back."
Bedford categorises wing-back behaviour into three areas
- Low wing-backs
- Half-space wing-backs
- High wing-backs
When the wing-back is low, Bedford says: "The full-back can only commit if we have good numbers and good pressure. It's a big distance for them to travel." And it may be more efficient for the winger to continue the press with support from the striker to prevent Paris SG from switching back inside.
The half-space wing-back generates the most complex decisions: "These are the key decision-making moments, where full-backs need to quickly assess the moment in play to decide whether they commit to jump, and everyone else needs to be ready to deal with the space left behind them." Leuven needed not only alert full-backs but coordinated cover from midfield to track Paris SG's inside-to-outside runners.
When the wing-back is high and behaving like a winger, Bedford notes that "It's easier positionally for the full-back to take care of the wing-back," but this comes with another danger: "The opposition can exploit 2v1s in wide areas, so it is important to have good cover from your midfielders and ball-side wide player." Paris SG's attempts to isolate Leuven created exactly these dilemmas.
One alternative strategy Bedford highlights involves using midfielders to press the wing-back: "This is more utilised against a 3-4-3 formation, as the team has fewer central players and often the full-back can be pinned in."
Coaching the strategy through the week
How to coach these complex scenarios? "The strategies you employ to prepare your team are very dependent on the time between games and number of training sessions available. It would be important to layer the information and use a mixture of team and unit meetings," says Bedford.
In a normal week, she would dedicate Tuesday to in-possession work and Thursday to out-of-possession. In the OOP meeting, Bedford would "paint an overview of key game moments and areas of the pitch" and emphasise preventing switches. Unit meetings then dive into detail "to spotlight some key areas focused around how we deal with the space our full-back leaves."
On the pitch, Bedford focuses on two key principles:
1. "Locking play one side and preventing switches."
2. "Dealing with the space left by the full-back jumping: communication/tracking and organisation to defend this space."
"Point 1 can be brought out in a number of more tempo-based practices, through delivering switching play possession focused drills which incentivise keeping play locked in wide channels.
"Point 2 would be harder to set up on the pitch, but I would design a phase of play which encourages the opposition creating overloads in wide channels with half-space runs. I would consider locking the centre-backs into central channels so that they can't be the solution to the wide overload. It might require a fixed start position with a switch of play where the full-back makes the wrong decision to jump and then the team are forced to defend the overload."
Use of telestration
The analyst also plays a vital role, providing "clear annotated clips to support both the team and the units to understand the concepts they will face.
"Clearly annotated clips which can highlight runs and trends from the opponent are helpful for creating clarity for players. The analysis would ensure that unit clips create more discussion points and, where needed, support individuals with additional clips."
An Australian defender known for her leadership and composure, Tanya Oxtoby played both in her homeland and in the UK before moving into coaching. She has held prominent roles in English women's football and internationally; she had assistant coaching duties with Scotland and Chelsea, was in charge of the Northern Ireland women's national team and has most recently been appointed as manager of Newcastle United Women.
Lydia Bedford is an English football coach known for managing women's teams in the FA Women's Super League, leading England youth sides, and breaking ground as the first female coach to coach a professional men's side, Under-18s at Brentford. She is currently head coach at Calgary Wild FC.
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