Europa League Performance Insights: How Unai Emery's tactical adjustments delivered a European masterclass
Monday, May 11, 2026
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UEFA Technical Observer Willi Ruttensteiner analyses Aston Villa coach Unai Emery's big calls in their UEFA Europa League semi-final decider win against Nottingham Forest.
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Trailing 1-0 after the first leg of their UEFA Europa League semi-final tie, Aston Villa needed a controlled but aggressive performance to overturn Nottingham Forest and book a place in their first European final since 1982.
Forest, meanwhile, were aiming to reach their first continental final since lifting the European Cup in 1980. What followed was a display that encapsulated everything Villa coach Unai Emery has built his reputation on: meticulous preparation, tactical adaptability and an impressive competitive mentality.
As UEFA Technical Observer Willi Ruttensteiner observed, "It started from the beginning of the game: it was an excellent match plan from Emery. He adapted to the Forest team and to the game. The mentality to win this game from the first minute was impressive, and it was equally clear for the team and for all involved people." Indeed, this was discussed in our previous article Europa League analysis.
Experience and tactical adjustments
Emery's know-how in Europe is unmatched. With four Europa League titles, he has repeatedly shown an ability to tailor plans to two-legged ties. Against Forest, he paired his own expertise with one of the most experienced starting 11s Villa have fielded in years.
The average age of the side was 29 years and 329 days, the club's oldest team in a major knockout match since 2001. Even Morgan Rogers, at 23 the youngest starter, already carries significant high-level experience.
Ruttensteiner also highlighted the importance of Emiliano Martínez in goal: "He was a leader on the pitch, and really super from the first to the last minute. Not just [important] for the big saves. He provided safety for the whole game."
As can be seen in the video above, Forest's 4-4-1-1 structure caused Villa problems in the first leg, particularly through Igor Jesus operating between the lines behind the central striker.
Ruttensteiner explained why this role is so difficult to defend: "Knowing Nottingham Forest play 4-4-1-1, it is always difficult to know who is responsible for the player behind the target striker."
In the return leg, Emery introduced Victor Lindelöf as a holding midfielder. Lindelöf had played primarily as a centre-back or in a conventional back four throughout the campaign, but here Emery used him as a specialist screen in front of the defence.
Ruttensteiner praised the move: "Emery surprised with the selection of Lindelöf, and in hindsight it proved to be an excellent tactical move. Lindelöf operated as a classic holding midfielder in front of the back four, reading and anticipating the game very well.
"Out of possession he closed the centre intelligently and largely neutralised Igor Jesus playing behind the target striker. Whenever one of the central defenders stepped out wide, he also understood how to cover and occupy the vacated position."
Lindelöf finished with three interceptions, more than any other Villa player.
Lindelöf's positioning to support the back line
• Prevented Forest from finding their supporting striker between the lines
• Provided cover whenever Villa's centre-backs stepped out to engage
One particular strength of Forest is their ability to break at speed after regaining possession. Emery's response was immediate, coordinated pressure the moment Villa lost the ball.
Ruttensteiner noted how effectively Villa nullified this threat: "The counterpress was excellent. It was immediately one, two players near to the ball, pressing and man-marking behind, so it was not possible for Nottingham Forest to play their usual transition game."
Whenever attacks developed, enough players remained positioned to compress the space around the ball, lock onto Forest's nearest outlets and protect against direct balls into depth. This structure allowed Villa to recover possession high up the pitch and sustain pressure.
Just as importantly, it created attacking opportunities. Three of Villa's four goals stemmed from regains and quick transitions, turning defensive organisation into offensive momentum.
Attacking structure enables individual brilliance
Villa's attacking structure was built on a nominal 4-2-3-1, but in possession it regularly transformed into a 3-2-5 or 2-3-5. As Ruttensteiner described, "Structurally, they were very fluid and direct in possession (the base shape was a 4-2-3-1 that often morphed into a 3-2-5 or 2-3-5 in attack)." This organisation can be seen in the graphic below.
This shape gave Villa:
• A double pivot securing transitions
• Narrow attacking midfielders overloading centrally
• Full-backs providing width
• Aggressive counterpressing after losing possession
One of Villa's key objectives was to force Forest's defensive block to make impossible choices. Ruttensteiner explained: "Villa's spacing in possession was very effective. Strikers played central, Emiliano Buendía moved inside from left, John McGinn was in the inside-right half-space and Lucas Digne held the width high on the flank.
"That stretched Forest horizontally. Once Forest narrowed to stop the combinations inside, Lucas Digne had space to progress on the outside."
As a result, Villa then had the option to attack both inside and outside, preventing Forest from settling into a compact block.
Ruttensteiner highlighted how John McGinn's performance was a textbook example of how Emery uses midfielders to attack space late: "Villa repeatedly created numerical advantages between the lines (2v1, 3v2, 4v3 situations). John McGinn constantly drifted inside and occupied the half-space rather than hugging the touchline. His late runs into the box were classic Emery patterns. Both of his goals came because he started deeper and attacked space after Forest's midfield collapsed."
By beginning in deeper positions, McGinn avoided close marking and arrived into the penalty area at precisely the right moment. These delayed movements are difficult to track because defenders are naturally drawn to the initial ball carrier and central forwards.
If McGinn was the chief runner, Buendía was the player who threaded Villa's attacks together. Ruttensteiner said: "Buendía was the key connector and creator in possession, playing as a free No10. He played a decisive role in the opening goal with outstanding individual quality and converted the penalty for the second with composure and mental strength.
"He played intelligently between lines, receiving on the half-turn and combining in tight spaces. He understood it brilliantly, moving left to combine with the left full-back or drifting inside to create triangles and overloads."
His influence was decisive both creatively and psychologically.
The crucial importance of set pieces
Another major feature of Villa's dominance was their work from dead-ball situations. Ruttensteiner highlighted the importance of "preparation of the coach focusing on set pieces. When you analyse the set pieces, you could feel a goal was coming.
"Villa created quality scoring opportunities with a lot of variations and creativity (multiple routines, well prepared and trained). The delivery quality was high, while the players' movement and timing were well coordinated."
As can be seen in the video below, "Villa understood how to overload or to move and isolate defenders. The decisive 2-0 goal came from a well-rehearsed corner routine that led to a penalty, which was then confidently converted by Buendía."
Villa varied their routines to attack different zones, manipulated Forest's marking assignments and consistently generated high-quality chances. The second goal, stemming from a rehearsed corner sequence, was a tangible reward for that preparation.
Combined with a highly experienced team and a collective mentality set from the opening whistle, Villa produced a performance of genuine European pedigree.
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